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The author employs research skills from law, history and religion in 
order to present an account of the relations of law and religion in Oregon's 
history from its earliest days to the present. 
Oregon is considered by its leading historians to be affected 
periodically by religious and racial prejudice. The salient example is the 
period of Ku Klux Klan dominance in the 1920s and the Oregon School Bill. 
The management of church-state relations has generated a larger number of 
cases and controversies than most lawyers and historians realize. Using 
techniques and insights employed by historian-lawyers such as Mark De Wolf 
Howe and Orville Zabel, the author examines in detail, case by case and sect 
by sect, the development of principles of church-state relations in Oregon. 
Zabel, in his history of Nebraska's church-state development, had opined that 
Nebraska's history was that of the nation writ small. He concluded that 
American jurisdictions had essentially followed a common path. The Oregon 
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example suggests otherwise. Howe has demonstrated the wide variety of 
forms church-state management took in American jurisdictions and suggested a 
rationale for some convergence among the States in form. 
However, what each demonstrates upon examination is how each 
jurisdiction had a wide range of choices, and that wide experimentation was 
and continues, in spite of the homogenizing pressures of the federal 
courts, to be the rule. 
Howe predicted that the concept of equality of treatment, which he 
saw as the dominant theme of 20th Century law and politics, would have the 
effect of so broadening the definitions of religious groups as to eventually 
remove the protections afforded them when the definition was more narrow. 
Finally, in recent years the United States Supreme Court, reversing a 
pattern of at least thirty years, has begun to defer again to the States in 
such Constitutional areas as religion. States, Oregon being a leading example, 
have responded with increasingly independent interpretations of their own 
Constitutions. This reversion to state court law-making has created a need 
for detailed state histories of religion and law. 
The author presents the major themes, events and persona of Oregon's 
legal-religious history. He examines education, enforcement of morality, 
taxation and exemption, the treatment of minority religious groups, and the 
rise of professional interest groups. Legal sources such as court decisions, 
Attorney General opinions and statutes are assembled, assessed and annotated. 
Church histories, theses on Oregon religious groups, biographies and memoirs of 
leading actors are carefully reviewed. Special attention is given to Oregon's 
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Constitutional development on religion and to the Oregon School Bill, which 
set a national precedent for religious liberty while simultaneously expanding 
the federal role. 
The author concludes that a combination--the expansion of the roles of 
state and federal governments, the rise in taxation, religious prejudice 
(especially anti-Catholic prejudice), the progressive secularization of legal 
rationales and public fora, the impulse to equalize treatment of religious and 
non-religious groups--have all converged in Oregon. That combination has left 
the law in appearance and in fact not only unfriendly to religion, but in many 
areas seemingly on the attack against it. Because U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions establish a minimum to which states must adhere, state independence 
can only be directed toward further restriction of religion. Whatever the 
reality, state institutions will therefore appear to be more unfriendly than the 
federal. The general animus against special deference to religious groups 
overarches and contributes to the special actions which, when taken against 
this church or that, seem to display only special bias. While anti-Catholic 
prejudice, e.g., is real and important, it is not sufficient explanation for the 
state's persistent extreme separationist trend. 
The author suggests that a correct reading of the history of Oregon 
Constitutional foundations and of the practices of its people should result in a 
more accommodationist attitude on the part of Oregon's legal entities. 
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Oregon cases, opinions, laws, and law review articles are given in the 
bibliography with full citation and annotation. This information is not 
repeated in the text save where necessary. The reader should refer to the 
bibliography for fuller information on sources, using the name of the case, or 
the year for Attorney General Opinions and laws. 
" ..• the religion clauses of the First Amendment were intended to erect "a 
wall of separation between church and state" ••• (which) must remain "high and 
impregnable"". 
Jefferson's Danbury Letter and 
Eversonl 
"the line of separation, far from being a 'wall', is a blurred, and indistinct, 
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship." 
Chief Justice Burger in Lemon2 
"Something there is that doesn't love a wall." 
Robert Frost, Mending wan3 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically the church-state controversy has been in the United States 
largely confined to the state level. 4 Only in the years since 1941 has the area 
of church-state matters become federalized through decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court.5 Recently, however, that court has seemed to be 
adopting a more accommodationist role. It has deferred to the states in this 
and other constitutional areas. The result has been an increased attention to 
the resolution of church-state matters within the states. 
This thesis presents a summary of Oregon history relating to the 
·interaction of law and religion, and presents analysis of the causes of the 
major events and trends. In so doing, it seeks to show the proper approach 
and mix of disciplinary skills needed for the handling of such a history. 
There have been surveys of church-state law on a national basis. 
Sanford Cobb's -i_902 The Rise of Religious Liberty6 is a good survey not only 
of the law at that time but, as importantly, of the conceptions then prevailing 
of the nature and sources of that law. It was clear to Cobb, as to the 
leading 19th century scholars, that the federal constitution did not apply to 
the states and that states had a wide range of discretion in how they managed 
church-state relations. Carl Zollman's 1933 American Church Law7 reassessed 
legal developments: in 1933, church-state law was still a matter for 
regulation by the states only. In the 1940s Anson Phelps Stokes published 
Church and State in the United States,8 a strongly separationist history which 
began to identify the federal intervention into church-state law. In later 
editions, co-author Leo Pfeffer of the American Jewish Congress, a noted 
separationist lawyer and scholar, would update the work and emphasize 
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separationist themes and trends. 
Other surveys, such as those of Charles Antieu, Religion Under the 
State Comtitutiom (1955) and Conrad Moehlman's The American Comtitutiom 
and Religion (1938) provide basic data and some good but dated analysis.9 
Writers on church-state relations in the past three decades have largely 
focused on the development of federal constitutional law, with the result that 
current sources on state law and development tend to be dated and of limited 
usefulness. 
Two especially fine works portray at the national level the major actors 
in church-state cases. 10 Separationist and accommodationist groups there 
have become so aware of each other and so formalized that their strategies 
and conflicts have been described as an involved minuet. Frank Sorauf and 
Richard Morgan have each carefully studied the litigants and their strategies, 
as carefully orchestrated as that of the plaintiffs in the desegration cases 
which led to Brown v Board of Education.11 At the state level, however, 
there exist more actors and less coordination. Indeed chaos is not an inapt 
term. Local chapters of national groups such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), local Catholic bishops and schools, local public school boards 
and private citizens act with both greater autonomy and greater irregularity. 
They will often have determined the facts or the agenda before the national 
protagonists can intervene. Thus some awareness of the national actors is 
necessary but not sufficient for Wlderstanding developments within a state. 
In 1955 Orville Zabel published his centennary God and caesar in 
Nebraska-Church and State 1854-1954. This excellent state history examines 
the development of church-state relations in Nebraska and contrasts that 
development with laws and practices elsewhere. 
It is appropriate for a comparable study to be done today, both because 
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so much change has occurred since 1955 and because the reversion to state 
constitutions has created a need for good state histories on critical 
constitutional subjects such as religion. Some members of the Oregon Supreme 
Court, and some Oregon scholars, have been seeking for over two decades to 
interpret the Oregon constitutional provisions on religion in a more strict and 
more separationist manner than the federal First Amendment. In so doing, 
they have appealed--the author believes incorrectly--to Oregon history, 
selecting, in the manner of lawyers, only those words or incidents which 
support their views. 
This thesis seeks to provide a firm base of information, so that Oregon 
scholars and lawyers will have a fuller account from which to draw. To make 
the work more useful, its bibliography includes annotated lists of Oregon 
cases, laws, attorney general opinions, and law review articles. The author 
has written at length on the Oregon School Bill in his 1984 thesis, The Oregon 
School Bill of 1922--Reevaluation,12 to which readers are directed for a fuller 
account and documentation than occurs here. 
Historians writing on Oregon have emphasized the persistence of racial 
and religious bigotry from its earliest days to the present. However, they 
have rarely focused on religious or legal matters. When they have done so, 
they have usually included significant errors of fact or perspective. This 
work, by joining legal, historical and religious perspectives, seeks to provide a 
corrective resource. It also identifies the unrepresentative nature of reported 
legal cases, and emphasizes the need to review the practices of the people, 
which may not conform to the supposed legal norms. Some writers speak of 
American church-state relations as a de facto establishment of Protestant 
Christianity.13 As separationist or secular visions of the preferred 
relationship have come to predominate, there has developed a cognitive 
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dissonance, a gap between the assertions by our courts as to what the law is 
or should be, and the practices of the people and many of their local 
institutions. It is a legal, a policy and a historical question just how much 
weight should be accorded to those persistent practices which court decisions 
have been slow to eliminate. A very few cases, using the method ·the author 
believes most appropriate, have assayed the practices of the people and their 
characteristic representatives as the best guide to what the law should be.14 
Lawyers know little of history and usually misuse it. 15 Historians know 
too little of law, and often misunderstand or misrepresent legal developments. 
Writers on religion often know little of either law or history save as it affects 
their sect. Historians generally give too little attention to religion.16 
By using the Oregon example, the author hopes to present the factors 
and methods of analysis which he believes show the full extent of church-state 
relations in all of their complexity. The method chosen is thematic, and 
necessarily involves some duplication, but references have been streamlined to 
facilitate reading and cross-reference. 
The author has a Roman Catholic upbringing, has served with boards and 
committees of the ACLU since the 1960s, and describes himself as belonging to 
the free exercise rather than the establishment, or rather anti-establishment, 
wing of the ACLU. He is also a strong believer in judicial restraint and that 
judges are to interpret and enforce laws but not to make them. This 
perennial conflict assumes a different label for each generation. These biases 
should be evident in the text, but readers who are unaware of these 
distinctions may find early mention of them helpful. In terms of the religion 
cases, Richard Morris characterizes these variations as separationist or 
accommodationist, but these terms merely describe directions on a continuum 
which some scholars, such as Howe, think may be circular.17 
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For purposes of this thesis, it seems not necessary to define religion, 
although such definitions are not unimportant to the subjects of this study. 
The courts, under the terms of equality of treatment and non-establishment, 
have been progressively widening the acceptable meaning of religion until it 
has become so broad as almost to lose meaning.19 Present definitions would 
prove unrecognizable to the founders of the state. Problems of definition 
have mostly proved unimportant in Oregon history. What has proved important 
is the distinction between denominational or sectarian religion, as opposed to 
non-denominational religion or religion as an integrative force (civil religion). 
Courts have routinely denied the former either funding or a role in state 
institutions, while retaining a place of honor for the latter. 
The sequence in this thesis is largely chronological across a range of 
important themes. Because state courts and other state personnel have often 
acted without apparent reflection, without awareness or consideration of state 
and national history, and at cross-purposes, some sections read unevenly. That 
style reflects the content, where a smooth narrative account would not do 
justice to the discontinuity of the events. Religious historian Martin Marty 
has described American religious history as a "chaos" or accumulation of 
"concurrent tumults" ,20 and suggested that a proper history can only proceed 
by first honestly naming its subject as chaos. Other sections such as the 
overview on constitutional development and the period of the Oregon School 
Bill lend themselves to a more traditional-appearing historical account. 
An attempt is made at the beginning of each chapter to set the 
background for its subjects and themes. It is critical to reflect that each 
choice might have been different. Decade by decade, A~erican (not to speak 
of foreign) examples presented a wide range of selections of differing methods 
of management of each area of church-state relations. 
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The range of choice remains wide even in the Oregon of the 1980s. 
Oregon's choices--how to shape church incorporations, how to limit church 
ownership of property, whether to fund church personnel or institutions, the 
manner and extent of tax exemptions--were not predetermined and could have 
been resolved in a number of other ways. This text seeks to show first what 
choices were made in Oregon, and then to provide some insight into them. 
Oregon is considered by its leading historians to be affected 
periodically by religious and racial prejudice. The salient example is the 
period of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and the passage of the Oregon School 
Bill. The management of church-state relations has generated a larger number 
of cases and controversies than most lawyers and historians realize. Using 
techniques and insights employed by lawyer-historians such as Zabel and Howe, 
this thesis examines in detail, case by case and sect by sect, the development 
of principles of church-state relations in Oregon. Zabel, in his history of 
Nebraska's church-state development, had opined that Nebraska's history was 
that of the nation writ small. He concluded that American jurisdictions had 
essentially followed a common path. The Oregon example suggests otherwise. 
Howe has demonstrated the wide variety the forms of church-state 
management took in American jurisdictions and suggested a rationale for some 
convergence among the states in form. However, what each demonstrates 
upon examination is how each jurisdiction had a wide range of choice and that 
wide experimentation was and continues, in spite of the homogenizing pressures 
of the federal courts, to be the rule. 
Howe predicted that the concept of equality of treatment, which he 
saw as the dominant theme of 20th century law and politics, would have the 
effect of so broadening the definitions of religious groups as eventually to 
remove the protections afforded them when the definition was more narrow. 
·! 
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That prediction is proving true. 
Finally, in recent years the United States Supreme Court, reversing a 
pattern of at least thirty years, has begun to defer again to the states in such 
constitutional areas as religion. 
responded with increasingly 
States, Oregon being a leading example, have 
independent interpretations of their own 
constitutions in order either to avoid federal dictation or to accept its 
invitation to independence. This reversion to state court law-making has 
created a need for detailed state histories of religion and law. 
This thesis presents the major themes, events and persons of Oregon's 
legal-religious history. It examines education, enforcement of morality, 
taxation and exemption, the treatment of minority religious groups, and the 
rise of professional interest groups. Legal sources such as court decisions, 
attorney general opinions and statutes are assembled, assessed and annotated. 
Church histories, theses on Oregon's religious groups, biographies and memoirs 
of leading actors are carefully reviewed. Special attention is given to 
Oregon's constitutional development on religion and to the Oregon School Bill, 
which set a national precedent for religious liberty while simultaneously 
expanding the federal role. 
A combination of factors--the expansion of the roles of state and 
federal governments, the rise in taxation attendant upon that expansion, 
religious (especially anti-Catholic) prejudice, the progressive secularization of 
public fora and of legal rationales, the impulse to equalize treatment of 
religious and non-religious groups--have all converged in Oregon. That 
combination has left the law, in appearance and in fact, not only unfriendly 
but in many areas seemingly on the attack against religion. Because U .s. 
Supreme Court decisions establish a minimum to which states must adhere, 
state independence can only be directed toward further restriction of 
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religion.21 
Whatever the reality, state institutions will therefore appear to be 
more unfriendly than the federal. The general animus agaimt special 
deference to religious groups overarches other factors and contributes to the 
special actions which, when taken against this church or that, seem to display 
only special bias. While anti-Catholic prejudice, e.g., is real and important, it 
is not sufficient explanation for the state's persistent extreme separationist 
trend. 
A correct reading of the history of Oregon's constitutional 
foundations and of the practices of its people should result in a more 
accommodationist attitude on the part of Oregon's legal entities. 
I. PROLOGUE 
A perennial problem in Western culture has been the management of 
relations between church and state. The Christian West, with the inherent 
dualism of its loyalties to earthly and heavenly kingdoms, has wrestled for 
centuries with the problems of dominance, separation and accommodation.22 At 
times the solution has appeared simple, such as when the Roman Catholic 
Church ruled church and state, or when each principality followed the rule of 
cujus regio, ejus religio. 
Such orthodoxies, eternal or momentary, never resolved the problem of 
the correct relationship. Indeed such orthodoxies never entirely held sway 
even in their own times. Both academic and very real dissent were always 
present. Succeeding ages, or succeeding weeks, would raise it anew. The 
movements of rationalism, enlightenment, Protestantism and democracy only 
presented in new form the questions which previous ages had addressed in 
terms of the proper sphere of Pope and Emperor. With the onset of the 
Reformation, men's consciences now sought new mediators between God and 
man and between man and man, or would brook no mediation. The problem of 
intolerance for the church or particular churches became more intense. 
In the United States, the colonies came to have different methods of 
accommodation of church and state. The firm orthodoxy of Plymouth Colony 
led to the partial tolerance of Rhode Island. Accidents of friendship and 
loyalty induced the grants of Pennsylvania and Maryland as temporary havens 
of tolerance for Quakers, catholics, and others. When the United States was 
formed, there was thus no one model of how church, state, and the individual 
should interact. It was this very diversity of solutions which was part of the 
states' firm resistance to the idea that a federal government should have any 
powers in this and like areas. 
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The colonies, each jealous of its hard-won liberties and wary of 
establishments, whether of Church or Crown, wrote into their Constitution a 
rule that the new national government would have no role in church-state 
relations. Although many believed that, in a government of limited power, the 
federal government could not act at all where not expressly authorized, others 
thought a Bill of Rights necessary expressly to ensure non-interference. The 
First Amendment, ratified in 1791, succinctly stated: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." 
The states, each in its own wisdom, were left to determine the 
arrangements which best suited them. Some, such as Virginia, tended from the 
beginning to strong separation. Others such as Massachusetts continued to 
have established churches into the 1840s. New Hampshire even into the 1880s 
still restricted to Protestants the right to serve as Governor or in the 
legislature. The leading legal scholars of the 19th century, James Kent, Joseph 
Story and Thomas Cooley, emphasized not only that the federal government 
could not intervene in state religious matters, but described the common law 
as Christian in nature. 
At any given time, the states presented an array of relations. Of 
course, in those days the U.S. was deemed to be a Christian nation.23 The 
founders' pronouncements and our documents of birth are replete with 
statements of dependence upon the Almighty. To many statesmen and 
scholars, the roots of both democracy and liberty were found in Protestantism. 
However establishments official and unofficial, after the Revolution as before, 
presented the problem of how the state should choose, if at all, among 
churches. The exiled Puritan came to contend with Anabaptist and Quaker, 
and met their threat by exile or even hanging. The new orthodoxy of Roger 
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Williams' Rhode Island, in spite of the eloquent language of The Bloudy 
Tenent, had little room for other dissenters. After the Revolution, the 
established Church of England was rejected, only to be replaced with state-
established churches which continued to tax and discipline all citizens. 
Perry Miller well points out that only in the 1950s was Roger Williams 
"discovered" as a prophet of extreme separation of church and state. To his 
contemporaries, he was no such thing. 
The Blaine Amendment, introduced by the Speaker of the House, James 
G. Blaine in 187 5 during the Grant Administration, sought to apply the federal 
First Amendment to the states, but failed of passage. It continued to be 
introduced into the 1940s, over 20 times in all. Until the 1930s there was no 
acceptance of a federal role in church-state relations. 
In the 1780s, questions of congregational versus episcopal policy began 
to break down the state-established churches. Over time political pressures, 
generated by increasing numbers of adherents of non-established churches, led 
to resolution or laws which effectively congregationalized24existing 
orthodoxies. Mark DeWolf Howe well analyses this period of change in The 
Garden and the Wilderness. Congregationalism was more in tune with 
American ideals of freedom of conscience and government by the consent of 
the governed.25 
The politics and wars of Catholic France with England in the early 
1800's and Protestant atavistic fears of the Pope as anti-Christ confirmed the 
drive toward individual and congregational independence. However, the 
tendency was not to remove the church-state connections, but progressively to 
non-denominationalize them. A Christian nation still, the U.S. found itself in 
the Horace Mann compromise of 1848 where the King James Bible would be 
read in the public schools, but there would be no proselytising for particular 
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sects. 
Oregon was first settled and came into being as a political entity 
during this period. Governed by nominally Church of England Great Britain, it 
was actually largely manned by Presbyterian Scots managers and French 
Catholic Metis trappers. The American settlers were accompanied by 
Methodist and later Presbyterian ministers such as Jason Lee and Marcus 
Whitman. The uneasy accommodation of nations was paralleled by an uneasy 
accommodation of religious practices. Protestant and Catholic competed, first 
and always for souls and then for the land and its governance. The 
Americans, to secure votes, were at first open to the French trappers and 
British settlers. The British, seeing the potential and then the reality of 
American immigration and dominance, were generous and accommodating of the 
Methodist pioneers. But behind the surface cooperation, there was a struggle 
to save the Oregon country for the United States and from the Catholics. 
The Protestant missionaries and settlers thus set from the very beginning an 
anti-Catholic tone and enforced an anti-Catholic reality. The history of 
Oregon begins with religious conflict. 
IL THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND 
Federal law has been operative in Oregon since Territorial Days. 
State law cannot be understood without a firm sense of the federal presence. 
When Oregon was a Territory, federal law applied, although the 
Territorial legislature and officers were its erratic instruments. The peaceful 
resolution of both the Oregon question and the boundary question had been 
quiet triumphs of diplomacy, especially in the face of provocations such as the 
Whitman Massacre Myth. Such chicanery as that which deprived Hudson's Bay 
factor John McLoughlin of his Oregon City land claim had a religious aspect, 
but can not be isolated as religious. 
The troubling question of Oregon's early days was that of the Indian 
missions and schools. Under the federal reservation system, these were 
assigned to Protestant or Catholic, often without respect for the wishes of the 
Indians or for who had previously operated the mission. Federal and 
territorial law also provided that missions should be alloted a certain amount 
of land, which led to disputes among missions and churches about who was 
entitled to which area. In The Dalles, although the Catholics had been 
operating the mission since the Methodists pulled out during the Cayuse War 
period, the Methodists unsuccessfully sought to stake a claim.26 
In 1875, under the anti-Catholic administration of President Ulysses S. 
Grant, his surrogate, then representative James Blaine, introduced into 
Congress the "Blaine Amendment", which sought to impose upon all of the 
States the equivalent of the federal First Amendment and to prevent aid to 
religious schools. That amendment passed both House and Senate by 
majorities, but failed to obtain the two thirds Senate vote needed for passage. 
Blaine later became tainted by association with the phrase of "Rum, 
Romanism, and Rebellion" which marked his image in history as anti-Catholic 
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and thus doomed his own presidential aspirations. 27 
The second federal responsibility which dominated the late 1800s and 
continued to dominate lllltil the 1920s was that of Immigration. The 1840s 
and post-Civil War period brought the Catholic Irish and the Catholic Eastern 
and Southern Europeans into the States in immense numbers. Resultant 
periods of intense nativism gave rise to the Know-Nothing Party in the 1850s, 
and the American Protective Association in the 1890s. Each had but brief 
impact and little membership in Oregon. The Spanish-American War of 1901 
was seen by many as a war again.st Catholicism, to free Cuba and the 
Philippines from the rule of the Pope. The hyper-patriotic activity of World 
War I and its aftermath again accented feeling again.st those who retained 
foreign ways or rule. The Catholics were especially subject to this wave of 
feeling, because the Pope was seen as a foreign and anti-American ruler. 
Donald Kinzer well analyses the American Protective Association,28 
and John Higham gives a splendid view of the whole process of nativism into 
the 1920s.29 Within Oregon, Charles Carey and Priscilla Knuth give detailed 
accounts of the APA and of the factors and groups which rose periodically 
against Catholics and other foreigners.30 
The Know-Nothing Party in Oregon was a short-lived phenomenon. 
Although a separate party, its members were centered in the Whig Party of 
that day. When Asahel Bush, editor of the Salem Statesman, obtained a list 
of its members and threatened to publish the list if they did not withdraw, the 
Party was dead. 31 
The American Protective Association hardly fared better. At best it 
had a few members in Oregon. Like the Klan of the 1920s, it inflated its 
membership figures and appeared more formidable for a brief period than it 
proved in fact to be. 32 
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However, the loyalties, fears, and views of Protestantism and 
Americanism which motivated those who joined, remained powerful forces in 
Oregon life. "Escaped nuns" were a staple on the Oregon lecture circuit in 
the period. The Tale of Maria Monk, the equivalent to the Catholics of what 
the Protocols of the mders of Zion was to the Jews, had a continual 
circulation.33 Circulation of one such tale led to a successful state criminal 
prosecution for malicious libel in the 1905 Hosmer case. The development of 
the patriotic societies, such as the Orange lodges and the Knights of Pythias, 
and of the Masons, all sustained a view of the Catholic Church as inimical to 
American ways and provided a firm backgr0tmd for periodic eruptions of 
prejudice. 
Once Oregon became a state in 1859, under the views of the federal 
First Amendment then prevailing, the United States was thought to have no 
role on religion within the state. When cases were brought, even as late as 
Brunswick in 1916, the federal court merely recited that the federal 
Constitution left such matters to the states. 
It is worthy of note that one of the major authors of the 14th 
Amendment, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held to impose the First 
Amendment upon the States, was George Williams,34 Oregon's U.S. Senator 
from 1865-1871, who as Republican U.S. Attorney General in 1875 was one of 
the supporters of the Blaine Amendment. The evidence is unsatisfying that 
the authors or Congresses of the time believed by passage of the 14th 
Amendment that they were affecting States' rights in the area of religion. 
Indeed, the Blaine Amendment in one form or another continued to be 
introduced into the 1940s, Congress after Congress, showing by the attempt 
the prevailing belief that the First Amendment did not apply to the States. 
When the Oregon School Bill, which appeared35 to outlaw private and 
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parochial schools, was passed by initiative in 1922, the catholics at first saw 
no role for the federal courts or government in overturning it. However, 
when the u.s Supreme Court in Meyer v Nebraska,36 decided in 1924, 
announced that the federal Constitution would now prohibit a state from 
criminally punishing a school teacher who taught in German, this precedent led 
the Catholics and the Hill Academy to file in federal Court under the federal 
Constitution. In its decision in 1925, in Pierce v Society of Sisters, the U.S. 
Supreme Court firmly announced that henceforth parental rights to education 
of children were enshrined in the federal Constitution, that states could 
regulate but not eliminate these rights. This charter for private and parochial 
schools has continued to serve as a firm shield for them from too aggressive 
state regulation. 37 
In the same period, the National Immigration Act of 1924 was passed, 
which firmly placed a lid on immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe by 
imposing national origin quotas. This lid, plus the good times of the period, 
satisfied and thus dampened the strong nativistic impulses of the immediate 
post-War period. 
Prohibition, made part of the national Constitution in 1919,38 created a 
federal presence throughout Oregon and the rest of the country. Its 
imposition, both then and during the agitations of the Women's Christian 
Temperance Union Days of the previous century, had anti-Catholic overtones, 
and were strongly supported by the Protestant Churches, especially the 
Methodists and Quakers. Indeed, the Oregon legislature considered in the 
1923 session outlawing sacramental wine. The forces behind Prohibition were 
those of respectable Protestantism. At the 1924 Nominating Convention of the 
Democratic Party, the Democrats were not able to adopt a resolution 
repudiating the Ku Klux Klan, which was seen by nearly all as prejudiced 
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against catholics and Jews. Al Smith, both as Governor of New York and as 
Presidential candidate, was seen as tainted by his Catholicism and by his lax 
enforcement of the Prohibition laws. 
Under the Roosevelt administration, the federal government began to 
expand its role into areas previously the realm of the states. Federal laws 
and regulations followed the federal dollars. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court 
had not begun in the 1940s to interpret the federal First Amendment as now 
applying to the States, the same effect was being achieved through federal 
programs and dollars. In 1940, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the first 
Jehovah's Witnesses' cases concerning flag salutes and pamphleteering on the 
streets, and so established a federal law and presence in the area of religion. 
This was extended with the aid-to-parochial-schools decisions beginning in 
1947, the Bible-reading decisions of the early 1960s, and accelerated in the 
last two decades. Indeed, the federal presence became so great that a 
generation of lawyers and judges came to forget the primary and historical 
role of their own state Constitutions.39 From 1960 to the 1980s, lawyers and 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union would invariably file 
in federal courts. Only in the 1980s, as the U.S. Supreme Court began taking 
more accommodationist positions, did a reverse trend set in.40 
In 1944, in the case of Thornton v City of Portland, the Oregon 
Supreme Court declared that, although they were couched in different words, 
the religion clauses of the Oregon and federal Constitutions had the same 
meaning. This principle was reaffirmed time after time (with two temporary 
exceptions: in the Dickman case and in the second decision of the Eugene 
Cross case trilogy). However, in 1985 the Court, now w:ider the dominance of 
liberal constructionists, reinterpreted the Oregon Constitution more narrowly 
than the federal in the Salem Academy case. 
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Although the most current analytical method41 focuses first on Oregon 
law, the federal law still sets minimum standards. The states, such as Oregon, 
can be more restrictive of religious establishment, but they cannot be less. 
They can provide more religious freedom, but they cannot provide less than 
the federal law requires. The federal presence is still substantial. 
In 1964, the federal government passed the Civil Rights Act,42 which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of religion and creed, as well as race 
and color. An Executive Order,43 introduced the same year, prohibited such 
discrimination for all federal contractors. The Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 similarly provided for massive aid to schools, and 
included provision of aid to parochial schools. These provisions, and others 
like them, necessarily affected Oregon as well, though perhaps less than other 
states to the extent that Oregon had fewer federal bases and major contracts. 
Oregon does however have its public schools, the Bureau of Land Management 
and Forest Service, the Bonneville Power Administration, and a substantial 
federal presence, which set standards for the state, and supplanted it in some 
areas, because of the effectiveness of the federal remedies. 
Indeed, in 1985, the federal Congress passed a law which required all 
schools receiving federal aid or having federal contracts to provide equal 
access to religious groups and students with other groups.44 This law has 
required districts to adopt or consider adopting rules to implement. The 
moving force behind this law was Oregon's Senator Mark O. Hatfield, who has 
stressed that its intent is to protect religious liberty. 
The federal law is now a dominant and omnipresent factor in matters 
of religion and law within Oregon. This is a radical change from the first 
century of Oregon's history. Today's renewed reliance upon the Oregon 
constitution still recognizes that the expanded federal role sets minimal 
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standards. Thus the federal law, whether overtly or not, will be carefully 
analysed in each case. The range of choice for the states has been 
progressively limited. As Zabel says, such expansion of federal jurisdiction 
reduces "religious freedom by imposing national uniformity at the expense of 
local solutions •••• 1145 
III. OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1857 ••• The Oregon constitution is adopted. At the Convention, there 
is a September afternoon's discussion on whether to pay for chaplains in the 
legislature... And then, 10 5 years of silence. 
Only in 1962 does the Oregon Supreme Court decide to apply Article 
I, Section 5 and disallow free textbooks to parochial school students based 
upon a prohibition "found" in the Oregon Constitution. That decision, 
Dic.lanan v School District 62C, has but one paragraph devoted to history. 
That paragraph says in full: 
The historical setting in which constitutional provisions such as 
Article I, Section 5 were written and the factors which 
prompted their adoption have been thoroughly explained 
elsewhere; it is not necessary, therefore, to repeat those 
observations here. 46 
The sources cited have nothing to do with Oregon, save only Charles 
Carey's record on the Oregon Constitutional Convention of 1857. 
On the federal level, the U.S. Constitution was approved in 17 87 ••• 
And then, 160 years of silence. Only in 1948 did the U.S. Supreme Court find 
that the First Amendment religion clauses apply to the States, in spite of 
their express words that "Congress" shall make no laws ••• That decision, and its 
successors, while they refer to history, are also remarkably devoid of it. 
They are criticized uniformly by historians, even by those who approve of the 
case holdings. 
How is it that in the United States and in Oregon, where the written 
Constitutions are our Bibles and we require that judges explain and justify 
their decisions, that major constitutional changes suddenly occurred, after over 
a century, with no historical justification and indeed with no history? What 
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happened in Oregon? 
The fact is that there is a history of religion and law in Oregon. If 
that history never appeared in the law books, it is riot because it did not 
exist. In our government, history constitutes the records of our fourth branch 
of government--the people themselves, in whom are reserved all powers. 
However, the common practices and shared beliefs of a religious people were 
not thought to belong in the courts, so long as the government did not seek to 
suppress religion. Oregon has a long history, which its early courts did not 
find necessary and its later courts have not seen fit, to examine. 
Legal historians have long faulted lawyers and courts. They point 
out that constitutional cases tend to be misrepresentative. They present, not 
what usually happens, but the unusual. Courts, which rely upon unusual cases 
as their sole or primary source of guidance, are systematically misled in their 
use of history.48 The narrow methods of courts in handling rules of evidence 
are unsuited to insightful examination of broad themes and subjects, and can 
be too twisted by the partisan pressures of the adversary system to allow 
dispassionate search for truth. Legal truth is managed truth. Moreover, 
courts are reluctant and often unable to go back and correct later-discovered 
errors. A decision, once made, acquires a life of its own, even if originally 
wrongly decided. 
In the area of religion, the history as recounted by the courts has 
been outstandingly poor. The federal cases, whatever one thinks of them as 
policy, ignore or misrepresent the history and intent of the First Amendment. 
Historians of all persuasions are remarkably uniform and severe in their 
criticism, from Edward Corwin to Leonard Levy, from Paul Murphy to Michael 
Malbin. The innovative federal changes are so devoid of accurate history as 
to have given birth to Corwin's riposte: "Undoubtedly the Court has the right 
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to make history •••• ; but it has no right to remake it.1144 
The Oregon Country was settled by the Hudson's Bay Company, which 
employed Catholic French and Metis trappers. The first American settlers 
were missionary Protestants, largely Methodist. catholic and Protestant began 
to compete for Indian souls: The infamous Whitman Massacre in 1847, when 
Marcus Whitman and many of his company were killed by Cayuse Indians, was 
used by some Protestants to seek to discredit Catholics. Some blamed the 
Catholics, and indeed there was an attempt to pass a law expelling Catholic 
priests from the Oregon Territory.50 When Chief Factor John McLoughlin of 
the Bay Company reconverted to Catholicism, the American sentiment against 
him took on anti-religious overtones as well. 
The first organized governments of the Oregon Country were deeply 
religious and friendly to religion. Indeed, the "Mission Party" retained control 
for a number of years. The Organic laws of both 1843 and 1845 included 
verbatim the famous words of the original Northwest Ordinance: 
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of education shall forever be encouraged.51 
In the 1700s and 1800s, nearly all Americans believed that religion 
and government were inseparable, that good government must be firmly 
grounded in religious belief. From the earliest times, we have merged the 
Pilgrim Fathers with the Founding Fathers, with our "city on the hill" being 
based upon both Bible and Constitution. The federal Constitution had 
prohibited the federal government from interfering in religion in the States. 
But within the States there were in post-Constitutional days several 
established churches. A gradual evolution occured as the character of the 
inhabitants changed, more and more respecting individual beliefs, but also 
retaining religious practices in schools, courts, legislatures, and throughout 
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government. State governments evolved away from establishment. They 
fiercely rejected imposition of particular religions on the unwilling, but also 
firmly established prayer, Bible reading, chaplains, and religious observances in 
the secular part of life. Leading 19th century Constitutional scholars, such as 
Thomas Cooley, James Kent, and Joseph Story, found that Christianity was an 
inseparable part of the common law and compatible with the federal 
constitutional system. 
When, in 1857, Oregonians came together to draft a Constitution,52 
they established a committee to make a Bill of Rights. That committee, using 
the Constitution of Indiana as a mode1,53 presented what became Article I of 
the Constitution, with Sections 2 through 7 dealing with religious belief. 
These provided: that all men were free in religious belief, that no law should 
interfere in free exercise of religious belief and rights of conscience, that no 
religious test should be required for off ice, that no person should be 
incompetent as a witness or be questioned in court on his religious belief, that 
oaths should be in the form most consistent with a person's beliefs and, in 
Section 5, that no money should be drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of 
any religious or theological institution, or appropriated for payment of any 
religious services in the legislature. As originally drafted, this last section 
would have prohibited compensation for any religious services, but in final 
form the prohibition was significantly narrowed. The committee and 
Convention declined to adopt the anti-establishment section of the Indiana 
Constitution.54 
Only Section 5 occasioned debate. Hector Campbell moved to strike 
out the provision preventing employment of a chaplain by the legislature. 
After long discussion, his motion passed. 
The original section read: 
No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the 
compensation of any religious services, or for the benefit of 
any theological institution.55 
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After Campbell moved to strike out so much of it as would prevent the 
employment of a chaplain in the legislature, the text was changed to read: 
No money shall be drawn from the state tre~~ry for the 
benefit of any religious or theological institution. 
This was adopted by a vote of 24 to 16. A motion by George Williams, to 
prevent payment for religious services in either house of the legislative 
assembly was defeated at this point. However, when Williams again presented 
his amendment to the Convention in September, it passed by a vote of 26-21, 
so that the final version, as engrossed, added to the above words: 
Nor shall any money be appropriated for the payment of any 
religious services, in either house of the legislative assembly. 
The original section when first introduced was labelled as Section 6, 
although it became Section 5 in the final version. The original section 5, 
although approved and passed, unaccountably disappeared from the final 
version. This section, a non-establishment or non-preferment clause, read as 
follows: 
No law shall give preference to any creed, religious society, or 
mode of worship; and no man shall be compelled to attend, 
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry without his consent. 
Because the legislature did not approve a verbatim transcript of its 
proceedings, no account appears to exist which explains this deletion. 57 
The most eloquent and substantial statement was made by the 
President of the Convention, Judge Matthew Deady, later Oregon's federal 
judge for over forty years. Deady asserted as the reason that the legislature 
should not pay to prefer one religion, that this would necessarily tax all 
people to support one religion. 
. ~ 
What is the theory of our government upon this subject? It is 
that the government shall be separated from the churches, and 
the maintenance and administration of religion; that religious 
duties shall be no function of government. And why? 
Re cause the country contains persons of all religious 
denominations, as well as non-believers, and if you have 
religious services carried on and paid for by the government, 
you necessarily tax all people to supQOrt some one religion, let 
their sentiments be what they may~ 
25 
But Deady further asserted that he would vote to invite a chaplain to 
officiate before the legislature. It was not the involvement, it was the 
payment necessarily coerced from dissidents, to which he objected. 
Interestingly (and unnoticed by the courts since), when the 
Convention later addressed education, Judge Deady, the "Oregon Justinian" and 
father of the University of Oregon, spoke again with eloquence. He moved to 
strike out the section providing for the state university, fearing that it would 
be "really, though not nominally, sectarian" as it was in Indiana. Judge 
Deady thought: 
Education should be under the direction of the various 
religious denominations of the country, and parents could send 
children in accordance with their sectarian bias. And if the 
state appropriated a school fund, let it be drawn by the 
various sectarian schools, in proportion to the number of 
scholars they had, and let those of no religious profession draw 
their proportion.59 
His motion carried. This expressed a friendliness to religion in 
education. It also, perhaps, made a distinction between monies drawn from 
the Treasury by taxation, necessarily also from dissenters, and that drawn for 
the benefit of all groups from the common school fund. Deady believed both 
that there was no evil if all could draw, and that was especially true of funds 
not derived from direct taxation which therefore did not require dissenters to 
pay. 




religion. One law allowed a mission to hold a township (23,040 acres). In 
the early days, until into the 1880s, most schools were private sectarian 
schools, and some were funded from local taxes. Religious leaders taught in 
them, with prayer and the Bible as their staples, supplemented by the piety of 
books such as the McGuffey Readers.60 Perusal of articles in the Oregon 
Historical Quarterly shows over and again the permeation of religious 
observances in the schools far into the 20th Century. Several theses from the 
University of Oregon examine religion in Oregon public life and schools. 
Robert Woodward, writing in 1963 on Education in Oregon in the Progressive 
Era, and Wallace Farnham, writing in 1965 on Religious Influences on Life and 
Thought in Jackson County: 1860-1891, make clear what no one has disputed: 
that church and religion in the public school and public life were common and 
thought to be acceptable by nearly all. As historians such as David Tyack 
have noted,61 missionaries were a driving force behind the development of 
education in Oregon, and their influence pervaded schools public and private. 
When Catholics later objected to Bible reading in the public schools, they 
sought not to exclude it, but to be able to read their own Bible. Prior to 
1922, Catholic nuns in religious garb taught in several public school districts 
and were paid from public funds.62 
The main controversies about religion in Oregon in the 1800s involved 
politics or federal law, especially the perennial question of which religious 
groups were to be assigned the Indian schools. The anti-Catholic Know 
Nothing Party made a brief appearance, but was shamed into oblivion by threat 
of exposure of its members. The American Protective Association also made 
an appearance in Oregon, with anti-Catholicism as one of its themes. It was 
stimulated by hard times, and by controversies about Papal condemnation of 
secret societies (such as Masons, Knights of Pythias, Knights of Labor), 
27 
indignation over Papal condemnations of Americanism, Modernism, and Masonry, 
the declaration of Papal infallibility, and about turn-of-the-century 
arrangements in New York and Massachusetts under which catholics were 
allowed to be paid teachers in public schools. The Temperance Movement in 
Oregon also had religious overtones. But none of these currents required 
formal action by the government of Oregon directed to religion as such.63 
Decade by decade after 1875, Oregon and the U.S. were faced with the Blaine 
Amendment, which sought to impose the federal First Amendment upon the 
States, and perennially rejected such imposition. 
In the 1900s, prayer and Bible-reading remained common in the public 
schools of Oregon, as evidenced by general accounts and occasional articles of 
protest.64 World War I brought a resurgence of patriotism, and a resurgence 
of religion, into public life. Financial pressures and scarcity of teachers led to 
religious personnel teaching in public schools wearing religious garb, especially 
in rural areas where nuns were the only teachers. The fury of war and its 
aftermath, the concern about communists and immigration restriction (later 
largely satisfied by the post-War federal restrictions on new immigration), 
stimulated the rise in Oregon of the second Ku Klux Klan from 1921 to 
1925.65 
In 1922, seemingly from nowhere, the Klan dramatically appeared in 
Oregon, advocating a pure Protestant America. It supported laws, passed in 
1922-1923, which prohibited religious garb in public schools, and would have 
prohibited the existence of private and parochial schools. It would have 
required that all schools be conducted in English. The Compulsory School Bill 
would have harmed especially Catholic and Lutheran schools. 
In an impressive one-day campaign, the Masons, the true and 
effective force behind the School Bill, gathered enough signatures to place an 
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initiative to outlaw private schools on the ballot. Oregon became a focus of 
national attention, some writers claiming the state was controlled by the Klan. 
Governor Walter Pierce and others were accused of being Klan members. A 
lawsuit was soon brought by Hill Academy and the Catholic Society of Sisters 
in the federal court, which held that the law violated the federal 
Constitution's contract rights. Because the federal First Amendment did not 
apply to the States, it was not invoked. {It is also remarkable that Section 5 
was not invoked, or deemed sufficient to prohibit religious garb in the schools, 
evidencing what people thought Section 5 meant). Governor Pierce, supported 
by the Masons {who still believe they were right),66 appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court which, in 1925, firmly rejected the law. That landmark case, 
Pierce v Society of Sisters, established for the whole country the rights of 
parents to control the education of their children. Although some historians, 
such as Father Lawrence Saalf eld, in his recently republished Forces of 
Prejudice in Oregon 1922-1925, have described this period as one of prejudice 
and Klan-domination, later accounts present a more balanced picture, showing 
the influence of Progressive and Enlightenment forces, which considered the 
Catholic Church to be anti-democratic, anti-American and superstitious, and 
which wanted to shape the new society through the vehicle of the public 
common schools which all must attend. 67 
From the 1800s into the 1920s, "escaped nuns" were common on the 
lecture circuit in Oregon.68 Malcolm Clark, in "The Bigot Disclosed: 90 years 
of Nativism", discusses69another secret order, the Guardians of Liberty, whose 
one claim to fame was actually to have produced an "escaped nun", Mary 
Lose nan, who told of kidnap, orgies and infanticide, placing part of her 
captivity in the convent at Mt. Angel. When J.E. Hosmer of the Silverton 
Journal published her accounts in both press and pamphlet form, the convent 
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sued for publishing a malicious libel. Convicted, Hosmer was sentenced to a 
short prison term. 70 Friendly to religion in many senses, the state's people, 
as noted by all of its historians, 71 maintained a continual theme of racial and 
religious prejudice against certain groups. Al Smith, Catholic and Democratic 
Party candidate for President, campaigned in 1924 and 1928, with religion and 
Americanism among the major themes. The 1924 Democratic Convention 
declined publicly to reject the Klan, even though the Klan itself was soon to 
be dead, "killed by its own hand", 72 by 1925. 
In the 1920s came the worst days of Prohibition, seen by many as 
having religious overtones, as Progressives and Fundamentalists joined forces 
against Catholics, and law enforcement took a holiday into the 1930s. The 
American Civil Liberties Union arrived in Oregon. The clash of Darrow and 
Bryan over evolution in Tennessee reverberated in Oregon. The 1930s saw the 
arrival of the Jehovah's Witnesses, pacifists and persistent proselytizers, in the 
federal courts. 
In 1944, the Oregon Supreme Court, in 'lbornton v Portland, said that 
Oregon's religion clauses should be interpreted in the same way as the first 
Amendment, a decision justified by neither logic nor history. 'lborton 
attached Oregon's constitution not to a fixed star but to a comet--of varying 
path, direction and intensity. The case itself involved whether the State 
could prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from using his children to solicit on the 
streets. Oregon followed a U .s. Supreme Court decision, Prince v 
Massachusetts, which supported the state. 
In the 1940s, Oregon and other states approved laws allowing released 
time from schools for religious instruction. Although such laws were approved 
by the Attorney General and later by state and federal courts, school funding 
cases began to generate immense controversy. ACLU and other interest 
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groups began to press the federal courts for removal of religion from schools 
and public life. In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court first struck down a state 
program of aid to religion with the First Amendment. Federal decisions began 
to produce changes in long-standing practices in Oregon. In 1952 an Attorney 
General Opinion disapproved of Bible study and religious education in public 
schools.73 The practices, however, continued and that opinion is evidence of 
their continuance, as laws are made when there are problems. 
In 1961 and 1962, an Oregon Constitutional Revision Commission 
proposed changes in the Oregon Constitution. After immense objection form 
religious groups, it declined to recommend an ACLU proposal that "The public 
schools shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence, and no 
religious instruction, exercise or worship shall be part of the curriculum of any 
public school." The AC1:_U had noted that "most states have specific 
provisions against religious instruction in the public schools," but Oregon did 
not. The Commission proposed, as if in rebuttal to Judge Deady, to change 
the Article I, Section 5 words: "No money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury ••• " to "No public money shall be used ••• 11 .74 The change was not 
approved, but in 1962 the Oregon Supreme Court decided the case of Diclanan 
v School District 62C. The Oregon legislature had passed a law which 
provided free textbooks to all Oregon students (permissable under federal law), 
'including those in parochial schools. However the Oregon Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Kenneth O'Connell (one of the members of the Revision 
Commission), interpreted Section 5 as if it said "No public money ••• " and held 
that nothing, neither money or services, could be provided by the State if it 
benefited a religious group. Normally language in a State Constitution which 
limits the people's powers is narrowly interpreted, but not in this case. 
Oregon's friendliness to religion (i.e. to Protestant or civic religion) was, at 
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one bold stroke, officially gone. 
In later years, Justice O'Connell would be celebrated (by such as 
ACLU) for his activist interpretations of the Oregon Constitution.75 In a 
1984 ceremony honoring Judge O'Connell, Judge Alfred Goodwin, another 
activist and member of the Revision Commission, amusingly mispoke himself 
and, purporting to quote Section 5, instead recited the failed-in-vote but 
successful-in-court "no public money" interpretation.76 As Judge Hans Linde 
has said and written: When I was on the Revision Commission, we sought to 
make changes in the Constitution. When I was appointed to the Court, I 
found that the changes we wanted had been there all along. 
One might have thought, after Dickman, that a clear course was set. 
But two factors were in opposition. It is not usual for a court decision 
readily to change long-established and passionately believed practices. Prayer 
and religious observances in Oregon schools occur today. Also, the Dickman 
court was a temporary majority, and, as personnel on the Court change, so 
does the interpretation of its laws. During the 1960s, the Court again 
approved Oregon's released-time law. The Attorney General advised that 
distribution of Gideon Bibles to schoolchildren was a violation of law, but 
approved of prayer at commencements and non-compulsory baccalaureate 
services. The State Board of Education, assisted by the ACLU, drafted a 
Model Policy of a strictly separationist nature for Oregon Schools, but that 
policy had no legal force and was largely unobserved. 
From 1969 to 1977, Oregon's ma:;t interesting and strange case on 
religion worked its way through the state and federal courts. The Eugene 
Cra:;s Case, Lowe v City of Eugene, was an attempt to f<;>rce the removal of a 
large cross from the top of Skinner's Butte in Eugene. In the early 1920s, 
the Butte had been one of the favorite places in the state for the burning of 
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crosses by the Klan.77 A cross had dominated the Butte, in one form or 
another, since at least the 1930s, on city-owned property. It is still there 
today, visible all over the City. 
A trial court found in 1969 that the cross violated principles of 
separation of church and state, and ordered it removed. The Oregon Supreme 
Court first held that the cross could stay (on a 4-3 vote). After change of 
personnel, the Court reheard the case, and now said the cra;s was not 
permissable and ordered it removed. The U .s. Supreme Court refused to get 
involved. Although the Oregon Supreme Court had ordered the cra;s removed, 
it was still there eight years later when the case again came before the 
Court, now again with changed personnel. This third time, the Court declared 
the cross could stay as a secular monument. 
This time, the Court did look at history. It found that Americans 
regularly used religious symbols as part of their secular life, and that this was 
permissable. In passing, it mentioned Christmas trees, stars, and cemetery 
crosses. To the public, what mostly became clear was that it mattered who 
the judges were that heard a case. The 1977 Court displayed a respect for 
the experiences of the people, the till-now "silent history" • 
••• many crosses and other religious symbols traditionally have 
been used as monuments and memorials upon public property 
throughout Oregon and the United States, without appellate 
court challenge ••• This, in itself, is indicative of a feeling 
among a people who strongly support a constitutional 
government, that there is no constitutional question invot~ed in 
such a case, or it is so minimal as not to merit notice. 
After the 1977 Cross Case decision, a crescendo of cases were brought. The 
Cross Case was frequently ignored (with its holding that the Oregon and 
federal Constitutions should be interpreted in like manner) and the more 
narrow Diekman case followed, which held that Oregon's Constitution imposed 
more restrictions. In 1972, supporters of aid to religious schools had sought a 
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constitutional amendment of their own. They wanted the State Constitution to 
read like the federal First Amendment, which was then held to allow some aid 
to religion. This initiative, which sought to overturn Diekman, did not pass, 
but the final Cross Case decision which re-aligned the two Constitutions, 
achieved its goais.79 
In 1973 separationists again attacked both shared-time and released-
time school arrangements in Clackamas CoWlty. The Fisher case prohibited 
the first, and allowed the latter. In 1975, the Attorney General approved 
religious displays in schools, so long as there was equal access for non-
religious displays. 
The pace of litigation and lawmaking continued into the 1980s. 
Incidents of racial and religious bigotry occurred: defacement of synagogues, 
paintings of swaztikas, plantings of crosses and Klan symbols. The legislature 
made racial and religious intimidation crimes amid concerns that this might 
limit free speech. 
The 1971 legislature, in a manner suggested by ACLU, passed a law 
which provided funds to all Oregon colleges based on their number of Oregon 
students. This included denominational colleges. Nonetheless, ACLU filed suit 
against the program in 1981 in Cogan v Atiyeh. The religious colleges, 
fearing that the entire program might be destroyed and faced with forced 
recoupment of ten years of funds if they lost, voluntarily withdrew from the 
program, thus losing millions of dollars.SO The legal issue was not decided. 
The "Cults" -- especially Scientology and Rajneeshism -- dominated 
the headlines in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and found themselves in court 
with depressing frequency. In a major damage case against the Church of 
Scientology, Kristofferson, where a jury first awarded significant damages, the 
Oregon Appeals Court reversed, saying there could be no inquiry into the 
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sincerity of religious belief. The arrival of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and 
his followers has led to over one hundred lawsuits and hearings, on many 
issues but with religion always a factor. The Bhagwan asked the courts to 
protect his vow of silence. They provided some accommodation, but were 
unwilling absolutely to do so. The Attorney General, after first declaring the 
City of Rajneespuram unconstitutional because it was religiously run, filed suit 
in state court to disincorporate it. That suit, still pending, has bounced back 
and forth from state to federal court. Surveys have shown tremendous 
religious bias against this group in Oregon. 
Four other major areas of cases have occured in the 1980s. The 
Oregon Supreme Court has told Salem Academy that churches must pay 
unemployment taxes for their employees, in spite of a federal exemption. 
Judge Linde, with a new majority, reversed the holding of the 1944 Thorton 
case and of the Eugene Cra;s Case, and held that Oregon's religion clauses 
were now to be interpreted more narrowly than the federal. He also reminded 
readers that tax exemptions were a gift of the state. Students of Oregon tax 
decisions have noticed that, as on the federal level, there have been 
increasing litigation and unfavorable tax decisions towards churches in the last 
two decades. Separate Multnomah County courts have prohibited prayer at a 
high school graduation exercise, Kay v David Douglas High School, and 
prohibited a prayer day service in Portland city council chambers, Wells v 
Ivancie, while allowing it in the adjacent city park. Finally, the Garb Bill of 
the 1922-Klan Era was attacked, when a teacher was dismissed because she 
wore a Sikh headgear in school. That suit was compromised in 1985, just as 
the legislature was prepared to eliminate the law81. It remains in the books. 
After 105 years of comtitutional silence, religion has now become a 
matter of daily headlines, as the legislature, executive and courts pronounce 
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upon it and intervene in it. There are now over one hundred reported Oregon 
cases on religion. Why now •• .after 105 years of State Constitutional silence 
after 160 years of federal silence? Why now? 
There are many answers. In most states and as with the United 
States, the courts have always been slow to take on powers of judicial review. 
In a state's first years, as Friedman points out in his History of American 
Law,82 as with the federal government, the legislature is first dominant. It 
includes those who framed the Constitution, and who know well what it meant. 
Constitutional history is their own history, and their own beliefs and practices 
form its application. Over time, the executive acquires more power. Only 
much later, as memories fade and as courts learn to mediate between 
legislature and executive, do they acquire confidence and assert powers of 
substantial judicial review. The states were also emboldened after 1947 by 
the innovating example of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Dickman and second 
Eugene Cross Case majorities were capable and sincere judges who believed 
that judges should make law and mould living and evolving constitutions to 
their view of the good society. Unfortunately, that approach left the meaning 
of the Oregon Constitution dependent upon who was on the bench on any given 
day. 
The tremendous increases in federal programs under Roosevelt in the 
1930s and again under Johnson in the 1960s made the federal First Amendment 
and other constitutional provisions apply much more broadly than before. 
Entire new areas were opened to federal regulation. 
Another answer can be found in the a-historical nature of Americans. 
Although in some ways we are obsessed with history, at our roots we, of all 
the people of the world, concur with Henry Ford that "history is bunk" and 
we ignore it. We have been a predominatly Protestant nation, whose people 
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have always gone directly to the Book, whether Bible or Constitution, and 
counted for little the years of interpretation or experience that came 
between. One man, we feel, can read the Bible, or the Constitution, as well 
as any other man. What care Oregonians in the 1980s how an American or 
Oregonian of the 1880s may have understood Constitutional meanings. Most of 
us implicitly approve a new understanding fit for a new age. But we also 
hold our judges to a standard. They must interpret our Tables of Laws, and 
they are caught in the conflict of our demands. 
As Tocqueville realized in the 1830s, our democracy is especially prey 
to innovation and easily detached from the past. Our courts make history, but 
alas, too seldom respect it. 
Now that the U.S. Supreme Court appears to many to be abandoning 
the strict separationism of the post-1947 period, separationists are turning 
with renewed vigor to state courts and state constitutions to mold their 
visions of our society. As they do so, Oregonians should require that "a 
decent respect for the opinions of mankind" demand that this revolution also 
state its reasons and give the history underlying its efforts. 
With a sense of history informing courts, decisions could have been, 
and might be, different. Mark deWolf Howe, in The Garden and the 
Wilderness, shows how it matters if one derives the metaphor of the wall of 
separation of church and state from Roger Williams instead of from Thomas 
Jefferson, the first friendly, the second unfriendly to religion. In Oregon 
legal and general history, respect for the origins of and precise language of 
the religion clauses, respect for the expressions through their history of what 
Oregon's people believed their constitution to mean, might have produced 
different rulings. How, for example, can a decision forbidding aid to 
denominational schools be reconciled with Matthew Deady's remarks at the 
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Constitutional Convention suggesting that all schools could draw from the 
common fund? How can a decision prohibiting a day of prayer in Portland 
City Council be reconciled with the debate at the Constitutional Convention 
which expressly approved chaplains appearing before the legislature? 
With a sense of history behind him, the Mayor of Portland in 1982 
might well have intoned to the Court, in Websterian manner: 
I take my stand with Matthew Deady and the Founders of 
Oregon in Constitutional Convention in 1857. With them I 
vote to invite prayer to be said before the Council. They 
wrote that right forever into the Constitution of Oregon. Let 
any judge who would take it away show by what authority the 
people of Oregon allow him. 
A better sense of the history of religion in Oregon, and of how Oregonians 
have themselves acted out their beliefs since 1857, should be an essential part 
of every collision of law and religion in Oregon. The people of Oregon are 
and remain the first and original branch of government, to whom the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches should ever turn attentive ear. The people 
express themselves through their history. It is to that history, "indicative of 
a feeling among a people who strongly support a constitutional government," 
that all should turn when seeking to apply law to religion in Oregon. 
DI. PRIVATE PARTIES, CHURCHES, AND THE STATE 
(A) Charitable Immunity: 
Until well past the halfway point of the 20th Century, churches and 
other charitable institutions in the United States were generally immune from 
liability for torts (negligence, defamation, etc.). They could not be sued. 
Society and courts justified this immunity on several bases: that to allow 
suits would discourage or destroy charity; that a charity's assets were held in 
trust and could not be allowed to be diverted; that in any case it made no 
difference because most charities had no assets to satisfy a judgement. 
During this century, academics, writers and reformers had begun to 
advocate removal of this immunity. In 1936, two articles appeared in the 
Oregon Law Review, one arguing for and one against charitable immunity. In 
1951, another article appeared opposing such immunity. In 1953, a review of a 
book opposing immunity appeared, followed in 1958 by a review of a 1955 
Oregon Supreme Court decision which had said that it was the place of the 
Oregon legislature, not the Court, to change the immunity rule. 
In the 1960s, as part of a growing nationwide trend, the legislature did 
end charitable immunity. This removal was a traumatic shock to hospitals, and 
doctors, who were forced down from their "Magic Mountain11 83 into the real 
world of total liability. For churches, the effects have been more gradual, but 
no less profound. Subjection to total liability has increasingly led to 
professionalization of charity. The removal of immunity coincided with the 
rise of insurance which enabled churches and other charities to bear losses 
and still continue to operate. Insurance had undermined the rationale for 
total immunity. However, even churches which failed to obtain insurance 
mostly remained protected by their lack of money against which a judgement 
could be taken. 
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There are therefore few reported cases against churches. In 1937, a 
visitor to the Pirst Congregational Church of Portland, who went into the 
church to interview the minister, fell down the stairs while looking for the 
lavatory. He sued both the church and the church trustees individually Wlder 
tort theories of negligence and nuisance. Recognizing the fact of charitable 
immunity, the plaintiff himself vollmtarily dismissed the church as defendant. 
The court ruled he had no claim against the trustees either, ruling that as a 
mere licensee he took the premises as he found them. 
In 1963, 1966, and 1975, after passage of the law ending immunity, 
three cases reached the appeals colll'ts. Most cases are not appealled because 
they depend upon questions of fact, not of law. In the Benedictine Sisters 
case, the Supreme Colll't said that it was a question for the jury whether the 
quality of glass in a door window, which had broken and injured a child who 
pushed against it, was below community standards to such an extent as to 
render the Sisters liable. In 1963 the Court ruled for the Grant Park Baptist 
Church that a railed light-well was not a dangerous condition so as to make 
the church liable for negligence when a five year old child fell into it. In 
197 5, the Cornelius Christian Church was f OWld liable for negligence after a 
softball player was injured when he fell into a hidden hole under the grass of 
a playing field which had been recently farmland. A statute exempted 
"agricultural land" from liability for negligence, but the Church was not 
allowed to hide behind this law. 
The importance of examination of this area of law is that it leads one 
fully to recognize that law books, especially appellate reports (which are 
normally the only cases reported), may not contain any record of cases for 
many reasons. The dog that did not bark in the night, as Holmes (Sherlock, 
not Oliver Wendell) said, is important. 
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In the tort area, until the 1960s, churches along with other charities, 
doctors, hospitals and the like were shielded from lawsuits. The state had 
determined that although wrongs might occur, it would not recognize them. 
When the dam broke, it broke with a vengeance. Claims have increased 
exponentially, and fundamentally altered the world of charitable endeavor. 
Questions of liability, as much as needs, now predominate in the helping 
professions. 
But reported court cases remain few. Many claims are handled by 
insurance. When there is no insurance, injured parties very often do not sue. 
Some are still reluctant to sue a charity or church. Others cannot afford to 
sue. Others, because the particular charity may have no resources, decline to 
sue because it would be a waste of time and money. Finally, for those who 
sue and even prevail, questions of liability in tort cases are usually questions 
of discretionary judgement by judge or jury about what actually occurred, 
what the facts were. Such decisions are seldom appealable to the higher 
courts. Although the legal landscape has changed radically, this is not yet 
reflected in the number of reported cases. 
Analyses like these are important because they make clear the role of 
the state in making itself available or declining to make itself available as a 
forum or agent for private citizens to resolve their disputes. When the state 
will not recognize disputes by blacks alleging racial discrimination, those acts 
do not cease to exist, but the court records will not show them. For years, 
the state said it would not recognize any complaint in tort against a charity. 
The state was therefore an omnipresent but silent actor. 
(B) Intra-Church Litigation: 
In a similar way, the courts in the United States, and Oregon, 
decided very early that, though churches sought to use them to resolve 
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internal disputes over fine points of doctrine, it was not the place of 
government to be so involved. 
In Oregon, the 1893 case of Philomath College v Wyatt announced 
Oregon's adherence to the American Rule that courts would not interfere in 
ecclesiastical disputes. Or rather, it appeared to do so.84 Actually the 
Philomath case ranks with the Eugene Cross Cases in the confusion of its 
procedural history and its illustration of the importance of who judges are, 
rather than what the law is. The decision, which had the effect of affirming 
a lower court decision which announced that Courts should not intervene in 
church disputes, engaged in nearly one hundred pages of very close 
examination of church doctrine and history. 
The Philomath College case involved a dispute over ownership of the 
property and church revenues of the church of the United Brethren In Oirist, 
which had split into two factions, the Liberals and the Radicals.SS In 
adopting a new constitution at the national conference in 1889 by somewhat 
irregular procedures, the conference led to a walk-out, each group maintaining 
it was the true church, and going to courts around the country to assert their 
claims. Similar cases were decided in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, 
Ohio, and Missouri. Similar questions had been raised in other churches, 
especially in the major divisions which occurred as a direct or indirect result 
of the Civil War, which affected nearly all of the major Protestant churches.86 
The Brethren's 1831 Constitution required, before it could be changed, 
that two-thirds of the membership must request the change. The 1889 
Convention was called by substantially fewer than two-thirds. The Convention 
adopted changes which led the Radicals to walk-out and reassemble nearby. 
They claimed that the group they left behind had left the true church by 
departure from constitutional procedure.87 The Liberals left behind claimed 
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that those who walked out volwttarily resigned. Each asked the courts to 
determine who was the true church. 
In Oregon, there were then three judges on the Supreme Court. Judge 
Robert Bean, however, also served as Circuit Court Judge, and heard the case 
at the trial level. He ruled that the Church itself had determined that the 
new Constitution was valid, that although the changes were irregularly made, 
they were not substantial but essentially amounted to a codification of 
previously existing doctrines, and that the Church could deviate from correct 
procedures in non-essential respects and ratify the result. Although he 
announced adherence to the American Rule, his examination necessarily 
involved his determining what change was substantial and what was not. His 
language however stated that he was not enquiring into doctrine, but merely 
applying the church law as he found it, just as he would that of any other 
corpora ti on. 
When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Judge Bean could 
not participate, because he was the judge whose ruling was being appealed. 
Judges Frank Moore and William Lord heard argument in the case, and reversed 
Judge Bean, deciding that the irregularity of procedure invalidated the 1889 
Constitution. On rehearing, the case was argued again, but before a decision 
could be made, Judge Charles Wolverton replaced Judge Lord. The case was 
argued once more, and this time Wolverton and Moore came down on different 
sides, one for the Radicals, one for the Liberals. This split had the effect of 
affirming the decision of Judge Bean on the trial level. The record of the 
case contains therefore a lengthy statement of facts, and then two opinions, 
each of which announce the American Rule, but each of which applied it 
diffently. 
Judge Moore stated that when questions of faith or ecclesiastical law 
·i 
43 
have been decided by the highest judicial tribunal provided for in a church 
organization, the civil courts will follow such decisions, but that the regularity 
and legality of legislative acts of churches were always open to investigation. 
He noted that "the respect which coordinate branches of a government owe 
one another ought also to exist between civil and religious bodies.1188 
Judge Wolverton, on the contrary, analysed both church doctrine and 
the facts of the dispute and decided that the changes were not substantial and 
were ratified by the Convention and Church. He decided that "those who 
adhere to the new and reject the old are the meek and lowly followers of the 
real church, and, incidentally, are entitled to the occupation and enjoyment of 
the ecclesiastic al revenues. 118 9 
Although the application cannot have been satisfactory in theory, the 
effect was that the majority could retain the church90 and that a court of 
equity could announce a clear rule, but still find its way to an effectively 
"just" result. 91 
That message surely contributed to the very few subsequent cases 
which followed on division of church property. These latter cases, involving 
small numbers of members and negligible amounts of property, were decided 
with more decorum and precision, and are not particularly worthy of remark 
save to make that point. Application of the American Rule effectively 
removed such disputes from the courts, and kept the Oregon courts uninvolved 
in disputes over doctrine. 
Thereafter, intra-church legal disputes were handled much as internal 
disputes of any corporation. In 1882, e.g., a legal battle arose in the Oregon 
Lutheran churches over the will of Pastor A.E. Fridrichson, who left his 
church to the Missouri Synod with Pastor Edward Doering (the Lutheran 
"pioneer priest") as trustee. Scandanavian parishioners, who did not want the 
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property in the hands of the German Lutherans, sued. The court ignored their 
wishes, even though they were the parishioners, and routinely upheld the 
wm.92 
In the 1946 Banlcs case, a property deed was held invalid when the 
court found that there had not been notice to all of the church members in 
accordance with the usages of the church which the court held to have the 
effect of bylaws. The enquiry of the Court was entirely into questions of fact 
as to which persons were actually members and at what times, as it might 
have inquired of any corporation concerning its bylaws. In the 1981 Berean 
Baptist Church case, the court firmly stated that civil courts may not enquire 
into church doctrine to resolve church disputes. In the Berean case, the only 
allegation was that doctrinal differences caused the plaintiffs to leave the 
church, which had been converted from a member of the Conservative Baptist 
Association to an Independent Baptist Church. The Court found that this did 
not state a cause of action it could recognize. Actually, the facts before the 
trial court showed that the proper procedures had not been followed, but the 
court concluded that acting as a court of equity this did not matter. The 
church, it determined, would have died if the new people had not taken 
charge, and there was no real remedy for the disaffected. 
The examples in this section illustrate that in analysing church-state 
relations, one must look not only to existing cases, but to underlying principles 
which prevent cases from being given legal recognition and remedies. The 
State may have an effective policy of non-recognition. It may, in other 
cases, have a firm policy, but not enforce that policy, so that the law will 
appear to be one thing, while practice may be the contrary (as in the case of 
school prayers and Bible readings). In any case, it must solve in some way 
the dilemma of finding an orderly process for the management of ecclesiastical 
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affairs. That a choice has been made may not be at all apparent unless one 
studies the history, the choices of other times and places, and the roads not 
taken. Other American jurisdictions had given preference to democratic 
majorities. This had the effect in New England of disestablishing the 
Episcopal churches and preferring congregational churches. Other states by 
law required congregational forms, effectively outlawing or severely 
disadvantaging hierarchical churches such as the Roman catholic. Again, some 
states refused to recognize the corporation sole (a corporation of one 
individual), but--as in Nebraska--forced the Roman catholic Church to vest 
ownership of its properties in lay trustees. This procedure, which forced the 
church to act contrary to its long-established policies, created several 
notorious controversies where congregations sought to take or retain control of 
church property or appointment of the priest and suffered hierarchical 
sanction. The American Rule, adopted by Oregon at first in name and later in 
practice, was a choice among many alternatives, made after review of other 
states' development and practice. It allowed the state to remain on the face 
of it neutral and uninvolved in theological disputes. 
v. TAXATION93 
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy. 11 94 In English and 
continental history, churches were not only free of tax, but had their own 
court and tax systems. Indeed, at times they were able to use the state as 
their arm of enforcement and collection. Established churches in the New 
World imposed taxes before and after the Revolution, with the State as their 
agent. After the Revolution there were still nine established churches,95a 
majority of the thirteen states. 
In colonial times, churches were not taxed because they were a part 
of the state. When legal separation of church and state later occurred, the 
customary exemption was continued and still later was extended to dissenting 
churches. 
By the time Oregon was settled and its government formed in the 
1840s, established churches in the United States were largely history. In 
principle, the founding fathers of the state determined that no individual 
would be forced to pay taxes to support state establishment of a particular 
religion. 
This was, however, not done clearly. The Indiana Constitution, Article 
I, Section 4, from which the Oregon Constitution was drawn, had a provision 
barring establishments of religion. This was not carried forward into the 
Oregon Constitution (although this failure has not been accorded significance 
to date).96 
Methods of exemption vary state by state. Some constitutions require 
and some merely permit exemption. Others are silent and leave exemption up 
to the legislature. Most states limit the amount of property which may be 
exempt. Some use the test of ownership, some of area or value, some of actual 
use, and some use a mix of methods, but all use some technique to keep the 
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extent of exemption under control. 
Before 1917, Art IX, Sec I excused churches from taxation as the 
legislature deemed fit.97 The Oregon Constitution after 1917 neither imposed 
taxation upon churches nor excused them from taxation. It was therefore left 
to the legislature to set policy. The legislature, strongly supportive of 
educational, religious and charitable work, chose to exempt from taxation 
property belonging to such organizations, incorporated or not, which was 
actually being used for such purposes. Because the existence and extent of 
such taxation was a legislative matter, questions would therefore revolve 
around construction of the precise words in the statutes. An attempt was 
made in the 1923 House of Representatives to tax churches, in a bill favored 
by the anti-Catholic federation of Patriotic Societies, but it failed by a 24-35 
vote.98 
The Oregon position, as it came to be interpreted, was a strict and 
rigorous one. It was assumed that taxation was the rule, and that any claim 
of exemption would be rigorously scrutinized. 
There are few tax cases from the early days, reflecting in part the 
small role the state then played. Early cases involved inheritance taxes and 
ad valorem taxes on property. An Oregon income tax was not passed until 
1923, and then promptly repealed. 
The key early case was that of Benevolent Hibernian Association v 
Kelly, in 1895. That case involved the question of to what extent ad valorem 
taxes were assessable against the land and building of a Hibernian group 
providing membership and charitable services to some Irish. It was determined 
that an organization could be charitable even if its me!Ilbership and services 
were not available to all. A rule of reasonable apportionment was also 
adopted. To the extent that the premises of the Society were actually used 
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for charitable purposes, it would be exempt. This decision, though strict, was 
clearly accommodating. Other early cases were similarly favorable. In 1870, 
the Oregon Supreme Court, in a case involving the Methodist Episcopal 
Protestant Church, ruled that a religious corporation could receive a bequest. 
In 1888 it ruled, again in favor of the Methodists, that the property of an 
unincorporated religious association, conveyed to a literary association--
Oregon State College--which was required to hold the property for the 
church's benefit, was valid.99 
Again in 1890 it held that a devise was for a public charity where it 
was for the advancement of religion by the comtruction of a (Presbyterian) 
church. 
In the early twentieth century, this accommodationist trend continued. 
In 1917, in Scott v Roman catholic Archbishop, the Supreme Court interpreted 
a deed, which contained explicit restrictive covenants for residential purposes, 
to allow the grantor broad powers of waiver. A Catholic Church, convent and 
school were allowed in spite of the objections of one of the other landowners. 
Similarly, the court enthusiastically foWld a Catholic Sisters of Mercy Hospital 
in Eugene to be a charitable and laudable exempt enterprise, even though it 
charged some patients and made money. This same pattern of broad exemption 
was continued when in 1933 a gift by will to the First Church of Oirist 
Scientist for the Christian Science Monitor was held to be for religious 
purposes and exempt. 
A different tide came increasingly to flow in the late 1940s, 
coincidentally with an increased federal role in both religious and state 
affairs. The Tax Commission began to assume a more active role in taxation. 
The 1949 case of Tax Commission v Methodist Book Concern emphasized that 




1954, the Court approved a will which made inheritance contingent upon a 
daughter not becoming or marrying a Catholic. Even though Oregon had 
passed a law determining that discrimination based on religion was contrary to 
state policy, and had expressly forbade such discrimination in employment and 
public accommodations, the court said that private parties retained the right 
to discriminate, however unreasonably.100 In 1959, in a case involving 
Multnomah School of the Bible, the rule was relaxed to one of "strict but 
reasonable" construction. But 1961 saw a Methodist Home held not exempt, 
and 1963 saw the operations of the Methodist Board of Publication held not 
exempt. The court noted that federal law used the "destination of benefits" 
test, granting exemption where the income of a business went to charitable 
purposes, but that Oregon employed a test of strict construction, which 
focused upon and required actual use. Thus, although all the prof it and 
benefits of the Church publishing business went to church exempt purposes, it 
was itself found not exempt. 
Another 1963 decision, contrary to the spirit of the 1888 decision on 
the Methodists, held that property of a church was not exempt where the legal 
title was held by trustees. The Court announced that Oregon was concerned 
only with legal title.101 Thus, property of the First Evangelical United 
Brethren Church, although clearly used for religious purposes and otherwise 
exempt, was held not exempt. 
This case also showed a further intensified presence of the state 
through the State Department of Revenue,102 which henceforth became a 
persistent litigator. In 1964, the Court again held against the Methodist Board 
of Publication. In 1967, it held that the Sisters of Charity, otherwise clearly 
exempt, waived that exemption by failing to claim it on time, and that the 
State Tax Commission was the place to seek relief, not the local courts or 
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commissioners. In 1977 this principle was reaffirmed when the Pacific 
Conference of Evangelical Churches was told that even though its failure to 
file timely was based upon the advice of a government official, its otherwise 
exempt conference center at Jennings Lodge could not be fotmd exempt. 
Again in 1971, when the Evangelical Lutheran Charity Board had 
acquired land for church and charitable purposes, the Colll"t held that the 
property did not become exempt until actually used for such purposes. Land 
held for future use was held not exempt. 
Somewhat less restrictively, in two companion cases, the Court found 
that the administrative center of the Protestant Episcopal Bishop and the 
chancery and newspaper {Sentinel) off ices of the catholic Archdiocese were 
exempt, because advancement of religion was held to be charitable. The cases 
followed in the line of Oregon Attorney General opinions which had long held 
that parsonages were not exempt, though churches and church-related 
activities were. 
A 1972 ruling, though favorable, showed the increasingly unrelenting 
pressure of the Department of Revenue. In the case of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, receipt of net income was held not to 
render a charitable/religious group non-exempt. Since the principle had long 
since been established in the 1923 Sisters of Mercy case, there was evident an 
attempt to change the law. 
From 1972 on the cases flowed faster and faster, more and more 
restrictively. The fact of litigative pressure is obvious, even though some of 
the decisions were not initially unfavorable. A Christian Pre-SChool was found 
to be exempt but only after intensive scrutiny and under _an analysis which had 
the result that much church-related child care would not be exempt. The 
197 4 Kelly case held that all income earned in an individual capacity was 
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taxable. Land held by the St. Vincent dePaul Society was held not exempt 
when "merely held with intent to use for charitable purposes". 
In 1976, the Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), was told by both 
Tax Court and Supreme Court that its farm, whose income all went to charity, 
could not be tax exempt. Again, it was emphasized that Oregon focused upon 
actual use, and was not a "destination of benefits" state. Another 1976 case, 
involving the German Apostolic Church, held that a statutory change had 
widened the concept of use, although the result seemed to be no more than an 
application of the Kelly principle of apportionment applied to exempt portions 
used for church activities, but not apartments. Analytically, it is a sign of 
the narrowing that a legislative change which restored the status quo ante was 
seen as a "widening". In a second LOS case, proper "use" was found and 
exemption granted where the delay in charitable use occurred only because of 
the government itself, whose permit requirements took time to obtain. 
The 1970s and 1980s saw an assault upon churches by the State 
Employment Division, which failed several times before at last achieving 
success. In 1977, the recently established Court of Appeals held that church 
schools were not covered under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). 
In 1979, the Archdiocese of Portland was similarly held not covered. These 
cases corresponded with similar attacks upon churches nationwide, as the IRS 
and unfriendly private parties and labor unions sought to bring churches under 
federal labor and tax laws. 
In 1980, the Appeals Court--with changed personnel--found that the 
Shiloh Youth Revival Center was covered "when its activities were of a type 
normally for profit and not integral to religious purposes". In 1981, the 
Supreme Court, in the Miller case, involving the Union Gospel Mission, held 
otherwise. 
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The federal and state constitutions, previously not thought relevant, 
now came to be used to attack church exemptions. 
The Supreme Court, with changed personnel, found its position shifting. 
In 1984, it ruled that a requirement, that Workers Compensation claimants 
could refuse treatment only when relying upon an accredited practitioner of a 
well-established church, would violate both the Oregon and Federal 
Constitutions. This court, like the federal courts, was beginning to extend the 
concept of religion so broadly that it would not for long be able to sustain 
church-related exemptions.103 
Indeed in 1985, in Salem Academy, a new landmark case, the Court 
held that even though the federal law "appeared" to require that churches be 
exempt from FUTA, it would separately interpret the Oregon Constitution to 
require that they be covered. The Court of Appeals had said that the 
distinction between recognized and unrecognized churches made the exemption 
law invalid. The Supreme Court held that the law was constitutional, but 
reached the same result by finding exemption could not be extended only to 
church-directed schools but not church-related schools. 
Indeed, in several footnotes, Justice Linde,104 the moving force on the 
Court in constitutional revision and strict separationalism, invited the 
legislature to consider disapproving all tax exemptions for churches. Speaker 
of the House Vera Katz had long held such a desire, and the footnotes have 
been interpreted by Charles Hinkle as an invitation to her to advance such 
proposals.I 0 5 
There are other Oregon tax cases which fit into the above patterns. 
As the state is seen by many to have the first obligation of charity and to be 
the institution of society which should have all or most responsibility for 
charity (now as a matter of right),106 so its presence and financial needs 
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seem to place it in competition with private charity. As in the field of 
education, that competition is not always expressed in direct form but in 
increasing financial pressures which lessen private parties' capacities to 
compete. 
The state, so able to make fine distinctions in some areas, in others 
finds itself unable or unwilling to do so. It allows itself to lessen the 
protections and exemptions accorded churches, rarely by direct attack, but 
more often by requiring such an expansive definition of religion or church that 
protection appears to become a reductio. 
In the 1980s, the state - acting through the Department of Education, 
the Attorney General and others - has been aggressively seeking ways to deny 
tax dollars to Rajneesh enterprises. This has led to ex parte accusations, 
unilateral suspension of payments, lawsuits and legislation. 
When Oregon tax law and policy are seen in conjunction with other 
state policies and practices towards religious groups, the era of generous 
preferment is clearly past. Churches are now at best like other private 
charities. All are under increasing restriction. At worst, they are not 
allowed even the exemption granted other charities because they are religious. 
The state has become neither friendly nor neutral, but antagonistic. 
VI • THE OREGON SCHOOL BILL OF 1922 
In 1922, the Ku Klux Klan, appearing out of nowhere, took over the 
State of Oregon. In a very few months, operating behind a veil of secrecy, it 
defeated one governor foolhardy enough to oppose it, and elected another who 
eagerly embraced it. It controlled local officials across the State, dominated 
the legislature (whose Speaker was named K.K. Kubli), and passed laws 
banning religious garb in public schools and outlawing all private and parochial 
schools. 
So goes the legend of Oregon history. It is true that the Klan 
briefly appeared in Oregon from 1921-1925. A Compulsory School Bill was 
passed which sought to require that all students attend public schools. But 
for that bill, the Klan was not primarily responsible107 and Oregon's Klan of 
the 1920s was very different from the Klan of today. Those differences, and 
the history of that Klan, require separate examination. Historians of the 
period have been too ready with epithet and mere charge, rather than 
evidence. Rather than the Klan, it was the "good people" of Oregon who 
conceived and passed the School Bill.108 
There are at least two stories: what actually happened; and how it 
came to be told otherwise. The one is a story of history, the other of myth-
making. It is important to understand both of these stories because, although 
the Klan is gone, the forces that made for the School Bill have been in 
Oregon long before and long since. 
The general public still scarcely knows the story of the School Bill, 
and it may come with ill grace to suggest it has the story wrong. But the 
1984 publication of Father Lawrence Saalfeld's Forces Of Prejudice In Oregon, 
1920-1925, done as a thesis in 1949, again draws attention to a moment when 
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Oregon trod the national stage to its discredit. Articles and theses on the 
School Bill and the Klan, and general histories of the period which tend to 
rely upon them and reproduce their themes, stand substantially uncorrected. 
Both the event and the accounts need more exposure. 
Readers of the history of the 1920s, nationally or in Oregon, will find 
those years facilely portrayed as a time of reaction, when the forces of 
fundamentalism and prejudice swept the country. Images of the decade have 
been crystallized by events such as the Scopes "Monkey Trial", the executions 
of Sacco and Vanzetti, the raillery of H. L. Mencken, the satire of Sinclair 
Lewis, and the anti-Republican writings of Arthur Schlesinger. Frederick 
Allen Lewis' Only Yesterday sets the tone. The Great War and the Great 
Depression limned the shores of memory, and all was seen as aftermath of the 
War or prelude to the Crash. The detail of events, as seen by the men who 
lived them, was too easily lost in such prepossessions. The times needed to 
heed the rebuke of an Edmund Burke or Samuel Johnson and be recalled to 
human and historical fidelity. Burke had said: "I do not know the method of 
drawing up an indictment against a whole people."109 
Fresh examination of "what actually happened" in the decade has 
begun to yield correction and more balanced explanation. Let us therefore 
examine the period of the School Bill with respect for the facts, for the 
individuals and their biographies, and for broader historical and political 
trends. Using our Occam's razor of historical technique, let us, before we 
must have recourse to concepts of group prejudice and disease concepts of 
moral history, review the plain facts. 
In the general elections of 1922, Oregon voters approved Initiative 
69, known as the Compulsory School Bill. The law, which would have gone 
into effect in 1926, provided that all children between the ages of eight and 
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sixteen were to attend public schools and be educated in the English language 
only. 
The Initiative petition was conceived and circulated by the Masons of 
Oregon, at the instance of the national Masonic Order. The Masons were 
advocating compulsory school and language bills nationally, and chose Oregon 
as a test case. In a dra111atic one-day campaign in June of 1922, enough 
signatures were obtained to place it on the November ballot. At first, it was 
claimed that 50,000 signatures were gathered in that one day. Actually only 
29,000 had been obtained, of which 13,000 were found invalid. Still, this was 
more than enough, and the 50,000 figure left an impression of overwhelming 
support. 
The Masons filed the arguments in the Voters Pamphlet for the Bill. 
They wrote to and placed advertisements in the newspapers. When the bill 
passed, claimed victory. When the law was attacked in Court, the Masons 
def ended it, at the trial court and before the U .s. Supreme Court. Today, in 
1985, they still defend its rightness.110 
Who are and were the Masons? Seen today by most as a charitable 
society which wears funny hats and helps sick children, the Masons are a 
society of humanists which exists world-wide. They claim origins in ancient 
times, but their present forms derive from the Europe of 1782, when they 
formed an intellectual and fraternal secret society to advance men's knowledge 
and oppose despotic rule. The French Encyclopeadists were Masons, as were 
such of our Founders as Washington, Hamilton, and Franklin. Masons have 
since been in the forefront of independence movements around the world, with 
such luminaries as Goethe, Lafayette, Kossuth, Boli~ar, and San Martin. 
Intellectual and political opposition to Catholicism, perceived as an opponent 
of free intellect and democracy, has also been part of Masonry's heritage. 
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Those who lmow Catholic Church history well have long regretted her too 
ready defense of reactionary governments in Europe and elsewhere. 20th 
Century readers of Thomas Mann's The Magic Momitain will recognize the 
passions for freedom and intellect, and the hatred of the catholic Church, 
which informed the Masons. Arising out of the Enlightenment, the Masons 
were committed to complete separation of church and state. The 
condemnation in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries by the Catholic Church 
of secret societies was a direct attack upon them. Simultaneous 
condemnations of Americanism, Modernism, and of public schools only proved 
their views of the Church. 
In 1920, the second post-War national Masonic convention was held in 
Portland. This move, engineered by Mason Mayor George Baker, made the 
national leadership familiar with Oregon. In the same year, Oregon's Masons 
adopted verbatim the national resolution calling for free and compulsory 
schools for all "as the only sure foundation for the perpetuation and 
preservation of our free institutions.11 111 Over 20 other states passed laws to 
require education in English alone, but Oregon was chosen for this test 
"because she has no foreign element to contend with and is, more that any 
other state, purely and fundamentally American.nll2 This conclusion was 
based upon Oregon's homogeneous population, its solid Protestantism, its 
common origins in New England and the Middle West, and its demonstrated 
patriotism in the recent War. It was hoped that Oregon would prove an 
"example for the rest of the country" .113 The Masons believed, with the 
experiences and the War years just behind them, that private schools were 
being used by the immigrant and church groups to continue to maintain divided 
loyalties, class differences, and opposition to American ideas of democratic 
practice. They believed, with educator John Dewey, that education was "the 
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fundamental method of social progress and reform.11114 
The Oregonian, although it opposed the School Bill, properly gave 
credit in a 1922 editorial to both the aims and effect of the Masons: 
It is not necessary to say that so patriotic, 
respectable and influential an organization as the 
Masons(Scottish Rite) would not sponsor any 
measure without a conscientious desire to promote 
the public welf are.115 
The Bill's opponents, especially the Catholics and Governor Olcott, 
scored a major victory in successfully ignoring the role of the Masons and of 
the common school movement, and in attributing it to the Klan. That 
characterization, belied upon close examination, mobilized national criticism of 
Oregon and aided in the law's eventual defeat. 
Many accounts of the School Bill are actually accounts of the Klan in 
Oregon. By providing such emphasis on the Klan, they leave the intended 
impression that the Klan was the major, if not the only, real force behind its 
adoption. The success of the one is held to demonstrate the success of the 
other. 
The Klan was formed in Portland in late 1921. The federation of 
Patriotic Societies (of which the Klan was not a member, and never could 
become one) caused the concept of compulsory school bill to become an issue 
in the 1922 Primary. Republican Candidate Charles Hall announced his 
support. When Republican Governor Ben Olcott, who in late 1921 had told a 
national paper that the Klan did not exist and could never take hold in 
Oregon, just five days before the Primary publicly attacked the Klan, it threw 
its support to Hall. Olcott, based upon incidents of violence in southern 
Oregon (never firmly tied to the Klan), issued a Proclamation accusing the 
Klan of violence and of religious intolerance. When Democratic Party 
Catholics and others crossed over to vote in the Republican Primary, Hall lost, 
~ 
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but by a bare 500 votes. He at first sued for a recount (W.S. U'Ren, ACLU 
correspondent in Oregon and Father of the Progressive System, was his lawyer. 
His campaign manager was Jewish.), but when election day crossovers were 
held legal, the suit was abandoned. He considered running as an independent, 
but discovered that this was prohibited by Oregon law. 
The Masons, persuaded of the support for the School Bill, introduced 
their Initiative in June. The Klan wavered. When it was clear that Hall 
could not run, Klan support was given to Democrat Walter Pierce. The Klan, 
enemies of Olcott, had no other place to go. Pierce indicated he supported 
the School Bill, and emphasized his descent from nine generations of 
Protestants, but also made clear that he would run, as he did, solely on the 
question of taxes. 
Pierce, a former school teacher and school superintendent, was a 
long-time Mason, and an admirer of the agnostic and anti-Catholic Robert 
Ingersoll. Lifelong he believed that Catholicism was a political force opposed 
to democracy. He worked for absolute separation of Church and State so as to 
prevent religious intrusion into public life. There are allegations that Pierce 
was a member of the Klan, but Pierce denied them, and the evidence is not 
credible that he was ever a Klan member, though it appears he did not reject 
Klan support in the campaign. At the time, Pierce expected the School Bill to 
lose, and estimated it would cost him 10,000 votes. 
During the Primary, Catholics, Lutherans, private school forces and 
others had organized to def eat Hall, symbol of the School Bill. Upon his 
def eat, they thought they had won. When the Masons dramatically announced 
the simultaneous filing and 50,000 signatures, they recognized their limited 
resources and sought national support. The Knights of Columbus and National 
Catholic Welfare Conference (the national conference of Catholic Bishops) 
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aided with money, legal advice, and publicity. Within Oregon, the Catholic 
Truth Society, led by Father Edwin O'Hara and Father Smith, dogged each 
pro-Bill speaker and cotmtered with the Catholic response. Father O'Hara, a 
nationally known figure for his work in labor and education, was the most 
eloquent opponent. O'Hara had been the key figure in passage of Oregon's 
protective labor laws for women and children, and placed his name on the 
successful defenses of those laws before the U .s. Supreme Court. As a result, 
he directly knew such figures as Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (who, 
as lawyer, had argued the famous Muller case from Oregon), and could call 
upon national leaders. Even American Civil Liberties head Roger Baldwin 
helped O'Hara find a lawyer. 
These impressive efforts failed to defeat the law, but did generate 
national attention for Oregon, most of it unfavorable. How, newspapers 
asked, could the progressive state of U'Ren, of Oswald West, of the Initiative 
and Referendum, now be under the thumb of the Klan? The law's opponents 
sought to portray it as the work of the Klan. Indeed, one editor, George 
Putnam, raged at the "conspiracy" on the part of the other Oregon press 
because they would not agree with his analysis that the Klan was behind it 
all. Putnam's analysis, given in such impartial languaage as: "Dangerous 
forces are insidiously gaining a foothold in Oregon11 ,ll6 suffers from 
inaccuracy and passion. Major newspapers such as The Oregonian had very 
publicly opposed the Klan as early as 1921, continued to speak against it, and 
attributed the Bill to the Masons, not to the Klan. Putnam's Salem paper, 
major papers from Portland and Medford, and of course, the catholic Sentinel, 
vigorously identified the Bill with the Klan and attacked both. National media 
in Oregon also attacked both. The Letters columns of many Oregon papers, 
and widely distributed pamphlets, debated the Bill. One can do worse than 
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take The Oregonian as a guide to these events. Putnam, the "crusading 
editor", had little respect for evidence and was such a partisan that he was 
arrested on Primary day for changing parties to vote against Hall (he was 
acquitted after a ruling that election day crossovers were legal). 
The Klan in Oregon was led by Fredrick Gifford, indeed a Klansman 
to defy stereotypes. Educated in Lutheran schools, he married a practising 
Catholic and had his three children educated in Hill Military Academy and St. 
Mary's Academy of the Society of Sisters (the later Plaintiffs in the court 
case). He remained friendly to catholics all his life, and there is evidence 
that he was threatened with expulsion from the Klan because he was too 
friendly to Catholics. Gifford's Klan will not match the ideas most people 
today have of the Klan. A prime example is the School Bill itself. In 
Oregon, the School Bill sought to join in one common public school all races, 
religions, and classes, to educate them together for citizenship in the 
American democracy. The Oregon Klan had auxiliaries for non-natives. The 
other respect in which it defies people's expectations of it is that it was 
largely ineffective. Its membership in Portland and Oregon never rose above 
14,000, and many of those were but paper members. It was unable to secure 
the memberships of such figures as Hall, Baker, and Pierce, and all were soon 
publicly to repudiate it. The Masons, nationally and in Oregon, announced 
that they would dismiss any Mason found also to be Klan member. The Oregon 
Klan was unable either to get accepted into, or take over, the Federation of 
Patriotic Societies. A close study of voting patterns in the State shows that 
where its slate differed from that of the Patriotic Societies, it was not 
successful. Two Portland politicians identified with the Klan were soon 
recalled. Governor Pierce refused the patronage which the Klan claimed that 
candidate Pierce had offered. Its leading publicist Lem Dever soon quit and 
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published a bitter attack. The Patriotic Societies sued the Klan in court, the 
revelations of which, combined with financial scandal, caused members to melt 
away like the proverbial morning dew. By 1924, the Klan was not to be 
found. Its paper, 'nle Western American, which in its day had eulogized 
Father O'Hara and his work for the laboring man, considered the Masons the 
true force and victors in passage of the School Bill, a claim a fortiori likely 
because it was made by the normally self-aggrandizing Klan. What the Klan 
did bring to Oregon was a dramatic brief presence. Like the American 
Protective Association, and the American or Know-Nothing Parties before it, 
however, the Klan had little actual membership or real power in Oregon. One 
writer once joked that in Atlanta, headquarters of the Klan, the B'nai B'rith 
had more members and influence. Certainly, in Oregon, there were more 
Catholics in Portland than there were Klansmen. The Klan played no role in 
the Initiative or defense of the case, and were dissolved before it was argued 
and lost in the U .s. Supreme Court. 
Upon the passage of the School Bill, not scheduled to take effect 
until 1926, opponents had a problem. Under existing law, it did not appear 
they could sue to prevent a distant future harm; there was no precedent 
overturning such a law; and education was an area of law considered reserved 
to the states. Yet if they waited, their schools would be destroyed long 
before 1926. They studied, and waited, and waited ••• Finally, in 1923, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case of Meyer v Nebraska struck down a Nebraska law 
which required, on criminal penalty, that all schools be conducted in English. 
Another court provided a precedent for suing to prevent future injuries. Only 
then did the Plaintiffs sue in federal district court in Portland, first the Hill 
Academy and then the Catholic Society of Sisters. Due to a clerical accident, 
the Sisters' case was called first, and so gave its name to the consolidated 
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case. The schools' lawyers included former legislator Dan Malarkey and future 
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hall S. Lusk. Lawyers assisting Governor 
Pierce and the State were Wallace McCamant and, on appeal, former Governor 
and U .s. Senator George Chamberlain. 
The Meyer case had shown that the Supreme Court would intervene in 
a state education case. In so doing, Justice McReynolds departed from current 
stereotypes of himself as arch-reactionary and automatic supporter of states' 
rights. The Pierce case was argued before the district court in early 1924. 
The schools' lawyers used analogies, derived from Father O'Hara's pamphlets, 
presenting the Bill somewhat confusedly as all at once a Platonic, Prussian, 
Spartan, and communistic attempt of the state to take over education. (Of 
course, the common school was precisely not like the schools of Sparta, the 
Republic, or Prussia, which admitted only the chosen few. The case shows 
once again the power of metaphor, especially misplaced metaphor, to shape 
legal decisions about religion). It also helps to remember that Oregon had a 
long tradition of unfriendliness to public, as opposed to private, education. 
The schools' attorneys quoted from Meyer verbatim and at length, anticipating 
later appeal to McReynolds and his Brethren. In April, the three-judge court 
found the new law was unconstitutional. It was held a violation of the 
private schools' contract rights, which the State might reasonably regulate but 
not destroy, and of the parents' (although they were not parties) rights to 
determine the education of their children. 
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Masons had no chance. 
Not only the Meyer precedent, but a headcount of the Justices must have 
discouraged them. There is evidence that Holmes, the "great liberal", who 
had dissented in Meyer did not attend the oral argument and may not have 
voted at au.117 He was the only uncertain vote, with his disposition to let 
64 
the people regulate themselves, even to Hell, if they would. McReynolds was 
a passionate supporter of private schools. Two Justices, McKenna and Butler, 
were Catholic. Chief Justice Taft was a Unitarian, who, when President, had 
appointed the catholic White as his predecessor, Sutherland was well known to 
be friendly to Catholics. Sutherland was Morman and a student of Judge 
Cooley: unlikely to support an anti-religious measure. Sanford had a degree 
in education and was educated in private schools. Van Devanter later joined 
the 1929 decision which, forcing the Klan to disclose its records, completed its 
destruction on the national level. Brandeis, a Jew, had been an ally of Father 
O'Hara who, through Felix Frankfurter, continued to have his ear. The 
Republican Court had little reason to oppose national opinion or to favor a 
Democratic Governor. The unanimous decision by Justice McReynolds was a 
landmark decision, and continues to be extensively relied upon today. 
McReynolds wrote that "The child is not the mere creature of the State", and 
that the American system "excludes any general power to standardize its 
children". An irony of the case is that McReynolds, today mostly seen as the 
arch-opponent of the New Deal, led this seminal intrusion into state affairs. 
The Masons had chosen Oregon as a test case, and so it proved to be, 
to their chagrin. The catholics, at first dismayed, came to see the case as a 
blessing in disguise. The right to private schools and to parental direction of 
education was now enshrined in the federal Constitution. 
The role of the Progressives and of supporters of the common school 
should also not be lost sight of. In the 1800s Horace Mann and his disciple 
Henry Barnard had sought to shape society through the common compulsory 
school. In the 20th Century, John Dewey also believed that private schools 
should disappear, not by compulsion, but because they would not and should 
not compete with the public schools. Dewey and Mann rejected private 
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schools as inimical to American democracy, and Henry Barnard advocated their 
outright abolition. Their positions then compare to that of educational 
associations and liberals today, who continue to find in the common school the 
panacea for society's problems. Then, as now, progressives generally revere 
the public school, and conservatives the private. Interestingly, it is today's 
liberal groups like the American Civil Liberties Union who support the garb 
bill and do much to weaken private schools to favor the public. These 
positions may or may not be prejudicial, but it is worth noting those who hold 
them. Are they prejudiced today because they assert what the Klan did in 
the 1920s? Historian David Tyack has written: 
At its most eloquent, the Klan rhetoric (of the 
1920s) sotmds like the plan of those integrationist 
liberals today who would make the public school a 
true "common school" by achieving a racial, 
ethnic, and economic cross-section in each 
classroom.118 
The Klan of the 1920s, contrary to the beliefs of many today about 
it, wished all children in the same classroom, whatever the race or religion. 
In these beliefs, and in their intent, they were heir to the progressive 
educator. Steven Recken, one of the most insightful analysts of those days, 
concludes that "Neither the Klan nor the Masons were as responsible for the 
Oregon School Bill as were Horace Mann and John Dewey.11119 
Without discounting the existence of the Klan and of some prejudice, 
and fully allowing for the Masons and Progressive educational forces, one may 
disabuse preconceptions with the contrariness of facts. For example, is it 
likely that Hall would have been a Klan member and defended by U'Ren? or 
have a Jewish campaign manager? Do many analysts recall, have they learned, 
that Olcott was highly unpopular in his own party and was an appointed 
governor with little following? Do they know that Pierce--known even in 
1918 as "Mr. Democrat"-- was widely popular and had been expected to win 
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in 1918 until an inopportune remark by Woodrow Wilson and the flu epidemic 
ruined his chances. He had been expected to win against the popular 
Governor Withycombe, and benefited from substantial democratic voting in 
1922. Pierce in 1922 did not need the Klan, and thought his support of the 
School bill would cost him votes. One can recite such anomalies at length, to 
show that the image of the State and election as Klan-determined, or even 
solely School Bill or Mason-determined was not only not the case, but would 
violate the normal rules of politics, and the complex political histories which 
brought each of the parties to those years. Historians' accounts of the Klan 
and School bill suffer from many defects. There are major factual errors, 
mere charges accepted as evidence, isolated incidents treated as though they 
revealed majority behavior, assertions that all must have been prejudiced 
because a few clearly were. Two major errors recur. A near-total focus on 
the Klan in telling the School Bill story gives the Klan the appearance of 
undue importance. Most writers are trying to explain the phenomenon of the 
Klan, rather than the events. Proper attention to the party politics and 
voting patterns of the period, as well as regional factors--what should be 
normal analysis--renders a very different picture, in which Pierce's victory can 
be explained without the School bill or the Klan. Similarly, a near-total focus 
on behavior alleged to be prejudicial gives it Wldue prominence, and fails to 
allow the normal and particular reasons of actual individuals proper respect. 
The reasoning of some historians is circular. 
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The garb bill is said to be prejudiced because the Klan supported it, 
and the Klan to be prejudiced because it supported the garb bill. The Klan is 
said to have run the State because the garb bill was passed, and the garb bill 
to have been passed because the Klan ran the State. Oregon's general 
historians appear to have given little direct attention to this period, as is 
revealed by fundamental factual errors which could not have occtn"red had 
they given it independent thought. 
The historians of the 1920s and of the Oregon School Bill have 
suffered from partial and biased accoWlts with overemphasis on the role of the 
Ku Klux Klan and upon shadowy forces of prejudice and bigotry. These forces 
are all too inaccessible to research, and lead to poor use of evidence and 
logic. Histories based upon them fail for the most part to search for and 
present complex motivations or explanations. There is too much review of 
"forces" and too little of real individuals, and what they believed and did. 
When the issues surrotmding the School Bill are reduced to study of 
major actors in its passage and defeat, stereotypes and preconceptions prove 
of little value. The neglected initiator and def ender of the Bill was the 
Masons. Even the Oregon Klan, though its role was less than has been 
supposed, was a very different Klan than most have imagined. Concentration 
on forces and statistics has allowed historians not to present the reality of 
these groups and individuals such as Olcott, Hall, Pierce, Gifford, Baker, 
O'Hara, or McReynolds. A review of the histories of the period shows this 
consistent neglect and an overemphasis on the imagined role of the Klan. 
Consideration of the biographies and moving (orces in the lives of 
Gifford, O'Hara, Pierce, Mc Reynolds does much to remove preconceptions and 
restore the issues of that day to their proper complexity. 
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Historians of the 1920s have for too long presented the period as one 
of backwardness and prejudice, and failed to search for its positive forces or 
the darker sides of forces viewed by the historians as progressive or 
enlightened (both small and capital). Out of the many studies which now 
exist of this period in Oregon, presenting a mosaic of increasing complexity, 
this essay develops a re-evaluation through the methods of presentation of the 
Masonic role, criticism of existing accomts, and review of major biographies. 
Gifford emerges as a Mason and a Klansman, but a Klansman who 
rejected violence and was friendly to Catholics. Pierce, a noted Democrat, 
populist and later New Dealer, had a lifelong animus against aliens and 
Japanese, but through his admiration of Ingersoll, his Masonic leanings, and 
his role as teacher and school superintendent, developed a firm devotion to the 
common school and to absolute separation of church and state. Father 
O'Hara, the sophisticated Catholic priest and historian, companion to local and 
national social welfare and educational elites, is seen to have successfully led 
an opposition which recruited the ACLU and even, waveringly, John Dewey 
himself, and to have placed natural law ideas into the mouth of a Supreme 
Court Justice. Justice McReynolds, for too long characterized as racist and 
reactionary, emerges as a champion of private schools and individual liberty. 
The Pierce case and the School Bill controversy well illustrate that 
appearances and labels can be deceptive, that easy and convenient attributions 
may prove wide of the mark. When alternative theories of the origin of the 
School bill, other than the Klan and prejudice, are presented, whether they 
show the Bill as the product of Progressive educational thought, as an 
expression of agrarian protest, or as the product of Masonic enlightenment 
theories and beliefs, both the characters and the facts more easily can be 
f omd to fit. The contradictions of accomts such as those of Kenneth 
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Jackson120or Father Saalfeld are then easily explained. Of course, no history 
can hope to capture the infinite complexities of men, but one must keep 
testing the evidence for a more coherent account, seeking in the best 
scientific and human spirit one which does not rely upon imagined and, in the 
end, unobservable forces. 
No character or group emerges from this analysis with a pure or 
correct mix of beliefs. The Pierce case well illustrates that the divisions of 
that day were found not only among groups, but within them, not only among 
individuals, but within them. As Kenneth Jackson said of the Klan, so also it 
should be said of the School Bill (parentheses added): 
Because it is more important to understand than to 
condemn, the text does not ring with denunciations of 
intolerance. The task is to examine ••• In the final analysis, 
the Klan (School bill) was not alien to society or 
unAmerican. If it were, the Problem would have been 
much simpler. Rather the Klan (School Bill) was typically 
American. It prospered and grew to national power by 
capitalizing on forces already existent in American 
society: our readiness to ascribe all good or all evil to 
those religions, races, or economic philosophies with which 
we agree or disagree, and our tendencies to profess the 
highest ideals while actually exhibiting the basest of 
prejudices. To examine the Klan (School Bill) is to 
examine ourselves.121 
With the caveat that historians, including Jackson, have too often 
behaved towards the School Bill and its supporters in the manner of easy 
condemnation they profess to disapprove in the Klan, it is proper to end with 
the statement that in searching for darker forces and motivations, which as 
children of Freud and Darwin our century destines us to do, we should not 
forget the open and obvious, and fail to credit what we can directly observe. 
The Greeks have told us that not even God can change the past, but 
our age knows that historians can. History therefore becomes for us not 
merely a science or an art, but a moral task. To that task, we must bend all 
70 
of our human faculties, but remember that it is humans like ourselves whom 
we are studying. Courtesy and evidence, respect for the best of men's 
motives and actions, must be as much a part of our search as properly 
considered charges and suspicions, weighed across the years and often without 
the subject able to explain himself. The period of the School Bill in Oregon 
can be a metaphor for prejudice, latent and revived. It can be a story of an 
excess, well-intentioned but best failed. It can be the story of a life, such as 
that of Pierce, which may never yield an answer as to his relation with the 
Klan, whether he merely used them, belonged, or allowed himself to appear to 
belong. In searching the period, we should be content with what it reveals, 
without the need to make it show us a false image of Oregonians as tragically 
tainted with prejudice which must needs recur on some Atropic schedule. The 
fault is not in the stars but in individuals. 
VII. DISSIDENT AND MINORITY CHURCHF.8 
The history of religion often appears to be the history of the 
development of differences among churches and the recruitment of the state 
to support one side against the other. One may with confidence assume that 
new or minority religions will face not only general resistance but legal 
resistance as well. Indeed, revolutionary visions often invite supression by the 
vigor and violence of their condemnation of the existing order or orthodoxies. 
This has certainly been true for Oregon. 
To understand the reception given new churches in Oregon, one must 
have some knowledge of that group's position in the country at the time. 
Oregon's reception, though it may have varied in intensity, was generally of a 
piece with that of other states. The reception of Jehovah's Witnesses and of 
the Russian Old Believers was demonstrably influenced by the U .s. Supreme 
Court decisions which accorded them protection and affirmative accom-
modation. The Old Believers came to public attention in Oregon after the 
Amish Yoder case had given license for their way of life. That they came as 
refugees from communist countries further worked in their favor and minimized 
local conflict. 
Below, brief descriptions are given of major minority religions or 
"cults" and their legal reception within the state of Oregon. 
( 1) The catholic Chureh.12 2 
From the earliest days, the Catholic Church has faced real and 
threatened disfavor. The American-British dispute over the Oregon Territory 
took on religious overtones, accented by the shameful treatment of 
McLoughlin's Oregon City land claims. After the Whitman Massacre, and 
attempts to place the blame on Catholic priests for instigating it, a law was 
proposed which would have exiled all Catholic priests from the Territory. The 
~ 
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very record of the 1857 Constitutional Convention, in the discussion of Article 
I, Section 5, on chaplains, contains the observation by member Waymire that 
"Suppose a Roman Catholic should be elected Chaplain; every other religious 
demonination in Oregon would be in open rebellion." Papal condemnation of 
Masonry and other secret societies, of Modernism and Americanism, and Rome's 
untimely endorsement of the principle of papal infallibility and of the 
Immaculate Conception, led Catholics and Protestants to pull apart from each 
other in distrust and distaste. Catholics saw nativist sentiments and 
movements successfully tighten irrunigration laws in order to prevent continued 
entry of their co-believers. The laws were also used to prevent entry and 
effect deportation of ethnic church members, including German nationality 
churches, many of which were Catholic. 
The major legal attacks upon Catholicism began in the 1920s. The 
Oregon School Bill, passed by Initiative in 1922, would have required all 
students under 16 to attend only public schools, with all teaching in the 
English language.123 The 1923 legislature also passed the Religious Garb Bill, 
designed to remove Catholic nuns from teaching in Oregon public schools and 
to impose criminal penalties for boards which refused to enforce the law. 
Prior to this time a number of Catholic rural corrununities had, persuaded by 
economics, consolidated parochial and public schools with the nuns teaching 
and being paid by the State. The legislature also considered making 
sacramental wine illegal, and cancelling Columbus Day as a holiday. 
Mostly the agencies of government chose not to intervene when private 
parties and groups chose to discriminate on the basis of religion. Catholics as 
well as Jews were excluded from employment, clubs and associations well into 
the 1970s. Even the ecumenical movement did not accumulate enough force 
until 1979 to allow the Canby Ministers Association to admit a Catholic priest 
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as member.124 In the 1954 Snodgrass case, the Oregon Supreme Court, even 
after the State had passed laws for bidding discrimination based upon religion, 
firmly supported the rights of private parties to discriminate and to use State 
agencies and courts as vehicles to enforce their will. 
Many laws, such as one proposed to prohibit any but American flags 
flying outside of public buildings, would not seem anti-religious unless one 
knew they were designed to prevent Irish Catholics from flying the Irish flag 
on St. Patrick's Day. 
Although parochial schools were now protected by law, after 1925 they 
were not protected from economics. It cost money to run the schools, and 
catholics were being taxed to operate the public schools as well. This dual 
burden led Catholics and their supporters to obtain laws which provided that 
the State make availale to all students free transportation, books, supplies and 
like benefits. Similar laws, and cases opposing them, were being passed in 
other states and at the national level. The U .s. Supreme Court in fact 
approved textbooks for parochial schools, but in the 1962 Dickman case, the 
Oregon Supreme Court, relying upon the provisions of the Oregon Constitution, 
said that this was an impermissible benefit to religion. 
In 1961 and 1962, the Oregon Constitutional Revision Commission 
sought to alter the Constitution explicitly to prohibit aid to Catholic schools, 
but faced such an uproar that the ACLU proposal was tabled. However, in a 
somewhat backdoor move, the Commission did propose a change in the language 
of Article I, Section 5, which would have provided that no state monies go to 
religion (a provision narrower than the existing words). Although that 
provision was not approved (the entire package failed to win enough support 
to go to the voters), those who sought to place it in the Constitution later 
found themselves on the courts and began actively to interpret the State 
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Constitution to give this meaning to the unchanged words. 
During the 1945 legislature, a released time law was passed, which 
required schools to allow students to attend religion classes. That law was 
approved by the Attorney General, but came under attack in the courts. In 
the 1960 Dilger case, the court, following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Colll't, 
approved released time. 
In 1972, an Initiative was filed by catholics. It sought to overturn 
the Dielanan case and to replace the language of Article I, Section 5, with 
the language of the federal First Amendment, now because of Dickman 
perceived to be more protective of religious groups. That proposal failed to 
pass. 
In 1973, Catholic defendants again sought to have the Court declare 
shared and released time arrangements constitutional. The Colll't rejected 
shared time, in which the premises of a catholic school were dedicated to 
public school education part of the day, and parochial the rest. The Court 
held that since the school authorities determined who could attend, the school 
could not be truly public. Released time was again upheld. The Colll't once 
again emphasized that the "student benefit theory" was rejected in Oregon. 
In 1980-81, after Catholic students filed suit attacking a law which 
prevented them from participating in school athletics for a year after any 
transfer to or from a public school, the Appeals Court ruled against them. 
Other cases along the way, usually paralleled at the national level, 
included attempts to have diocesan offices and the church newspaper office 
declared subject to state taxes, revival of the Garb Bill (though this time 
against Rajneeshees and Sikhs), and attempts to subject Catholic church 
operations to the labor laws and unemployment laws. In the background, anti-
Catholic posters were found in 1985 plastered to walls all over Portland. 
75 
These alleged that the Vatican controlled TIME Magazine, NEWSWEEK, and 
other media and banks.125 Anti-Catholic plays such as Sister Mary Ignatius 
Explains it all for You and Agnes of God,126played to full audiences, and even 
"escaped nuns", now Lesbians, lectured to large groups at Portland State 
University with convent tales as lurid as Maria Monk.127 
Were these cases not part of a much broader movement against 
churches, non-public schools and religious groups, Catholics might well believe 
they were being singled out. 
( 2) Early Churches. 
When Oregon's early churches disputed among themselves, the courts 
largely took a hands-off position over the question of which group was 
entitled to control church assets and policy. In the 1888 Liggett case, the 
Court said that an unincorporated church could properly impose a trust upon a 
corporation to effect its will. In the Philomath College case in 1893, the 
Court adopted the American Rule that courts would not interfere in 
ecclesiastical disputes, although a reading of the case shows that the Court 
went to great lengths to examine which was the correct body. Mostly the 
courts used the church rules as their constitution, or comparable practices 
with the effect of bylaws or constitutions, as in the Andrews case in 1917 or 
the Banks case in 1946. These decisions effectively kept church cases of this 
sort out of the courts. The very few cases which did come up had to do with 
whether or not correct procedure was followed, just as with any other 
corporation, and did not purport to deal with church doctrines or doctrinal 
differences. 
(3) CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS.128 
When the Christian Scientists came to Oregon in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, they were, as elsewhere, met with opposition. 
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But Oregon proved friendlier than other states. In Nebraska, in 1894, 
a Christian Science practicioner named Ezra Buswell was acquitted by a trial 
court of violating the law regulating medical practicioners. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court held to the contrary and even cited scripture to find him guilty 
of simony, selling the gift of the spirit for money. In 1900, it reaffirmed this 
position in another case. Only in 1921, after numerous failed attempts, did 
the legislature change the law to exempt religious practicioners (so long as 
they did not use medicines). 
In 1900, the medical profession in Oregon successfully sought to have 
a Christian Scientist practitioner criminally prosecuted for practicing medicine 
without a license. A gravely ill woman had been treated by many doctors, but 
all had given up on her. She then sought Christian Science treatment, but she 
died. The Christian Scientist was first found guilty before a Justice of the 
Peace Court jury, but on appeal to the Circuit Court in Clackamas Cotmty was 
retried and found not guilty. The Scientists wisely defended by stressing not 
so much the scientific aspect of their beliefs, but the social prominence of 
their members and supporters. They were quick, through the Christian Science 
Monitor, and through members from aristocratic positions in society, to become 
accepted.129 This case was judged for Oregon a rare instance of judicial 
harassment. The laws were later changed to protect religious healing 
practices.130 
Over the years Christian Scientists continued, however, to have 
problems with doctors and hospitals on such questions as drug and blood 
transfusion refusal. But they have been largely successful because they have 
well-organized and professional backup out of central headquarters in Boston, 
which stresses the scientific and legal support for their views and which shows 
to physicians that there are alternatives, such as plasma, which are acceptable 
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in most cases. The Christian Scientists, like the Unitarians, found quick social 
acceptability the key to relative acceptance to the world of mainline 
churches. The eminence of the internationally respected Monitor played no 
small part in this transf orma tion.131 
In two cases, Poe in 1933 and Estabrook in 1939, the Supreme Court 
accorded protection to Scientists. In Poe, it held that a gift to The Monitor 
was religious and therefore tax-exempt. In Estabrook it was held reversible 
error to allow inquiry into a witness's belief in Christian Science. 
(4) THE PEACE CHURCHES.132 
Members of the so-called "peace churches" -- Quakers, Amish, 
Mennonites, Hutterites, Brethren, etc. -- (Jehovah's Witnesses are treated 
separately below) perenially collide with the State because of their refusal to 
bear arms or participate in the wider society. Two areas of collision have 
been especially evident in Oregon. 
(1) Pacifistic beliefs in America tend to be respected in times of peace, 
but not in times of war. Our courts distinguish between religious beliefs and 
action, but our public seems at times to believe that one is entitled to the 
beliefs only. World War I, which nearly everyone at first opposed, became a 
moral crusade once the U.S. entered. Those who held back, whether for 
religious, ethnic or political reasons, were subjected to ridicule and attack, 
ranging from loss of jobs to deportation or imprisonment. 
Article X, Section 2 of the Oregon Constitution, not cited in any 
reported court decision, allows conscientious objection. It provides that 
"Persons whose religious tenets, or conscientious scruples forbid them to bear 
arms shall not be compelled to do so." Originally it excused only in time of 
peace, but was amended to its present form in 1962. 
The Quakers in Oregon have been almost entirely conservative 
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evangelicals, who withdrew from fellowship with more political Quakers. Mast 
were Republicans. During World War I many were placed in prison for refusal 
to enter the military. The 1922 Yearly Meeting adopted a resolution calling 
for release "of all C.O.'s who were being held as "political prisoners" "· 133 
By the time of World War II, the pacifistic churches and the military, 
with more experience of each other, generally handled alternative service 
smoothly for recognized conscientious objectors. 
By the eve of World War II, imprisonment was unsual. In 1945 64.596 
of young men of the Oregon Yearly Meeting were registered as combatants, 
and 35.596 as conscientious objectors (serving in noncombatant service or 
civilian Public Service camps). In only one case, Pacific College professor 
Edwin Sanders, who refused to register at all, did imprisonment result.134 By 
the time of the Vietnam War, Oregon Quakers avoided identification with 
non-evangelical Quakers who actively dissented, 135 including separation from 
affiliation with the secular American Friends Service Committee. The 
Conscription Act of 1940 was written in consultation with the Historic Peace 
Churches and provided for civilian public service for conscientious 
objectors.136 
(2) The German churches and associations, especially during WW I, were 
under extreme social and legal pressure, which fundamentally altered their 
shape. Laws were passsed all over the country forbidding use of the German 
language. Many churches and associations gave up or substantially reduced 
German language usage. Lutheran churches, strongly national in character and 
with usually strong Germanic flavor, especially felt this pressure. In 1916, 
irate citizens filed a petition to close the Lutheran School at Sheridan. "The 
Lutheran School officials took the case to a federal judge in Portland who 
ruled that the school was in no danger and promised it protection.nl37 A 1919 
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Oregon Law prohibited teaching in language other than English. The Lutheran 
School Board suspected this law was unconstitutional, but forbade any 
congregation from making it a test case before· it consulted with the Synodical 
School Commission.138The Oregon School Bill contained provisions which 
effectively prohibited teaching of school in German and outlawed church 
schools where national or ethnic separation could be taught. The Lutherans 
therefore became active opponents of the Bill, working, as did the 7th Day 
Adventists, with the Catholics, their traditional rivals. 
(5) JEHOV AB'S WITNESSES.139 
The Witnesses came into legal prominence in Oregon and the U.S. in 
the 1930's. Their aggressive on-street and door-to-door proselytising led all 
over the country to many arrests. Witnesses often played records or 
distributed materials extremely offensive to Catholics and other religious 
groups. They were arrested for violating noise laws, for disturbing the peace, 
soliciting without a license, contributing to delinquency of minors, violating 
child labor laws, refusing to submit to the draft or to take oaths or pledges of 
allegiance, or become recognized conscientious objectors. Their sense of 
separateness and litigiOusness (Courts being the one part of the State they did 
not disdain to use) led them to find prejudice where it may not have 
existed.140 
· The leading cases involving a Witness refusing to participate in the 
pledge of allegiance or take oaths were decided at the national level. Local 
instances occurred in Oregon, where they were addressed by Attorney General 
Opinions, based upon the U .s. Supreme Court decisions. These at first allowed 
oaths to be required, and then forbade. 
In Oregon, especially in World War II when their presence was more 
pronounced, Witnesses went to jail in large numbers for refusing to serve in 
80 
the military. Unlike the Quakers, they would refuse to register or do 
alternative service.141 
The leading Oregon case, and for many years the leading case in 
Oregon Constitutional law on religion, was occasioned by a Witness who was 
arrested for having his children distribute literature and solicit on the streets 
of Portland. In 1944, the Oregon Supreme Court, in the case of Thornton v 
City of Portland, decided that the city could reasonably regulate religious 
practices and prevent a Witness from using his 14 year old child to solicit on 
the public streets. 
The U.S. Supreme Court had just decided the case of Prince v 
Massachusetts, which allowed the State to prohibit using children for such 
work. The Oregon Court adopted that ruling. It held that, although they 
were expressed in different words, the federal and Oregon Constitutional 
provisions on religion had the same meaning {That continued to be the firm 
position of Oregon Courts until 1985, with the exception of the Diclanan 
decision and the second decision in the Cross case. In 1985 in the Salem 
Academy case, the Justices, led by Justice Linde who had been on the 
Constitutional Revision Commission and been a longtime advocate of State's 
independently interpreting their own constitutional provisions, reasserted that 
the Oregon Constitution was understood by them to be now narrower than the 
federal). 
The federal decisions, C&ntwell, Barnette, etc., established the legal 
right of the Witnesses to solicit on the streets and from door-to-door, and to 
at tend schools but decline to pledge allegiance. Those decisions were 
followed by state legal authorities. In 1940, after the first flag salute case 
in which Justice Frankfurter had eloquently ruled that Witnesses could be 




Little express legal discrimination against Jews has existed in Oregon. 
Private discrimination did exist, although Jews could be heard to say they had 
never encountered it. Still, such figures as Federal Judge Gus Solomon have 
said they encountered prejudice, in his case inability to find a law job with 
any firm in town or get admitted to Gentiles-only clubs. Religious 
discrimination was declared against state public policy and contrary to law in 
employment and public accommodations in 1949. But this only identifies one 
of the problems in analysing church-state relations or religious prejudice and 
law. Prejudice is no less existent when it is done by private individuals and 
the State declines to intervene or forbid. One could not have said there was 
no legal discrimination against Negroes because the law would not recognize 
them if they complained. 
Jews have been successful and important businessmen, civic leaders and 
politicians in Oregon. In the 19th century, German Jews were leading 
merchants and community leaders. This pattern of successful participation has 
continued in this century. Julius Meier became Governor in 1929, Gus Solomon 
became federal judge in 1949, and Neil Goldschmidt, former Mayor of Portland 
in the 1960s and Secretary of Transportation under President Carter, is a 
serious candidate for Oregon Governor in 1985. 
The 1949 State laws, and the 1964 federal Civil Rights Actl43and 
Executive Orders made public religious discrimination illegal, but did not reach 
private discrimination. In this sense, the 1954 Snodgrass case represented a 
legal setback for all religious groups. 
The late 1970s and 1980s have seen a resurgence of Neo-Nazi and 
ultra-patriotic, anti-semitic behavior and groups in the U .s., including Oregon. 
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Incidents of painting of swasticas and vandalism of synagogues have occured in 
Portland and surromding areas. These incidents, combined with Klan-type 
cross burnings and other racial problems, led the 1981 and 1983 legislatures to 
make racial and religious intimidation both misdemeanor and felony crimes. 
On these laws, portions of the black and Jewish communities were opposed by 
the ACLU, which was concerned with the restrictions on speech and thought in 
what it thought a poorly drafted bill. The Anti-Defamation League, strongly 
supported the law. These concerns led to adj~tment of the laws in 1983 to 
meet ACLU concerns. 
The presence, in Portland at least, of a strong Jewish presence since 
the 1880s, has placed a check on overt prejudice, but not successfully placed 
a check on private or anonymous behavior and opinion. Jews have been 
founders and leaders of the ACLU, including federal Judge Solomon, Attorneys 
Leo Levenson, Paul Meyer, Court of Appeals Judge Jonathan Neuman, and many 
others. Their concern for religious liberty and non-establishment has led them 
to play a forceful role in attacking bigotry or perceived establishment. 
{7) THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS 
("HARE KRISHNAS"))44 
The ISKC, known derisively as the "Hare Krishnas" because of their 
on-street chant {to the tune of "You Are My Sunshine") as they solicit 
passersby, came to Oregon as part of the 1960's counter-culture trend towards 
Eastern and quasi-Eastern religions. In Oregon as elsewhere, ISKA members, 
practicing a communal life, shaving their heads, wearing robes, aggressively 
soliciting on street corners and in airports and public places, living poorly, ran 
into legal problems. They were harassed and made to move on by police. 
They were arrested for solicitation without a license. The State conducted 
investigations into the raising of their children, and in some cases seized 
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children and removed them permanently because of alleged "inadequate care", 
which often seemed to mean placing them in other than a Christian 
atmosphere. 
In many cases, low level harassment was effective. In others, ISKAs 
were able to turn to free legal groups like ACLU and Legal Aid. Because the 
case law developed by the Witnesses on street soliciting and speech has been 
clear since the 1940s, usually intervention by a lawyer was all that was 
needed. Custody cases, however, with their resolution founded in discretion 
vested in judges who must assess individual facts and equities, usually were 
resolved on a non-religious basis on paper, though religion was clearly a factor 
and often the determining one. 
Parents and relatives also used the police and the courts, either to 
obtain help in seizing their children for "deprogramming", or to def end their 
actions in the courts. Most of these cases fizzled out, as the parties evaded 
jurisdiction once they were physically free of a court's jurisdiction. Most 
courts were pleased to be free of the problems, and allowed cases to be 
dismissed. 
In 1979, a Portland lawyer, aided by a Marion County Circuit Judge, 
obtained an ex Parte order which allowed him to seize his clients' son at the 
Portland airport. The son was promptly removed from the state for 
deprogramming. Although the press and the Judge expressed concern, the case 
was allowed to drop. ISKC in turn sued the parents, but also allowed its case 
to drop. 
One ISKA case, Leyda v Henrich Associates, reached the Oregon 
Supreme Court. Brought by Portland's free Legal Aid program, it held, based 
upon the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lloyd v Tanner, from 
Oregon, that the federal First Amendment did not compel privately owned 
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shopping centers to allow access to private parties to solicit on their property. 
ACLU subsequently has sought to obtain a different result in the legislature, 
but has not succeeded to date. 
(8) ETHNIC CBURCHES.145 
-Some of the Ethnic Churches, especially those which adhere to older 
ways, and including some of the Peace Churches, have been subject to 
investigation, by the State Childrens Services Division, of their child rearing 
and educational practices. The burden of such investigation and even 
prosecution has been heavy in some cases, with school authorities using the 
public prosecutors to assist. In 197 8, a family of Russian Old Believers in 
Marion County faced criminal and civil prosecution for refusing to place their 
children in public schools. The parents believed that those schools l.Uldermined 
their religious beliefs. Misdemeanor and contempt prosecutions were brought 
against them. They were continually and very publically theatened not only 
with jail but with loss of their children. Finally they left the State,146 and 
fled to Alaska. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court, in the Yoder case, gave 
constitutional protection to the separatist ways of the Amish, most states 
including Oregon have not been very respectful of the decision and have been 
slow to apply it. Home teaching is allowed in Oregon, but only with the 
permission of the local school superintendent. This has meant in practice that 
permission would be granted on a haphazard basis. Christians and Old 
Believers have complained that permission comes less often and with more 
difficulty to them than to "hippies" or more secular parents. Whatever the 
facts, the perception is real and reinforced by the discretionary nature, local 
option and standardless application of the law. 
Oregon has a strong and visible population of Old Russians, and a solid 
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core of Menonites and Quakers. These are usually solid citizens, rural and 
agricultural, with strong family life. Just as firmly and openly however, they 
decline to be part of modern life, and some find themselves in opposition to 
traffic laws, children's services, the schools, and the federal government's 
selective service and tax laws.147 
(9) THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY. 
The Church of Scientology has had a Portland presence since the mid-
1970s. It has operated a very viable downtown school, and several other 
locations, including a foundation school in Sheridan. It has been under attack 
and criticism for many years. Critics have said that it was a cult, a fraud, 
which brainwashed its adherents and subjected them to such pressures that 
they could not leave. As a result, Scientologists have been one of the groups 
subject to parental seizures for "deprogramming". Police and court-aided 
seizures have been common around the country, and have led Scientologists to 
adopt defensive measures which sometimes seemed to justify the original 
complaints. Several prominent cases have been in the courts and in headlines 
involving the Church. 
In 1981, the first Christofferson case was filed in the court and in the 
headlines. Julie Christofferson, a young woman from Utah, came to Portland 
and freely joined the Church of Scientology. She took a number of their 
courses in Portland and in Sheridan, but left voluntarily upon advice of the 
Church because her parents were objecting. She then sued and, after jury 
trial, obtained a multi-million dollar verdict against the Church. That 
judgment was reversed upon appeal, because it was ruled improper to allow 
inquiry into whether or not religious beliefs were sincerely held. 
On retrial, in 1984-85, a second jury again awarded multi-million dollar 
damages. It was clear that both government and Scientologists had engaged in 
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reprehensible practices, though not necessarily to Christofferson. The 
Scientologists engaged in major rallies and information distribution campaigns, 
alleging that the federal government in Oregon and elsewhere has been 
persecuting them. On motion for new trial, the judge vacated the jury's 
verdict, stating that prejudicial religious argument by Christofferson's lawyer 
had rendered it invalid. For five weeks of the trial, the plaintiff was not 
mentioned at all, only the Church of Scientology. Interestingly, Mark Hopper, 
lobbyist for the Scientologists, was one of the sponsors of the 1981 racial and 
religious intimidation law. 
(10) THE WORLD CHURCH FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CHRISTIANITY 
(THE "MOONIES").148 
The Unification Church has had a presence in Oregon since 1979. It 
has been most evident, not for having on-site residency here, but for its 
moving from state to state of solicitation teams of young, attractive men and 
women who canvassed streets, homes, airports, and other public places seeking 
donations in return for flowers, publications, candy and the like. The Church 
rarely provided legal guidance or support for its soliciting teams, which often 
ran into legal problems, arrests, harassment, and investigations. 
The "Moonies", as they are often derisively called, after their founder 
and leader Sun Yung Moon (who has recently served time in federal prison for 
tax evasion, in a case which recruited to his side prominent religious leaders 
and groups such as the National Council of Churches and Laurence Tribe of 
Harvard Law School), also actively participate in local charitable enterprises, 
and have been noted for starting their own church-run businesses and for 
living in communal centers. Oregon has been a site of their solicitation visits, 
but not until recently has it been a place of settlement. Presently there 
exists a community doing f oodbe.nk and other community service work in 
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Portland. While concerns have been expressed, there is little current evidence 
of interaction with the law. 
In other parts of the country, "Moonies" have been subject to regular 
intervention by the courts to seize children, where one parent has become a 
"Moonie", or to assist in kidnapping and deprogramming, or to resist the same. 
In 1979 appeared Hostage to Heaven, an account by Portland mother (and 
former Oregon ACLU staff person) Betty Underwood of how she rescued her 
daughter from the Unification Church through a traumatic lawsuit in 
California. 
Portland is national headquarters for a data-gathering service on cults, 
run by Adrian Greek and his wife. Although they do not practice 
deprogramming, they keep tabs on "cults" and assist parents to be in touch 
with others who can assist them to rescue their children from the "Moonies" 
and similar groups. The Greeks believe the Moonies and similar groups prey 
upon the young and troubled, or idealistic, and place them under such 
psychological stress and coercion that they cannot retain their individuality or 
think for themselves. Two of their own children joined the Moonies. Their 
son joined in 1976 and induced their daughter, who is still a member in 1985, 
to join. The Greeks obtained an Oregon court order, and obtained custody of 
the son who, after time with them, requested that the judge continue the 
order for his own protection. In another case a girl was seized in Oregon 
based upon a Washington Court order. The Unification Church objected, and 
obtained her release with a promise she would appear for hearing. However 
she failed to appear. The Unification Church has been somewhat quiescent in 
Oregon since, in the 1984 Robin George case in California, a jury assessed 
damages of $39 million against them because they forcibly kept custody of a 
minor. That decision, on appeal, has tied up their assets and forced closing of 
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the temple in Portland. The Foodbank, began in 1985, is very low key in its 
operations and avoids public identification with the Church. 
(11) THE BHAGWAN SHREE RAJNEF.SH AND HIS FOLLOWERS 
( "RAJNEF.SHEF.S" ).149 
At this time, Oregon is best known to many in the world as the home 
of the Bhagwan and the Rajneeshees, who have "taken over the State". The 
ongoing saga of the Bhagwan and his followers has dominated headlines and 
filled cotn"ts and hearing agencies since 1981 when they purchased the Big 
Muddy Range in Wasco County. Their story is a subject for many books, some 
of which have been written. The Rajneeshees have been involved in over 200 
legal encounters with courts and administrative agencies since their arrival, 
some initiated by them, some by their opponents. The federal immigration 
service has initiated mass proceedings to deport hundreds of Rajneeshee 
couples, and the Bhagwan himself. These proceedings have included such 
irregularities as scheduling dozens of interviews for the same time, and long 
delays in handling cases. The outrageous behavior of the Rajneeshees' 
opponents seemed to be matched at each stage by the Rajneeshees themselves, 
who sue and counter sue, employ a language more suitable to Oregon's early 
more robust days, and make soap opera moves such as the discovery that the 
Bhagwan was the child of an American citizen, and development of a homeless 
program. The 1000 Friends of Oregon has been the main mover against the 
Rajneeshees, and has supported ranchers who wanted to prevent settlement and 
development by the Rajneeshees. 
The situation of the Rajneeshees well illustrates one of the problems 
in analysing church-state problems. Most of the cases on their face have no 
relation to the religion and practices of the group, but it is general knowledge 
that the religion and practices are a major factor in all of them. 
89 
1000 Friends, joined by the Land Conservation Development Commission 
(LCDC), is lead party in the major lawsuits which seek to have the 
incorporation of the Rajneespuram declared invalid, based upon a law which 
was passed only after the incorporation. That case has been twice before the 
Oregon Supreme Court, which each time has remanded for further proceedings. 
The major clear religion case against them was preceded by an ex 
parte opinion of the Attorney General which stated, based upon assumed facts, 
that the city had no legal right to exist. The Attorney General filed in State 
Court to have the city declared unconstitutional. The Rajneeshees had the 
case removed to federal court, and it has bounced back and for th since. 
Ranchers and the other activists have filed libel suits against the 
Bhagwan and his lead followers, and they in turn have countersued. The 
Bhagwan, who had been under a vow of silence, was subpoenaed for deposition, 
and the question of whether his vow was entitled to religious protection by 
the courts was raised and settled against the Bhagwan, after unsuccessful 
appeals all the way to the U .s. Supreme Court. 
The Superintendent of Education has several times investigated the 
Rajneeshees, questioned them under the Garb Bill, declared their school 
without walls (where students work part of the day in the community and 
therefore in a religious environment) unconstitutional so that he withheld State 
funds, and generally made them work for each step of development. 
The Attorney General and 1000 Friends have, now that battle is 
joined, used many tactics: special investigations, ex pa.rte withholdings of 
school and road funds, public attacks, instructions to state departments to 
harass Rajneeshees in every way. Religion may not be the sole factor, but is 
clearly a major one in these proceedings. 
A detailed account of the Rajneeshees' religion has been prepared by 
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Professor Ronald Clark under the Oregon Conunission for the Humanities, and a 
detailed calendar of events since their arJ:"ival, including a listing of cases and 
proceedings, has been compiled by Professors Ted and Carey Shay. 
(12) PROTESTANTS AND OTHER "MAJORITIES". 
One person's rights become another person's duties. When one gains, 
another must lose. Rights given are rights taken away. 
Curiously, though logically, fundamentalist Protestants increasingly see 
themselves as a minority, or even majority, under persecution. They see the 
decisions removing religion and Bible reading, prayer and creches, from public 
life and the schools as successful attacks upon them and their beliefs by 
secular humanists and extreme separationists such as the ACLU. 
They are dismayed to find that the history of the country is 
disregarded, and that the beliefs and wishes of the majority must be excluded 
from the schools and public places. They are told they must respect the 
rights of minorities, but have come to believe that their own rights are not 
respected. 
This is well illustrated by the question of prayer or Bible reading in 
the schools, a practice as old as the schools themselves. A practice which 
they see as beneficial at worst, and harmless to any dissenter, is under firm 
attack whenever discovered. The will to root out any such practice appalls 
them as much as the success of the efforts. The Attorney General has ruled 
that Gideon Bibles cannot be given free to students even when done by 
private parties with the students' consent. Courts have ruled, with 
inconsistent logic and poor history, that there can be prayer in Congress and 
in the Courts, but not in the schools. One student, or two, has been 
permitted to nullify the practices and wishes of whole conununities. 
When these parents have turned to private schools or home schooling, 
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they have again found themselves under attack. Benefits to students who are 
in religious schools have been attacked and prevented by the courts, whether 
transportation, books, or tuition, whether grade school, high school, or 
colleges. While huge benefits have gone to public schools, the private schools 
have been placed at a tremendous disadvantage. Similarly, home schooling has 
been tmder increasing attack,150 with the teachers' unions and ACLU leading 
the attack, as they have led the attack on tuition credits, voucher systems, 
and other devices meant to restore some tax equity for parents wishing to 
place children in teaching situations outside the public schools. 
Just as the Courts seemed to have reversed settled law, and suddenly 
and arbitrarily created new law on prayer and aid to students, so court rulings 
on abortion and obscenity seem to ftmdamentalists to have reversed the 
positions of society on moral and religious questions. The State no longer 
prevents or prosecutes many previously prohibited practices, but now either 
enshrines them with legal protection, (as it does abortion and nude dancing,) 
or suggests it may soon do so (as with prostitution). The State, at one time 
the protector of moral values, is now seem to have gone over to the other 
side. Its vatmted neutrality is a neutrality agaimt. 
(13) SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS. 
The Seventh Day Adventists, who keep Saturday (the Sabbath) holy, 
and who decline to take oaths, run into problems in both employment and 
situations where oaths (upheld by law in many situations) are required. 
Federal law and federal and state statutes in recent years have sought to 
provide accommodation where possible, as in the lead case of Sherbet v 
Verner, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Adventist could not be 
denied unemployment because he would not work on Saturday. 
In Oregon, cases have arisen in several situations. In one, an 
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Adventist was unable at first to work for a federal agency because he could 
not take the oath, which the law required for the position. The agency was 
willing to hire, but bound by the law. Careful research found court 
interpretations which allowed the parties to design an oath free of mental 
reserva tion.151 
In the 1981 Tooley case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
federal law which allowed a dissenter to give money to charity in lieu of 
union dues was not a violation of the establishment clause. Oregon has a 
similar statute, which the unions have also sought to invalidate in the 
legislature. The federal law is clear, but has not prevented problems of 
accommodation occuring in private employment. 
(14), OTHER GROUPS AND CASES. 
The above are the major Oregon minority religious groups, but the list 
goes on and on. Discrimination against gypsies is common, as they are subject 
to arrest and harassment. An ordinance in Roseburg was declared invalid as 
an improper restriction on the content of speech when it forbade fortlllle 
telling (by gypsies). Beaverton considered but did not pass a similar 
ordinance. Ashland has a similar ordinance which, in spite of an ACLU 
demand, it has refused to repeal. Indians and Orientals, such as Japanese and 
Chinese, have suffered massive discrimination which at times has had a 
religious component, as the groups were not deemed to have true or real 
religions worthy of protection or respect. Groups such as the Black Muslims, 
or the Native American Church, have had to fight to win equal protection for 
their services, whether in the community or in prison, where so often members 
of these groups have found themselves. As church groups have become active 
in politics on behalf of or opposed to abortion, obscenity, free speech, and 
homosexuality, they have been vigorously attacked by other church groups who 
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claimed the activists were behaving illegally and that tax exemptions at least 
should be withdrawn. In America, people fragment into so many religous 
groups, that many are hardly ever even noticed and are little lmown. The 
Sikhs, a major religion in India, were largely unknown in Oregon until a Sikh 
school teacher was fired for wearing her white turban, lDlder a law originally 
aimed at catholic nuns, which now also threatens the red-clad Rajneeshees. 
People in one group most often know little or nothing about other groups. 
Highly literate and informed people cannot tell what distinguishes Catholic 
from Methodist from Lutheran from Episcopalian, not to speak of the hlDldreds 
of other large and small churches. Many members, who appear to belong to 
this church or that for largely personal or social reasons, are often hard put 
to explain the beliefs of their own church. And indeed, some churches, such 
as the Unitarians, seem able to include anyone, even athiests and agnostics, 
within their churches. In such settings, churches become social habits more 
than associations of common believers in one faith. This trend has led 
observers such as Richard Morgan to predict it will mean a lessening of 
church-state tensions as a state of "ecumenical indifference11152is achieved. 
More likely, if history is a correct guide, new religious groups will introduce 
new conflicts, and the perennial Protestant-Catholic and religious-secularist 
conflicts will flare anew. 
VIII • EDUCATION 
"no preference shall be given or discrimination shown on 
account of religious opinion, whether with the pupils or 
the teacher, nor shall any laws be enacted by any district 
that will or may in any way interfere with the ri~~ of 
conscience in the free exerise of religious worship." 
Apart from taxation of churches, the interrelation of church and state in 
education has seemed to produce the most conflict and emotion. 
From the earliest days, disputes about education of Indians divided 
Protestant and Catholic. The Provisional and Territorial governments were 
both friendly to religion and stressed, in the words of the Northwest 
Ordinance, religion's necessary relation to education and good government. 
They saw religion as the necessary support for a just society. The Provisional 
Government also passed a law guaranteeing religious freedom in the public 
schools. (quoted above). 
At the 1857 Constitutional Convention, its President Matthew P. 
Deady spoke against having a State University (though he later was f01mder 
and became known as "father" of the University of Oregon), on the grounds 
that, as in Indiana, it would become in fact if not in theory a religious 
(Methodist) school. Deady also advocated that school funds be available to all 
groups to draw from, religious and non-religious. 
In Oregon's first decades, public schools were few. The missionaries 
of Oregon played the major role in education, establishing a number of private 
religious schools, academies and colleges. These schools were the bases of the 
later state universities. But at that time, their existence delayed the beginning 
of widespread public schooling well into the 1880s. Many of Oregon's leaders 
indeed opposed having a public school system.154 
Prominent leaders in public life often started in Oregon as teachers in 
these religious schools. Deady, for example, and Delazon Smith were both 
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teachers in such schools. In both private and public schools regular use of 
the Bible, and the McGuffey Readers with their strong accent on prayer and 
the Bible, common employment of prayer in the schools, and belief in the U .s. 
as a Christian nation guided by God were the norrn.155 There was much 
animosity to Catholics and to Catholic Schools but not to religious teaching in 
the schools. Indeed, the schools were seen as the means to Americanize 
Catholics and minimize their influence. George Atkinson, American Horne 
Missionary Society leader, who became Multnomah Collllty (Portland) 
Superintendent of Schools, advocated the development of public schools to 
counter Catholic education.156 When Catholics, gathered in 1884 for the Third 
Plenary Council in Baltimore, declared that within two years a parochial school 
should be attached to every existing Catholic Church, it was taken as a 
declaration of war and separatism by many Protestants and by such groups as 
the American Protective Association. The rise of the influence and numbers 
of the Catholic Church during the post-Civil War period led to much of the 
animosity of this period. 
The Grant Administration, as evidenced by the Blaine Amendment, 
was very unfriendly to Catholics.157 By the 1870s, the Catholics had more 
Indians under their charge than any other denomination. The receipt of public 
monies by Catholics aroused the ire of anti-Catholic groups. The Grant 
administration developed a "peace plan", under which all denominational 
schools among Indians received public fllllds, which continued to the close of 
the century.158 The catholics also, in the famous Poughkeepsie, or Faribault-
Stilwater Plan, experimented with a compromise where secular education in 
parochial schools would be paid for by public authorities and subject to their 
scrutiny, but this approach aroused so much hostility it was terminated. 
Within Oregon, as elsewhere, this dispute about which church would operate 
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Indian schools divided the community. 
As public schools developed in the latter two decades of the century, 
religion was a common part of the practices of both Catholic and Protestant 
communities. Although efforts were made to keep these practices non-
denominational, all concurred in believing that religious practices properly 
underlay education and training for good citizenship. But the various sects 
would on occasion jealously watch to ensure that no one belief was advanced 
at the expense of others.159 
In those rural areas where Catholics predominated, economic realities 
and convenience led many communities to combine public and parochial schools. 
Nuns in religious garb came to teach in the public schools in such Catholic 
communities as Sublimity, Mt. Angel, St. Paul, St. Louis, Roy and Verboort.160 
In these communities this arrangement reflected the desires of all concerned 
and might have continued lDlnoticed and tDlobjected to for many more years 
had not the controversy over religion and education arisen in the 1922 election 
campaign. The ultimate passage of the Religous Garb Bill was a clear by-
product of the same agitation which led directly to the Oregon School Bill. 
As Malcolm Clark wrote "All Catholics, and a heavy percentage of 
Protestants, wanted religious instruction in the schools", though they differed 
on what instruction. To Protestants, "the Bible and the Common Schools were 
the two stones of the mill that would grind Catholicity out of Catholics" .161 
In 1921 a law was passed forbidding religious instruction in the public 
schools.162 But this was understood to prohibit only sectarian instruction, not 
Bible reading or related "non-denominational" practices. 
The agitation, largely to limit Catholic influence, had little real 
effect until, in 1922, the Masons and the Klan, aided by Protestant ministers, 
advanced what became the Oregon School Bill. That Inititiative would have 
97 
required that all children Wlder sixteen attend public schools taught in the 
English language. The fight over the School Bill polarized Oregon. It was 
clearly aimed at Catholics, although it would also have affected Lutherans 
(who taught and worshipped in national languages such as German and 
Norwegian), Seventh Day Adventists, Jews and some others. But the ideal 
public school was still one in which God, Bible and flag were together part of 
the American heritage. The 1923 legislature passed the Garb Bill, which 
prohibited any teacher in a public school from wearing religious garb, under 
pain of immediate dismissal and loss of teaching certificate. That law imposed 
criminal penalities upon any school board member who did not enforce this 
law. 
The Attorney General in 1923 issued an opinion that the Garb Bill 
allowed neither exceptions nor delay, nor did it allow nuns to teach in 
religious garb in public schools even to obtain their teaching certificates.162 
The Attorney General had already opined that transportation was for public 
school students only and not allowed for parochial students. 
The opposition was not to religious practices, such as Bible reading, 
in the public schools, but to any concessions to the Catholics. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, it was universally agreed that the Bible and God were a proper and 
necessary part of public school education. Oregon in the 1920s, as did most 
other states, passed a law requiring Bible reading in the public schools.164 
In 1939, an Oregon Law Review article suggested that Bible reading 
in the public schools might violate the State Constitution. This suggestion 
confirmed by implication that the practice was common. 
Some cases arose where municipalities or priv~te parties sought to 
prevent the establishment of Catholic schools. In 1932, e.g., the Oregon 
Supreme Court, in the Roman catholic Bishop case, ruled that the town of 
98 
Baker, which had permitted public schools to be built, could not exclude 
Catholic schools. 
As their number in Oregon grew, Catholics in the 1940s were able to 
secure laws or interpretations which provided free textbooks and 
transportation to all Oregon students, including those in parochial schools. 
But the Oregon Attorney General, in a series of opinions, folDld such 
provisions valid only under very restrictive circumstances. He concluded that 
parochial students could use public school transport, but only if the bus line 
was already on that route and they were not displacing public school students. 
Similarly the Attorney General approved laws which allowed released time 
(where students were released early to attend religious instruction) so long as 
the religious instruction was off school premises and not during school hours. 
The released time law was approved by the Supreme Court in the 1960 Dilger 
case, but free textbooks were ruled in violation of the Oregon Constitution 
(not the federal Constitution) in the 1962 Dickman case, which was brought by 
the ACLU in conjunction with Leo Pfeffer. The ACLU in 1962 also sought to 
place a provision in the Oregon Constitution which would have expressly 
forbidden religion. That provision said: 
"The public schools shall be forever free from sectarian 
control or influence, and no religious instruction, exercise 
or worshiQ shall be part of the curriculum of any public 
school" .l~ 
The ACLU noted that "most state constitutions have specific 
prohibitions against religious instruction in the public schools," but Oregon did 
not. After intense opposition was directed at the Constitutional Revision 
Commission by Protestants ministers and groups, it declined to support this 
proposal. It did seek unsuccessfully to alter Article I, Section 5 in a way 
which would have achieved the same result. 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Jehovah's Witnesses' cases 
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in Oregon and nationally were troubling the colBltry. The children of 
Witnesses declined for religious reasons to participate in the pledge of 
allegiance and flag salute. When the U .s. Supreme Court first heard the 
matter, in the Gobitis case, Justice Frankfurter, a Jew, wrote an eloquent 
opinion which held that the schools could require and impose these practices. 
Within four years, however, the Court reversed itself and, in the Barnette 
case, held that freedom of religion protected the Witnesses from such 
imposition. In the interim, the Attorney General relied upon the U.S. Supreme 
Court and told Oregon schools they could impose the practice upon unwilling 
Witness children. 
Attorney General opinions from the 1960s on advised that a number 
of common and pervasive practices were now illegal: distribution of Gideon 
Bibles, Bible reading, and prayer in the schools. These opinions usually relied 
upon U.S. Supreme Court cases, or state cases elsewhere. However within 
Oregon, these practices continued, and suits were not brought because 
complainants could not be found to bring them, or because the practices were 
temporarily discontinued after complaints. 
In 1969, at the instigation of ACLU and of the Portland Public 
Schools, whose Board President was then Jonathan Neuman (a former ACLU 
activist and now Court of Appeals Judge), the State Department of Education 
adopted a Model Policy on Religion which recommended a wide range of 
separationist policies.166 In Oregon, however, the Constitution gives much 
power to School Boards, in effect allowing local option. Attorney General 
opinions and advice from the Superintendent and Department of Education are 
advisory only and do not impose rules upon the locally autonomous schools. 
Stevie Remington of the ACLU has written that " ••• no one seems at all 
interested in enforcing or checking to see if they are followed even. If you 
' 
100 
question the system, you are rudely put aside." (Note on copy of Model 
Policy.) The lack of an enforcing mechanism has allowed policy to be one 
thing, and practice another. The 1985 law allowing withholding of school 
funds provides a mechanism for changing this condition, but it is the judgement 
of many that these provisions, passed to get at the Rajneeshees, will be 
seldom and arbitrarily used. 
In the 1970s, Catholic schools in Milwaukie, Oregon came to an 
arrangement with the local school district which was in effect a resurrection 
of the Faribault-Stilwater plans of the 1880s.167 A portion of each day in 
the Catholic parochial school was set aside in which only secular subjects were 
taught in rooms devoid of any religious symbols. This "shared time" 
arrangement was declared invalid in the 1973 Fisher case, when the Supreme 
Court said that a school could not be truly public when the Church determined 
who could attend. The Court confirmed that released time was valid when off 
school premises. The Fisher case involved Catholic historian Father Lawrence 
Saalfeld.168 
In 1971, the Oregon legislature, after consultation with and approval 
by the ACLU, passed a law which allowed the State to pay monies to private 
colleges based upon the number of Oregon students attending. The purpose of 
the law was to provide financial support for private colleges, which the State 
believed contributed to the quality of education. Religious colleges were not 
excluded. By the 1980s, this program, operated by the State Scholarship 
Commission and known as the PF.SIC (Purchase of Educational Services from 
Independent Colleges) Program, provided nearly $3 million to private colleges, 
including religious colleges such as Concordia, George Fox, Judson Baptist, 
Linfield, Marylhurst, Mt. Angel, Northwest Christian, Pacific, University of 
Portland and Western Baptist. Although ACLU had supported the law in 1971, 
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in 1981 it sued the Scholarship Commission and the private colleges, seeking to 
have the program declared unconstitutional. In the course of pre-trial 
investigations, a law was fotmd which would have required the schools to pay 
back all monies if they lost. Although the state and the colleges believed 
that they had a better than 50-50 chance of prevailing, the religious schools 
chose voluntarily to withdraw and the suit was dismissed. 
In the 1980s, a series of well-publicized cases on law and religion 
dominated the headlines. In 1981, the Appeals Court ruled in Cooper v the 
Oregon State Athletic Association that a one-year transfer rule, which 
required that most transf ering students abstain from interscholastic sports for 
one year (to minimize recruiting abuses), did not violate religious freedoms 
when applied to parochial students. The Garb Bill was resurrected in 1984 to 
force the firing and license termination of a Sikh teacher in Eugene, whose 
religion required that she wear a white turban-like head covering during the 
day. On appeal, the State Superintendent of Schools appointed a former 
Supreme Court Judge Arno Denecke as hearing officer, and affirmed the 
penalty. Lawsuits were filed in both state and federal courts, but these were 
compromised and dismissed in 1985 when the teacher, then living in New 
Mexico, had her license restored on condition that she not return to Oregon. 
ACLU, after internal debate which led to its first statewide membership 
referendum, intervened in the State suit, supporting the law, but arguing for a 
lesser penalty. The legislature vacilated, but appeared ready to strike down 
the law, when the settlement was announced and the matter was dropped as 
moot. Of the wide range of lawsuits surrounding Rajneeshpuram, the 
educational area has also been subject of attack. The Rajneeshees, who wear 
red garb and a mala (picture of the Bhagwan on a chain around the neck) 
were closely examined, and chose not to wear the mala in class to avoid 
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problems. The State intensely scrutinized their school operations and forced 
them to shut down an innovative "school without walls" program, where 
students spent part of the day working in the community, because the state 
deemed the community a religious one. A program that might have been 
acceptible in secular Portland was deemed not acceptable in religious 
Rajneeshpuram. The State first suspended State fllllding, then restored it 
after the program was halted. 
In 1984, a Multmomah County Circuit Court, in a case now on appeal, 
held that it was a violation of the State and federal Consititutions to allow 
prayer at a public high school graduation exercise. The suit was brought by 
ACLU, which later in the year chose to honor the plaintiffs, along with the 
plaintiffs in the Eugene Cross Case (another ACLU case) with the 
MacNaughton Award, its highest honor. 
Questions on education and religion have with increasing regularity 
come to the Attorney General and generated opinions on such diverse subjects 
as Bible use, transport of parochial school students, unpaid chaplains at state 
colleges and paid chaplains at the State Boys' school and prisons, requirements 
of Saturday attendance at the State Dental School, scientific creation theory 
and equal time, religious displays and equal access. The decisions went in 
different directions, as the Attorney General disapproved of proselytising, but 
approved equal access and information programs and displays or, in the case of 
coercive settings such as the prisons, held that free exercise required the 
State to provide paid religious services. 
ACLU files for the period 1955-1985 show that religious assemblies, 
distribution of Gideon Bibles, Bible readings and prayers in school, nativity 
scenes, religious music, use of schools by churches, shared and released time 
questions, and a wide miscellany of other questions and problems were 
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recurrent. Charles Hinkle, writing in the Oregonian in 1983,169described 
numerous examples of violations in each area. Sectarian religious classes, he 
found, had been occurring in' public schools in Alsea, Butte Creek and Newberg 
in 1978, 1980 and 1981. The reality--whatever the law--continued to be a 
strong pattern of religious practices in the public schools. Separationist 
groups, such as ACLU, considered these practices objectionable, but difficult 
to eradicate. 
In seeking reasons for the increasing support of separationist positions 
by the Oregon courts, several factors emerge. The character of Oregon's 
judiciary began to change as the Democratic Party came into real existence in 
the 1950s.170 It was, at its core, led by Jewish and secular liberals, who 
could be expected to take strongly separationist positions and to be supportive 
of judicial activism. Some judges, such as O'Connell, were deemed by Catholic 
writers to be anti-Catholic, and were judicial activists as well. Others, like 
Linde (who had been an aide to Senator Richard Neuberger and clerk to U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas) combined strong Democratic liberal, 
separationist and judicial activist qualities. The lead of the U.S. Supreme 
Court gave them an example and a rationale, as they achieved influence, for 
imposing their beliefs regardless of Oregon history or precedents. 
As Tyack illustrates, lack of knowledge, or denial, of the Protestant 
permeation of school and public life enabled state actors and courts to assert 
that they were preventing change rather than making it. Since the school of 
judicial realism of the 1930s, led by such as Jerome Frank, many judges have 
become precisely convinced that their role is to make law. That tendency has 
been especially strong among Democrats, and to some extent the rise of the 
influence of the Democratic Party coincides with the constitutional activism 
described in this paper. In a traditionally Republican state, this has often 
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meant that the judiciary, whose peer group lay in the elites of the 
metropolitan areas and of the nation outside of Oregon, has worked for 
different goals than the state's citizens. 
IX. A CONFUSION OF ACTORS 
The multiplicity of both state and private actors in the regulation of 
religion makes clear that church-state policy is not just one policy. 
In Oregon the federal Congress and many administrative agencies make 
rules which are enforced, or not, by federal and state courts, federal and 
state administrative agencies, U.S. Attorneys, and independent administrative 
law judges. Within the state the legislature, courts, the Governor, the 
Attorney General, the Superintendent of Education, District Attorneys and 
School Boards all have independent constitutional authority to make and 
enforce laws, as do many local municipalities. Legislatively-established state 
administrative agencies also make and enforce rules. The reality of law is 
that even most lawyers do not know all those who make and enforce it. 
In constitutional theory, the U.S. Supreme Court may have the final 
decision as to whether or not a policy is constitutional, but practically this 
means little. "God is in heaven, and the Czar is far away", goes an old 
Russian proverb. The Supreme Court is little closer. Only a few cases reach 
that Court. Many which do are effectively insulated from review because they 
fall within a range of discretion given some agency below which does not 
permit the Court to intervene. Even when the Court rules, as it has on Bible 
reading in the schools, its edicts are not necessarily enforced. 
Even on the Supreme Court, U .s. or Oregon, there is no necessary 
uniformity. In its early days, the Oregon Supreme Court, like most state 
courts at their inceptions, was reluctant to challenge the constitutionality of 
any law. Those who wrote the Constitution still lived and many were serving 
in the legislatures or the courts. They were unimpressed by courts who might 
tell them what they had meant in writing the Constitution. Also, in those 
earlier days, courts mostly held to theories which said that they discovered 
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and applied laws, not made them. 
Since the 1940s this has changed at the federal level, as a more active 
judiciary, with the Supreme Court leading the way through its incorporation 
theories! 7land creation of new constitutional rights, has transformed the 
federal role. State judges have come to follow, although more slowly because 
they are mostly elected and subject to check in a way that federal judges are 
not. 
In Oregon, change of judges on the Supreme Court allowed activist 
judges like O'Connell, Goodwin and Linde opportunity to put their beliefs 
about changing the law into practice. 
In the religion area, their first attempts failed. The Dickman case 
announced a divergent rule, but its principle of narrower state interpretation 
was not followed. The 1962 Constitutional Revision Commission failed. The 
Eugene Cross Case II was effectively overturned. Not lDltil the 1985 Salem 
Academy case, which again stated the Oregon's Constitution was separate and 
more narrow than the federal Constitution, did Linde prevail on principle, 
although it remains to be seen whether this is a permanent or transitory shift. 
The Thornton rule, with aberrations, held for 40 years and still has a 
substantial following on the Court. 
In 1961, Oregon created the Tax Court, in 1969 the Court of Appeals. 
Both have taken an active role on matters of law and religion, and have 
displayed a strongly separationist bent. Tax court decisions especially have 
been increasingly restrictive. The Court of Appeals has been dominated by 
judges who have been activists in applying the state constitution to invalidate 
laws and rules, and have also been separationist in religion. 
Attorney General opinions are not "law" in the same sense as Supreme 
Court opinions. They are, however, of strong weight and guide state agencies, 
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whom the Attorney General by law represents. In earlier years, before the 
proliferation of courts and administrative agencies at both state and federal 
levels, it meant more to be the state's chief law enforcement officer. Then 
an Attorney General opinion dominated the field, whereas today it is but 
another, though prominent, voice. To enforce his opinion, the Attorney 
General must sue in court like any other litigant. He is by law, however, the 
only lawyer whom state agencies may have, and thus he has real leverage over 
state agencies. 
Private parties in our legal system have long been the key actors in 
church-state relations. They are the ones in our legal system who initiate 
complaints and set the machinery in motion. Our laws are not self-enforcing. 
It took the Masons to conceive and carry through the School Bill. It took the 
Catholics and private schools to file suit to test the Bill in Court. Today 
groups like ACLU are the prime actors in initiating religion cases. 
Frank Sorauf has traced the importance of interest groups in the 
development of law and religion at the federal level. These include the 
National Council of Churches, the Baptist Joint Committee, Protestants and 
Other Americans United,172the Religious Liberty Association (7th Day 
Adventists), the American Jewish Congress (with Leo Pfeffer), the American 
Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the ACLU, and education 
groups such as the National Education Association. The Catholics and such 
Protestants as those connected with Chrmtianity and Crisis have proved the 
major accommodationist forces. The same groups have been active in Oregon, 
with the same essential strategy. In most situations, the plaintiffs are 
prepared and choose their time to sue, while defendants are usually unprepared 
and have few resources to defend.173 
ACLU first established a presence in Oregon in the 1920's, when Roger 
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Baldwin played a small role in the Pierce case. In 1955 it formally organized 
and has provided a sustained separationist presence ever since. As lobbyist 
and litigator, it has watched, warned, maneuvered and litigated to ensure that 
a strongly separationist view was presented. ACLU was the key actor in 
bringing the Dickman case, the Eugene Cross cases, the Fisher case, and just 
about every major case since. It proposed revision of the Constitution in 
1962, and opposed it in 1972. It first approved and then fought PESIC. It 
drafted and then supported the Model Policy for Oregon Schools. At each 
legislature it has had a strong presence of one or more paid lobbyists and 
dozens of volunteer lawyers and professionals. Its statewide presence has 
made it an effective monitor and influence. It has also been the coordinator 
of outside groups, drawing the aid of the national ACLU or such helpers as 
Leo Pfeffer and Protestants and Other Americans in Diclanan. It has done at 
least three conferences statewide which, altough purportedly neutral, have in 
conjunction with the Oregon State Bar and the Oregon Committee for the 
Humanities, presented and advanced separationist views. One almost needs an 
organization chart to follow the complexity of actors in law and religion. 
X. STATE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 
It is characteristic that most people do not see themselves as having 
value systems or cultures. Others do, but to a people it merely sees the 
world as it is. When a group enforces its values, it uses a wide range of 
methods, of which law is only one. When it enforces what it sees as universal 
values, it may not explicitly state that these values spring from religious 
beliefs rather than from a whole set of societal beliefs of which religion is 
but one expression. Abortion, e.g., may be condemned because killing is wrong 
for religious reasons, but not for reasons necessarily limited to religious 
reasons. In Western culture, many writers have asserted that its basic values 
can be derived from religion or from non-religious philosophy and ethics which 
have universal validity and which cross religious barriers. A people will not 
necessarily separate for itself which reasons motivate its enforcement of 
primary rules. At various times, those rules may be such givens that there is 
no need to make such a separation. Indeed, the effort will seem not merely 
unnecessary but inconceivable. Although various state court judges, constitu-
tional authorities and even the U.S. Supreme Court have at times asserted that 
we are a Christian nation and that Christianity was necessarily or historically 
linked both to our common law and to our Constitutional law, since the 1940s 
at least the tendency has been to find not merely non-denominational but 
wholly secular bases for "Christian" values embedded in law.174 
From Oregon's earliest days, its religious people were engaged in 
setting public policy. How could it be thought to have been otherwise, when 
a concerted missionary effort was one of the main factors in settling the 
area? It would not necessarily be correct to say of the original settlers that 
they sought to use the state to enjoin Christian beliefs. Rather, they held 
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their moral principles to have universal application. We are mistaken if today 
we read back into those times a complexity of competing beliefs which may 
demand more distinctions today. 
Both among themselves and toward the Indians, the early settlers 
sought to prevent the manufacttll'e and distribution of alcohol. The territorial 
laws provided for close regulation of taverns and imposed Sunday closing on a 
wide range of businesses. Before there were legal avenues to impose such 
limitations, however, the same results were achieved informally. The churches 
maintained internal discipline and corrective bodies,175 which imposed 
sanctions even to the extent of expulsion, which in a pioneer community could 
be a sentence of extreme hardship. Apart from church procedures, the 
settlers were quite capable of speaking frankly to off ending neighbors and 
setting them straight in a world where each depended on others. When 
Oregon became a state, these same formal and informal disciplinary devices 
were carried over. But as more settlers arrived and the society became 
larger and more complex, methods of societal discipline became more 
formalized and became embodied into laws. 
Because one may say that laws are not always necessary for members 
of a religious body, it is precisely correct to say that laws are made to 
enforce moral rules upon others outside of a structure of belief. The Sunday 
closing laws were a means by a religious people of imposing their religious and 
moral beliefs upon the whole society, although it should be noted that there 
are secular justifications for many at first merely religious rules (although the 
religion may determine the peculiar form of the rule). Oregon adopted a wide 
range of laws on what today would be considered by many to be private moral 
or religious matters.176 
The first court test of the Sunday Closing (or Blue) Laws came in 
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State v Palmer in 1866. An Act of 1854 had prohibited Sabbath-breaking and 
regulated barrooms. When Salem was incorporated, a tavern owner was 
prosecuted and defended himself with a claim, not that the law was wrong or 
unconstitutional, but that it had been superceded by the law which 
incorporated Salem. The argument was that Salem, as a municipal entity, 
would have had to make its own Sunday Closing laws. 
The Supreme Court denied the claim, noting that the statute has 
been in force for many years and that "many offenders had been subject to its 
penalties". It should be noted that Methodists, for much of the Territory's 
early years the dominant religious group, have always been especially opposed 
to alcohol.17 7 
In 1902 the Court, in the Northrup case, said that the law prohibiting 
barbering on Sunday was constitutional. The court traced the history of the 
Sunday closing laws since the territorial statute of 1854, and its permutations 
under the state of Oregon.178 One argument against the law was that it 
violated freedom of contract and liberty under the U.S. Constitution. The 
Court said that all courts in the U.S. had found such limitations, allowing on 
Sunday only works of necessity or charity, were a proper protection of 
employees to insure a day of rest. The Court noted: "If not in conflict with 
the federal constitution, it is necessarily not in conflict with our own", 
indicating at that early date an unwillingness to read the State Constitution to 
provide more limits than the federa1.l 79 Again in 1916 the federal court in 
Oregon, in the Brwiswick case, upheld the Sunday closing law against an 
attack which said it violated the religious guarantees of the federal 
Constitution. The Court said that such matters were left exclusively to the 
States. 
In November 1916, Oregon voters repealed the State's ancient closing 
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law "which over the years had been largely Wlenforced".180 
During the early years many laws were passed and enforced which, 
though some today may claim impose religious belief, were either not thought 
to do so then, or, if so, deemed proper in a Christian nation. Examples are 
laws against abortion, sacrilege, obscenity, SWlday violations or advocacy of 
birth control. Perhaps the laws on adultery and divorce are properly 
considered in this category also.· 
The Methodists, beyond their concern for alcohol, were pre-eminently 
social reformers since the time of John Wesley himself. They sought through 
individual and group missionary effort, as determined as that of the Puritans, 
to create a good society and to rescue or discipline the poor and erring. The 
Social Gospel approach, which was dominant in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
had always been true of them, but by the 1880s had become true of many 
denominations. In Oregon, Methodists and others placed church support behind 
the movement for women's rights to vote and behind temperance. Indeed, part 
of the support for women's suffrage was to obtain the votes to impose 
temperance. Malcolm Clark's War on the Webfoot Saloon recoWlts a chapter 
in the temperance wars, when religious women encouraged by Protestant 
ministers courted arrest and jail to prevent the evils of alcohol. Biographies 
of leaders of the movement, such as Abigail Scott Duniway, share the same 
condemnation.181 
This crusade, however had a darker side, in that it set Protestant 
against Catholic. Senator Blaine, who aspired to the Presidency, foWld the 
slogan "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" attributed to him as a characterization 
of the opposing Democrats. The Catholics, urban and Irish to a large extent, 
were seen as agents of demon rum as well as Satan.182 
The American Protective Association, in its brief moment in Oregon, 
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sought to use the laws to restrict Roman catholics. It succeeded in getting 
anti-Catholics elected to school boards in Portland and elsewhere, but failed in 
an attempt to pass a law forbidding the Irish flag from being flown on public 
buildings on St. Patrick's Day .183 
Much of the animus against aliens, oriental and other, was based on 
their Catholicism or non-Christianity. The Spanish-American War was partly 
motivated by efforts to save Cuba and the Phillipines from the Pope. The 
exclusions of Chinese and Japanese were in part based upon their being non-
Christians. 
In the 1901 session, there was talk of a law to prohibit Christian 
Science in the State, but it never took formal form. 
The Social Gospel movement produced in Oregon three church leaders 
of national prominence, who were successful in translating their religious and 
ethical concerns into law. Thomas Lamb Eliot, pastor of the Unitarian Church 
and with Reed College, created the Humane Society, established the juvenile 
court system and children's home, was superintendent of Portland's Public 
school system, and was for decades a leader in social reform, active in nearly 
every movement. (In later years, his Unitarian Church, under the leadership 
of E.B. McNaughton and Charles Davis, both also ACLU leaders, continued to 
have strong influence in church-state policies.) 
Edwin O'Hara, a Catholic priest from Wisconsin (where he fell under 
the influence of the labor priest Monsignor John Ryan), came to Portland and 
joined Rabbi Stephen Wise in successful efforts to enact protective labor laws 
in Oregon. O'Hara gave his name, as Commissioner of Labor, to the cases in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld those laws. O'Hara was also the moving 
force in opposition to the School Bill. Rabbi Wise, before going on to the 
Free Synagogue in New York, worked with O'Hara and other progressives in 
114 
Oregon on reform in labor laws, defense of working men and aliens, and 
respect for religious groups of all sorts. 
During the First World War, nationality churches of German 
background, primarily Lutherans and Brethren who spoke German, were placed 
under tremendous pressures to Americanize. 
membership after the War. Those such 
The patriotic societies swelled in 
as the Orange lodges were 
traditionally anti-Catholic. Rome had condemned them at the turn of the 
century, as well as other secret societies formed to support democracy or 
unionism, and earned long-memoried enemies. When the Klan came to Oregon 
in 1921, it found its membership largely in patriotic societies, and part of its 
goal was to restrict Catholicism in its non-American or anti-American aspects. 
The School Bill, the Garb Bill, and attempted laws prohibiting sacramental 
wine and seeking to eliminate Columbus Day as a holiday, were prime 
examples. Less obvious were the use of local laws and national laws, to curb 
immigration or restrict aliens and labor, which allowed indiscriminate 
application against members of groups disfavored in part because of their 
religion. 
A 1915 law was proposed which would have required inspection of all 
convents, monasteries, hospitals and like institutions both annually and upon 
petition of any twenty people.184 The law was aimed at catholic institutions 
to ensure that no un-American practices were going on in those institutions. 
In 1917, the Oregon Constitution was amended, Article IX, Section 1, 
to delete language specifically exempting "religious" entities. 
The ACLU, in its Annual Report for 1925-26, noted that Oregon had 
a law which required daily reading of the King James B(ble in the school. 
The School Bill from 1922-25 was defended by Governor, later 
Congressman, Walter Pierce, a lifelong anti-Catholic who was later a founding 
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member of Protestant and Other Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, a group which took its ideas from Paul Blanshard.185 The 
biographies of both Pierce and his wife make clear the extreme anti-
Catholicism which motivated them. 
The ACLU has had a presence in Oregon since the early 1920s, when 
William S. U'Ren and C.E.S. Wood were its local correspondents. Indeed, 
Roger Baldwin, ACLU's leader through most of its existence, had a small role 
in aiding the catholics to find an appellate lawyer in the School Bill case. 
Many of ACLU's early leaders nationally, and later in Oregon, were ministers 
of Unitarian or Social Gospel types. During the 1950s, E.B. MacNaughton, 
also national moderator of the Unitarian Church, was on the National ACLU 
Board, indeed heading it for a while. When the Oregon affiliate formed in 
1955, its leaders were Unitarians and Jewish Democrats, who strongly believed 
in separation of church and state. It was ACLU which filed the Dickman 
case, one of its earliest victories. Since that time, ACLU has been in Oregon 
the major policeman of church-state separation. Its constant efforts have 
opposed any religion in the schools and in public life. It has opposed public 
aid to religions, while at the same time defending religious groups against 
public intrusion or excessive public regulation. 
When ACLU, however, seeks to advance its opposition to the death 
penalty, it allies with church leaders and marshalls their participation in 
politics. When it opposes aid to parochial schools, it marshalls in its camp 
representatives of liberal or separationist church groups such as Ecumenical 
Ministries or the Lutherans and Seventh Day Adventists. 
Today, the State is a battleground on which separationist and 
accommodationist, church and anti-church forces compete to impose their will. 
Prohibitions once universally accepted (such as abortion) are now claimed to 
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be but the religion of a few, improper to impose upon others. Regulation of 
obscenity, pornography or prostitution is opposed in part because it is said 
some seek to impose the religious beliefs of a few upon all. On the other 
hand, church groups oppose gay rights and ask the State to outlaw behavior of 
which they disapprove. In an age of relativism, once secure State policies are 
under attack, and are attacked and defended for religious reasons. 
• 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Church-state relations in Oregon are, now as ever, in a state of 
turmoil. The conflict is built into Western culture and American history. 
Oregon has been no exception. The conflicting strands of extreme 
separationist and extreme accommodationalist approaches are met by pragmatic 
problem solvers in both community and court. The history has been one of 
accommodation here, and separation there, with an increasingly separationist 
trend. 
What is impressive is how few cases of constitutional import were 
brought before the 1940s, and how many after. Also impressive is the sheer 
bulk of reported cases and opinions on religion, showing that management of 
the proper sphere of each is a problem susceptible of much interpretation and 
judgment. 
It is difficult to define what a religion is. Americans find it as 
difficult to define orthodoxy as dissent.186 When they believe something is 
wrong, they often proceed against it in an apparently non-religious way. 
Trespass or nuisance laws are invoked against Witnesses, truancy laws agaimt 
Old Believers, and land use laws against Rajneeshees. A mere review of the 
records will not tell if criminals or religious dissidents are in the dock. The 
enforcement of morality will not tell us if criminals or religious dissidents are 
to be coerced. In an increasingly litigious society, those who wish to evade 
the law will become religious when it is a shield, whether to gamble or to sell 
good feeling. 
Presently, the Oregon Courts are interpreting the Oregon Constitutional 
provisions separately and more strictly and separationist than the federal 
courts interpret the federal First Amendment. This has resulted and will 
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likely result in more litigants using the Oregon Comtitution as a sword agaimt 
religious practices in the public arena. 
Oregon historians, with their judgment that the state has been 
progressive and rational, concur that it has engaged in periodic instances of 
religious, racial, and color bigotry. However, events have not always been 
reducible to discrete legal cases. Intimidation by the Klan or mass evacuation 
of the Japanese have had religious components difficult to extract from the 
larger events. Consideration only of court cases must prove inadequate. 
There is no sign that religion and law, church and state, will be less 
involved each with the other in years to come. The evidence is that the 
management of these relations requires continual adjustment. Even when 
pronouncements of law are made, the people do not necessarily submit. Bible-
reading and prayer in schools remain common practices although proscribed. 
Our legal system requires a complainant with standing, and many communities 
lack those who have the desire or will to object. The ACLU has been unable, 
however willing, to bring many a case because of lack of a suitable plaintiff. 
Only a few laws are self-activating or activated by public officials in the 
normal course. This lends a sporadic quality to enforcement, and allows a 
flexibility in the system which on paper it appears not to have. Local option 
has usually been the reality.187 
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53. Carey, 468. Sections, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 were copied verbatim save 
for the section on no payment for religious services in the legislature {Sec. 5) 
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schools." This was not the case in Oregon. The Blaine Amendment, with its 
express prohibition of aid to religious schools, is worth remembering here, as is 
the failed attempt to have the 1962 Oregon Constitutional Revision Commission 
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not then been extended by the U.S. Supreme Court, and these were included in 
the Commission's proposed constitution. Although the revised Constitution was 
not enacted, judical decision subsequently caught up with a number of the 
'proposed reforms'" (emphasis added). In a forum on the First Amendment at 
Reed College on November 16, 1984, Linde said that he had sought to make 
changes in the Oregon Constitution when he was part of the Revision 
Commission, which proposals were rejected, but that when he became judge, he 
"found" the changes to have been there all along. 
76. December 1984 ACLU Annual McNaughten Award Dinner in 
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89. At 396. 
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the supremacy of the church's central organs of government must be respected 
by the State. Howe interprets these two cases as bending to the political 
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92. Scheck, 43. 
93. See the Chapter on Tax Exemption (chap. 9) in Zabel for a 
discussion of the alternative methods states have chosen in regulating the 
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method is one which, in attempts to apply it, has resulted in continuous 
litigation. 
94. Chief Justice John Marshall, McCullough Y Maryland. 17 U.S. 316 
(1819). 
95. Sweet, 189. 
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a fair and equitable tax system and to allow exemption by categories. The 
existence and extent of religious exemption was left, after as before, with the 
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110. Letter of Oregon Inspector General David 0. Johnson, 1984, and 
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ill. Proceedings of the Grand Lodge, Ancient and Free Accepted 
Masons of Oregon. (Portland, Oregon. 1921-22) 
112. National Masonic representative William MacDougall, quoted at 
Saalfeld, ll8. 
113. Saalfeld, 118, quoting Oregon Masonic leader Robert E. Smith. 
114. John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, quoted a~ Richard Hofstadtler, 
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (Random House. New York. 1962), 367. 
115. The Oregonian, October 31, 1922. 
116. George S. Turnbull. George Putnam, An Oregon Crusader. 
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128. The main source on Christian Scientists in Oregon is Roy Molen 
Swenson, The Seekers of the Light--christian Science in Oregon 1880-1915. 
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or administers to the sick or suffering by purely spiritual means." Oregon 
law, quoted at catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, 737. 
130. Swenson, ll5. 
131. One watches a similar strategy at work with the Unification 
Church and its ownership of the Washington Times. 
132. On the Peace Churches, see especially Beebe, Fogelquist, Scheck, 
Silverman, Untiedt. For backgrolDld see John A. Hosteller's Amish Society, 
3rd edition (Johns Hopkins University Press. 1980). For the most part, 
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problems over pacifism occurred during the First World War. As Gaustad 
notes in Dissent in American Religion (University of Chicago Press. 1973), the 
Conscription Act of 1940 was written in consultation with the Historic Peace 
Churches, and provided for alternative service, 135-136. The author has 
represented and advised Friends on Selective Service matters for many years, 
and during the period 1963-75, and 1982-83, was actively involved with a 
Friends Meeting and with the American Friends Service Committee. 
133. Beebe, 77. 
134. Beebe, 78. 
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Beebe, 118. 
136. Gaustad, 135-136. 
137. Scheck, 107. 
138. Scheck, 115, Note 1. This kind of law was declared un-
constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1923 Meyer v Nebraska 
decision. 
139. The author has interviewed many Witnesses over the years on 
their proselytizing and pacifistic beliefs, and has visited Witnesses in 
Allenwood Federal Prison, where they were serving time for refusal to 
cooperate with the Selective Service System. 
140. Cf. the 1958 Mullen case. 
141. See the account in In the Service of Their Country: War 
Resisters in Prison, Willard Gaylin, M.D. (Viking. New York. 1970). 
142. See especially Toll, Urofsky, Oral Interview of Judge Gus Solomon 
(in possession of Jewish Historical Society, Portland, Oregon), and author's 
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145. See especially Richard E. Morris, John Sabey, Carol Silverman, 
Jules Untiedt, Marion County Russian Resource Committee, Interview with 
Margaret McKibbin, and sources cited therein. Morris, Bi-lingual Schooling, 2: 
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the local prosecutor's and court's non-interference position. Cf. Morris, Three 
Rwmian Groups, 161. At 16, it is noted that the parents, who believe that 
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with Margaret McKibbin, who was interpreter in the case. In Marion Col.Ulty, 
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Court case of Yoder v Wisconsin, which gave special protection to Amish who 
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Times. 
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public funds for denominational schools." Higham, 19. Cf. Meyer and O'Brien 
on the Blaine Amendment. 
158. Ahlstrom, Vol. 2, 339-340. 
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the religious school folBlded and directed as a joint enterprise of church and 
community ••• "Although the "American schools gradually ceased to be 
sectarian, the majority of them continued to be religious institutions for a 
considerable period of time. The religion taught in these schools consisted of 
the general principles of Protestantism which radiated from a study of the 
Bible." at 144. 
Cf. Farnham, Chapter VI,noting the widespread use of the Bible as a 
text (218) and that "Bible and prayer remained unchallenged in the daily 
school routine." (231). 
160. Schand. 
161. at 132. 
162. Wardin, 385. 
163. By contrast, the Nebraska Attorney General decided its law did 
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164. ACLU Annual Report, 1926. 
165. Files of the Oregon Constitutional Revision Commission. State 
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minority report on education by P.B. Marple, which was tabled. Its section 3 
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"no part of the common school fund shall ever be granted 
for the use or benefit of any religious sect and no 
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166. Interview with Judge Jonathan Neuman, 1985. 
167. Cf. Handy, 319-320. McAvoy, 37. 
168. Court files, correspondence of the parties (in ACLU files) and 
interviews with Father Saalf ield. 
169. "Separation of Church, State Demands Persistence, Vigilance,"The 
Oregonian, October 21, 1983, C 13. 
170. Cf. Alan L. Gallagher, The ACLU in Oregon from 1920-1955. 
(unpublished. 1981). Robert A. Burton, Democrats of Oregon (University of 
Oregon. 1970). 
171. During the 20th Century, judges and legal scholars developed the 
concept that some or all of the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights were, 
by incorporation into the 14th Amendment, made binding upon the states. 
There is a huge literature on the historical and juridical validity of the 
various incorporation theories. The author believes they are nearly all 
historically unwarranted and recommends the analysis of Raoul Berger, 
Goverrunent by Judiciary, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1922). 
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Scottish Rite. Morgan, 60. 
173. Morgan distinguishes between separationist and accommodationist 
groups, and observes that as government comes to do more and more, the 
occasions for church-state conflict arise more frequently. Cf. Richard E 
Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in America 
(University Press of America, Wash. D.C. 1980). 
174. Howe, 109. 
175. See account in Wardin, Baptists in Oregon (Judson Baptist 
College. 1969), 37ff, where the early churches were described as "moral cotn"ts 
of the frontier." 
17 6. Lord's Oregon Laws contains the crime of abortion, and a Chapter 
VII: "Of Crimes Against Morality and Decency," which includes adultery, 
polygamy, sodomy, prostitution and gambling, as well as a catch-all in section 
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barbering, but allows that "all circumstances of necessity and mercy may be 
pleaded in defense." (2125). Today, this list reads like a list of activities 
progressively made legal. Some of the Sl.Dlday Closing Laws were repealed in 
1916 (Wardin, 272), but a good part remained. 
177. " ••• the triumph of prohibition in the 18th Amendment was the 
last great victory of agrarian America against the power of the cities. In the 
campaign, the Methodists played a crucial role • • • " Norwood, 397. Cf. 
Clark in Deady's Journals, Vol. I, 179, and his "War on the Webfoot Saloon," 
Oregon Historical Quarterly LVII (March 1957) 48-62. 
178. The Oregon Constitution continued in force all territorial laws not 
specifically repealed. Art. XVII, Section 7. 
179. This observation was made at a time when the State was 
conceived to have all powers not specifically denied to it, and the federal 
government was conceived to have only those powers specifically granted to 
it. 
180. Wardin, 272. 
181. Duniway later judged that the linkage was politically detrimental 
and separated herself and the suffrage movement from the religious-
dominated prohibition movement. Dodds, 175-178 
182. This became especially true during the campaigns of Al Smith, 
who was opposed by Methodists because he was a Roman Catholic and a Wet. 
"Inextricably enmeshed in the prohibition struggle were issues of rural-urban 
strain, ethnic tension, Protestant-Catholic controversy, Church-State 
relationship, adjustment of means to ends • • • "Norwood, 397. The Social 
Gospel and Prohibition became the guiding lights as churchmen sought to 
reform mankind through the instrument of the State. (Quoting from Robert 
Miller, History of American Methodism, III, 330). 
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183. Clark, 137, "The Bigot Disclosed". 
184. Clark, 143. 
185. Blanshard wrote anti-Catholic articles for The Nation and wrote 
such books as American Preedom and catholic Power, which presented Roman 
Catholicism as an active enemy of American democratic institutions. 
186. "The American experiment, the American folly, was to place both 
orthodoxy and dissent upon the same shifting platf onns of public favor and 
public support." Gaustad, 3. 
187. Although the 1985 law allowing school funds to be withheld from 
any district supporting religious activity may prove to be a major end run 
around the standing problem. It could seriously reduce local options and allow 
such groups as ACLU to sue without injured local plaintiffs. 
XIII • SOURCES 
(a) BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
The standard histories of Oregon contain little information on religion, 
apart from accotmts of the f om ding of the State and of the Oregon School 
Bill period. Even those are sparse and contain incorrect information. Most 
are not included in the bibliography because they lacked information. For 
analysis, see Gallagher's The Oregon School Bill of 1922. 
In preparation of this thesis, an outline calendar of religious events 
and themes in Oregon history was prepared and submitted to historians Thomas 
D. Morris, Gordon B. Dodds, Fr. Lawrence Saalfeld, Fr. Wilfred Schoenburg 
S.J., James Schand, Fr. Pat Lee S.J., and students of religion and law Charles 
Hinkle, Claudia Burton, Stevie Remington, and Bill Long. Their comments 
were used to ensure that significant events had not been missed. Many of 
them also read the thesis in draft. 
Theses at state schools (University of Oregon, University of Portland, 
Reed, Oregon State University, Portland State University) and at Catholic 
University were reviewed. A thorough search was made of Oregon federal and 
state cases, Oregon Attorney General Opinions, and indices of the Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly, the Oregon Historical Quarterly, the Oregonian, and the 
Catholic Sentinel. Biographies of leading legal and religious actors in Oregon, 
such as Judge Mathew Deady, Governor and Congressman Walter Pierce and his 
wife, Father Edwin O'Hara, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Rev.Thomas Lamb Eliot, 
Senator and Judge George Williams, and Dudley Wooten were reviewed to 
provide backgrotmd and insight. Histories of major religious groups in Oregon 
were reviewed. 
The period of the Klan and the School Bill has generated a substantial 
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literature, mostly in theses and journals. The general histories treat the 
period briefly and usually with errors. A very few items of the literature 
contain balanced and reliable analysis. The best accomts, though they differ 
among themselves, are those of Tyack, Saalfeld, Malcolm Clark, and Gallagher. 
The large volume of cases and opinions is best reduced to thematic 
analysis. A detailed accounting would be of exteme length, whereas the major 
themes are clear. The annotations of the cases and opinions will give the 
reader quick entry into each controversy. These reported controversies may 
or may not be representative of the entire world of legal controversy. It is 
unlikely that they are, as few cases usually make it to the appellate or 
reported level. The arrests and trials of Witnesses or "Hare Krishnas", e.g., 
are low-level incidents, which rarely achieve public notice at all. Like 
acorns, most cases never grow into the oaks of appellate cases. Most never 
even reach the newspapers. To achieve some thematic adequacy, a review of 
general church histories and controversies throughout the co\llltry was made, as 
well as a review of files and records of the American Civil Liberties Union, to 
identify controversies. One can be aware that some controversies also 
occured here, e.g. the imprisonment of members of Peace Churches, although 
data may be hard to come by. 
138 
(b) BOOKS, ARTICLES, ARCHIVES 
Abraham, Henry J. Preedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in 
the United States. 4th ed. Oxford University Press. New York. 
1982. 
Ahlstrom, Sydney E. A Religious History of the American People. Image 
Books. Doubleday and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York. 1975. 
Vol. 2. 
American Civil Liberties Union. Portland, Oregon. Files. 
Antieu, Charles James, Cande, Phillip Mark, and Burke, Thomas Arnold. 
Religion Under the State Constitutions. Central Book Co. New York. 
1965 
Ballot Measure. See 1973-1974 Oregon Blue Book. 1972 Voters Pamphlet 
(Secretary of State). Proposed amendment would have made Article 
1, Section 5 like the US First Amendment. Meant to overturn 
Diekman and allow same as U .s. Supreme Court. 
Baltzell, E. Digby. The Protestant Establishment. Aristocracy and caste in 
America. Vintage Books. Random House. New York. 1966. 
Beebe, Ralph K. History of Oregon Friends. M.A. Thesis. University of Oregon. 
1969. 
Berns, Walter. The 1st Amendment and the Future of American Democracy. 
New York. Basic Books. 1976. 
Billington, Ray Allen. The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860: A Study of the 
Origins of American Nativism. Macmillan. New York. 1938. (1952). 
Blau, Joseph L. Cornerstones of Religious Preedom in America. Revised ed. 
1964. 
Bone, Arthur H. Oregon C&ttleman/Governor/Congressnvm. Memoirs and 
Times of Walter M. Pierce. Oregon Historical Society. Portland, 
Oregon. 1981. 
Braun, Kirk. Rajneesbpuram: The Unwelcome Society. Cultures Collide in a 
Quest for Utopia. Scout Creek Press. West Linn, Oregon. 1984. 
Introduction by Professors Carey and Ted Shay. 
Brisley, Melissa Ann. Cornelia Marvin Pierce. A Political Biography. Thesis. 
Reed College. Portland, Oregon. 1966. 
Burton, Claudia and Collins, Ronald. Text On Oregon Constitutional Law. 
Unpublished. Used at Willamette University Law School. Salem, 
Oregon. 1983-1985. 
Gallister, Scotte, Long, James, and Zactz, Leslie. "For Love or Money". The 
Oregonian, 20 part series on Rajneeshees. Jlllle 30, - July 19, 1985. 
139 
Cannon, Dale W. and Runkel, Ross R. Teaching About Religion. Oregon 
College of Education. Monmouth, Oregon 1979. 
Carey, Charles H. LLD. General History of Oregon. Binford and Mort. 
Portland, Oregon. 3rd ed. 1971 
The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and 
------:Deliitesot--tiie-COmtitutional ConYention of 185'1. State Printing 
Department. Salem, Oregon. 1926. 
Catholic Encyclopedia. "The Blaine Amendment" Vol. 2, pp 599-600. "Oregon" 
Vol. 10, p 737. McGraw-Hill Book Co. New York. 1967. 
Clark, Malcolm, Jr. "The Bigot Disclosed: Ninety Years of Nativism." Oregon 
History Quarterly. LXII. June 1974. 109-182. 
_____________________ Pharisee Among Philistines. Diary of Judge 
Matthew P. Deady. 1871-1892. Oregon Historical Society. 1975. 2 
volumes. 
Cobb, Sanford H. The Rise of Religious Liberty In America. Macmillan and 
Co. New York. 1902. Reprinted in 1970 with an introduction by 
Paul L. Murphy. 
Cooley, Thomas. Constitutional Limitations. Boston. Little, Brown. 1868. 
Cord, Robert L. Separation of Church and State - Historical Fact and CUrrent 
Fiction. Lambeth Press. New York. 1982. 
Donohue, William A. The Politics of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
Transaction Books. New Brunswick, New Jersey. 1985. 
Drinan, Robert. Religion, The Courts and Public Policy. McGraw Hill. New 
York. 1963. 
Farnham, Wallace D. Religious Tolerance In Life and Thought: Jackson 
Comtty, Oregon. 1860-1890. PhD. Dissertation, University of Oregon. 
1955. 
Fogulquist, Albin M. Lutheran Province in the Pacific Northwest Prior to WWI. 
University of Oregon. PhD Dissertation. 
Friedman, Lawrence M. A History of American Law. Simon and Schuster. New 
York. 1973. 
Gallagher, Alan L. The Oregon School Bill of 1922: A Reevaluation. M.A. 
Thesis. Corpus Christi State University. 1984 
-----.--~-...,.The Oregon School Bill of 1922. Unpublished essay 
written for the Oregon Committee on the Humanities. 1985. 
---~,_.,...-__,,~_Breaking the Silence: Law and Religion in Oregon 
History. Unpublished essay written for the Oregon Committee on the 
140 
Humanities. 1985. 
The American Civil Liberties Union In Oregon: ________ ..._.,.. ______ _ 
1920-1955. Unpublished essay. 1982. 
Gaustad, Edwin Scott. Dissent In American Religion. University of Chicago 
Press. Chicago. 1973. 
Goldberg, George. Reconsecrating America. w. B. Eardman's Publishing Co. 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1984. 
Greek, Adrian and Anne. Mind Abuse by CUlts and Others. Postive Action 
Center. Portland, Or. 1985. 
Gunns, Albert Francis. Civil Liberties and Crisis - The Status of Civil Liberties 
in the Pacific Northwest 1911-1940. PhD. Dissertation, University of 
Washington. Seattle. 1971. 
Handy, Robert T. A History of the Churches In the United States and Canada. 
Oxford University Press. New York. 1976 (1979). 
Higham, John. Strangers In the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 
1860-1925. Atheneum. New York. 1963. 
Hinkle, Charles R. "Freedom of Religion" in Oregon Constitutional Law. 
Oregon State Bar. Portland, Oregon. 1985. 
Hixon, Margaret. Old Believers. Oregon Committee on the Humanities/B. 
Dalton. Portland, Or. 1981. 
Hultkrantz, Ake. The Study of American Indian Religions. Edited by 
Christopher Vecsay. Crossroad Publishing Co. New York. 1983. 
Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (1981). 
Howe, Mark Dewolf. cases on Church and State in the United States. Harvard 
University Press. 1952. 
Howe, Mark Dewolf.The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government 
in American Constitutional History. University of Chicago Press. 1965. 
Howell, Erle. Methodism in the Northwest. Parthenon Press. Nashville, 
Tennessee. 1966. 
Johnson, Alvin W. and Yost, Frank H. Separation of Church and State in the 
United States. Minneapolis. 1948. This is a revised and enlarged 
edition of Johnson's 1934 The Legal Status of Church-State 
Relationships in the United States. 
Kent, James. Commentaries On American Law. 9th ed. Little, Brown. Boston. 
1858. 
Kinzer, Donald L. An Episode In Anti-catholicism - The American Protective 
141 
Association. University of Washington Press. Seattle. 1964. 
Knuth, Priscilla F. Nativism In Oregon. Thesis. Reed College. Portland, Oregon. 
1947. 
Kurland, Phillip B. (Ed). "Church and State. The Supreme Court and the 1st 
Amendment". Article for the Supreme Court Review. University of 
Chicago. 1975. 
Larson, Bob. Larson's Book of CUits. Tyndale House Publishers. Wheaton, 
Ill. 1984. 
Lewis, Ira. "Education in Oregon Constitutional Convention of 1857". Oregon 
Historical Quarterly. 23,p. 220-229. 
McAvoy, Thomas T. The Americanist Heresy in Roman catholicism. 1895-1900. 
University of Notre Dame Press. North Bend. Indiana. 1963. 
McClellan, James. Joseph Story and the American Constitution. University of 
Oklahoma Press. Norman, Ok. 197 4. 
McGuffey's Fifth Eclectic Reader. 1879 Edition. New American Library. New 
York. 1962. 
McLagan, Elizabeth. A Peculiar Paradise: A History of Blacks in Oregon 
1788-1940. Georgian Press. Portland, Oregon. 1980. 
McNall, Scott G. The Preedom Center. A Case Study Of A Politico-Religious 
Sect. (Walter Huss and Co). PhD. Dissertation. University of Oregon. 
1965. 
Malbin, Michael J. The Supreme Court and the Definition of Religion. PhD. 
Dissertation. Cornell University. (1973). 
Manning, Leonard F. The Law of Church-State Relations. West Publishing Co. 
St. Paul, Minn. 1981. 
Marion County (Oregon) Russian Resource Committee. Manual for Educators 
of Russian Old Believers in Oregon. Marion CoWlty I.E.D. Salem, Or. 
October, 1976. 
Marty, Martin. Pilgrims in Their Own Land. 500 Years of Religion in America. 
Penguin Books. New York. 1984. 
Maynard, Theodore. The Story of American catholicism. Image. Doubleday and 
Company, Inc. Garden City, New York. 1960. 
Mead, Frank S. Handbook Of Denominations in the United States. 7th Ed. 
Abingdon Press. Nashville. 1983. 
Mecklin, John Moffett. The Story of American Dissent 1871-1965. Kennekut 
Press. 197 O. 
Meyer, Alfred. "The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights". 64 Harvard 
142 
Law Review 939. (1951). 
Miller, Charles A. The Supreme Court and the Uses of History. Simon and 
Schuster. New York. 1969 (1972). 
Miller, Clifford R. Baptist Beginnings in Oregon 1840-1870. PhD. Dissertation. 
University of Oregon. 1955. 
Miller, Perry. Roger Williams. His Contribution to American Tradition. 
Atheneum. New York. 1962. 
Moehlman, Conrad H. Comp. The American Constitutions and Religion. A 
Sourcebook on Church and State in the United States. 1938. 
Morgan, Richard E. The Politics of Religious Confiiet: Olurch and State in 
America. University Press of America. New York. 1968. 
Morris, Richard A. Bi-lingual Schooling, Bi-cultural Exposure and Social 
Cohesiveness: A Comparison of Two RtmSian Comrmmities. Paper read 
to Alaska Anthropological Assoc. April, 1982. 
Morris, Richard A. Three Rmsian Groups in Oregon: Comparison of 
Bowidaries in a Pluralistic Environment. Ph.D. Dissertation. 
University of Oregon. 1981. 
Murphy, Paul L. World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United 
States. W.W. Norton & Co. New York. 1979. 
Myers, Gustavus. History of Bigotry in the United States. Random House. New 
York. 1941. 
Northwest Ordinance of 1 '187. 
Norwood, Frederick A. The Story of American Methodism. Abingdon Press. 
Nashville, Tennessee. 1981 {197 4). 
O'Brien, William Francis "The Blaine Amendment 1875-76". 41 Detroit Law 
Review 137-205 University. 1962. 
O'Hara, Edwin Vincent. Catholic History of Oregon. Catholic Book Co. 
Portland, Oregon. 1925. 
Oregon Law Index (To 1866). Steven-Ness Co. Portland, Oregon. 1937. 
Oregon State Bar. Oregon Constitutional Law. Chapter 2 "Freedom of 
Religion". C. Hinkle. Portland, Oregon. 1985. 
Oregon State Constitution. (See Carey and the Oregon Blue Book for Standard 
editions). 
Oregon Constitution Revision Commission Report. Salem, Oregon. 1962. The 
Minutes and Records of the Commission are in two boxes at the 
Oregon State Archives in Salem. 
143 
Oregon Board of Education. Model Policy For Oregon Schools With Respect To 
Religion. Salem, Oregon. 1969. 
Overmeyer, P.M. The Oregon Justinian. (Mathew Deady) PhD. Dissertation. 
University of Minnesota. 1940. 
Paulsen. State Constitution, State Courts and 1st Amendment Freedoms. 4 Law 
Review. p.628 (1951). 
Pfeffer, Leo. God, Caesar and the Constitution. Beacon Press. Boston. 1975. 
Practicing Law Institute (PLI). Recent Developments in State Comtitutional 
Law. New York. 1985. 
Quick, Alan F. History and Development of Common School P1Dld in Oregon 
1849-1872. PhD. Dissertation. University of Oregon. 1963. 
Recken, Stephen Louis. A Reinterpretation of the Oregon School Bill of 1922: 
The Concept of the Common School in Progressive America. MA 
Thesis. Portland State University. Portland, Oregon. 1973. 
Rhenquist, Justice William. Dissenting opinion in Wallace v Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 
2479 (1985). 
Reynolds, Charles. "Portland Public Schools 1845-1871 ". Oregon Historical 
Quarterly. XXXIII (December 1932) pp. 334-347. 
Richey, Russell E. and Jones, Donald G., editors. American Civil Religion. 
Harper and Row. New York. 197 4. 
Rosten, Leo. Religions of America. Simon and Schuster. NY 1978. 
Saalfeld, Father Lawrence. Forces Of Prejudice In Oregon 1920-1925. (MA 
Thesis. catholic University of America. Washington, D.C. 1950.) 
University of Portland. Portland, Oregon 1985. 
Sabey, John. Staroveri and School: A case Study. of the Education of Russian 
Immigrant Children in a Rural Oregon Comm1Dlity. Ph.D. Dissertation. 
University of Oregon. 1969. 
Schand, James. Garb Bill. Unpublished. 1984. 
Scheck, John Frederick. The Beginnings of the Gennan Lutheran Church In 
Oregon. MA Thesis. University of Oregon. 1961. 
Scheck, John Frederick. Transplanting A Tradition: Eliot and the Unitarian 
Conscience 1865-1905. PhD. Dissertation. University of Oregon. 1969. 
Schoenburg, Wilfred, S.J. Paths to the Northwest: A Jesuit History of the 
Oregon Province. Loyola University Press. Chicago. 1982. 
Schwartz, Michael. The Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. 
1985. 
144 
Shay, Ted and Shay, Carey. Calendar on Rajneeshpuram. Unpublished. Salem, 
Oregon. 1984. 
Rajneeshpuram and the Abuse of Power. Scout 
------Creek-PresS.-we;1-Emn, Oregon. 1985. 
Shaw, J.G. Edwin O'Hara: American Prelate. New York. 1957. 
Silverman, Carol. Russian Old Believers. Oregon Conunittee on the Humanities, 
Portland, Oregon. 1984. Film and lecture on folklore and background. 
Interview 1985. 
Sorauf, Frank J. 'lbe Wall of Separation: The Constitutional Politics of Church 
and State Princeton U. Press NJ. 197 6 
Stokes, Anson Phelps and Pfeffer, Leo. Church and State in the United States. 
Harper and Row. New York. 1964. 
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution. Boston. Little Brown. 1873. 
Sweet, William Warren. The Story of Religion in America. Harper & Row. 
New York (1930) 1950. 
Swensen, Roy Molen. The Seekers of the Light - Christian Science in Oregon. 
1880-1915. M.A. Thesis. University of Oregon. 1969. 
Tarr, George Allen. Judicial Impact and State Supreme Courts. Lexington 
Books. Lowell, Ma. 197 7. 
Tiernay, Brian. The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300. Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1964. 
Toll, William. The Making of an Ethnic Middle Class: Portland Jewry Over 
Four Generations. State University of New York Press. Albany, New 
York. 1982. 
Tyack, David. "The Kingdom of God and the Common School: Protestant 
Missionaries and the Educational Awakening in the West". Harvard 
Educational Review. Vol 36 (Fall 1966) 447-469. 
"Bureaucracy and the Common School: The Experience of ----=--.,---..,,.. 
Portland, Oregon 1851-1913". American Quarterly. (Summer 1967) 
XIX, 475-498. 
Underwood, Betty and Barbara. Hostage to Heaven. Clarkson N. Potter Inc. 
New York, NY. 1979. 
Untiedt, Jules A. Impingement on Old Believers in Oregon by Agents of Social 
Change. PhD Dissertation. United States International University. San 
Diego. 1977. 
Urofsky, Melvin I. A Voice That Spoke For Justice: The Life and Times Of 
Stephen S. Wise. S.U.N.Y. Press. Albany, New York. 1982. 
145 
Van Allen, Roger. The Commonweal and American Catholicism. The Magazine, 
The Movement, The Meaning. Fortress Press. Philadelphia, Pa. 197 4. 
Wilner, Don. Text on Oregon Constitutional Law. Unpublished. Used at Lewis 
and Clark Law School. Portland, Oregon. 1983. 
Warden, Albert w. Jr. Baptists In Oregon. Judson Baptist College. 1969. 
Woodward, Robert C. Education in Oregon in the Progressive Era: Liberal and 
Practical. PhD. Dissertation. University of Oregon. 1963. 
Wooten, Dudley. Remember Oregon. American Publishing Company. Denver, Co. 
1922. 
Zabel, Orville H.God and Caesar in Nebraska - Church and State 1854-1954. 
University of Nebraska. Studies #14. Lincoln, Nebraska (1955}. 
Zollman, Carl. American Church Law. West Publishing Co •• 1933. 
Zucker, Jeff, Hogfass Bob and Hummel Kay. Oregon Indians: CUltW"e, 
History and CUrrent Affairs, Atlas and Introduction. Oregon 
Historical Society. Portland, Oregon. 1984. 
146 
(c) CASES 
A complete list of Oregon's appellate judges can be found in any 
current edition of the Oregon Blue Book. The Court of Appeals was 
established only in 1962. The Supreme Court, which began lDlder the 
Provisional Government in 1841, was the only appeals court for most of 
Oregon's history. 
Oregon trial courts consist of municipal, justice of the peace and 
district comts (which decide minor civil and criminal violations or misdemeanor 
cases), and of the circuit courts, which are the courts of general jurisdiction 
which decide the major civil and criminal cases. For some minor offenses 
tried in the lowest courts, there have existed various appeals to the circuit 
comts. The Supreme Comt has original jurisdiction in a very few cases. The 
Tax Court was created in 1961. Especially for non-lawyers, it is worth noting 
that the growth of administrative agencies has created a large number of 
hearings procedures, boards and officers, with a specialized process for appeal 
from each. These include planning boards, local tax boards, state agencies 
such as Adult and Family Services or Childrens' Services, the Land Use Board 
of Appeals, State Land Board, etc. Legal cases can now occur before a 
bewildering variety of entities besides the courts. 
Ah Lee vs State 8 Or. 214 (1880). Common law rule, that non-believer in 
Supreme Being incompetent to testify, abrogated by Oregon Constitution: dying 
declaration of Chinaman admissable. 
Andrews vs. Sereombe. 82 Or. 616 (1917). Conveyance under church discipline 
is valid in the absence of a statute to the contrary. 
Antelope, City of vs Rajneeshpuram On appeal to Court of Appeals. (1985). 
Ownership of church building in Antelope challenged, even though unquestioned 
for years before Rajneeshees took over town. City in 1981 sold church 
building to Episcopal Diocese of Eastern Oregon. 
Archdiocese of Portland vs Employment Division 42 Or. App 421 (1979). 
Church schools are covered under FUT A. 
Archdiocese of Portland vs Department of Revenue. 5 OTR 111 (1972). Under 
ORS 307.130, advancement of religion held to be charitable, so that chancery 
offices and catholic Sentinel offices are exempt from taxation. 
Allen vs Watson U.S. District Comt Oregon - Civil 1985. ACLU alleged 
religious discrimination existed where American Indians in segregation unit 
were denied access to sweat lodges and to visits by "pipe holder". 
Baer vs City of Bend 206 Or. 221 (1956). Noted in 55 Michigan Law Review 
130, and in Antieau at 251. Floridation of city water held not unconstitutional 
against an attack on religious grounds. Charles Hinkle has stated that Salem 
Academy might compel different result. 
Banks vs Community Olureh of La Grande 178 Or. 1 (1946). A property 
conveyance deed was held invalid because there was no notice to all members 
in accordance with church usages which were held to have the effect of by-
laws. 
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Barnett vs State. 249 Or. 226 (1968). Manslaughter by abortion. Article 1, 
Section 6. Whether it would prevent defendant from receiving fair trial cannot 
be raised by demurrer. 
Barnett vs State. 251 Or. 234 (1968). Article 1, Section 6 does not prevent 
a prospective juror from being asked his religious belief. 
Berean Fundamental Olurch Council vs Bratm. 281 Or. 661 (1978). Held that 
the real property of local church was held in trust by the national ruling body 
for the benefit of the local pastor, local council and congregation. 
Board of Publication of Methodist Church. 1 OTR 413 (1963). Federal Law uses 
"destination-of-benefits" test, to determine whether property or enterprize is 
tax exempt, BUT Oregon employs test of strict comtruction which looks to 
actual use. 
Board of Publication of Methodist Church vs Tax Commission. 239 Or. 65 
(1964). Oregon does not recognize "destination of income" test, but uses rule 
of strict construction and looks to actual use. 
Boyle vs Medford School District. (1985). ACLU challenged allowing on-
premises after-class religious instruction to first and second graders in a 
public school (unfiled). 
Brunswick-Bal.ke-COllander-CO. vs Evans 228 F 991 (DC Or. 1916). The federal 
constitution and laws do not protect religious liberty or impose any inhibition 
on the State. This is left exclusively to state constitution and laws. Held 
that the SWlday Closing Law, L.O.L. 2125, does not violate Oregon 
Constitution Article 1, Section 3. 
Chrisman vs Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace 506 F2d 308 (1974). The Hill-
Burton Act, a federal law for hospital comtruction, which prohibited colll'ts 
from using receipt of Hill-Burton funds as a basis for compelling an individual 
or hospital to perform sterilizations when prohibited by the hospital on the 
basis of religous belief or moral conviction, does not violate federal 
establishment clause. 
Christian Pre-school and Stone Church vs Department of Revenue. 5 OTR 8 
(1972) A claim that a church school improperly competed with a private day-
care was rejected. Christian school was found to be exempt from taxation. 
Christian Retreat Center vs Board of Commissioners for Washington County. 28 
Or. App. 673 (1972). An ordinance which authorized denial of church and 
accessory use permit where the probable needs of the public would not be 
served was a valid and reasonable limitation on religious practice. 
Christofferson vs Church of Scientology. 57 Or. App. 203, rev. den. 293 OR 
456 (1982). On first appeal, jury verdict reversed because inquiry into 
sincerity of religious beliefs had been allowed. On remand, jury assessed 
damages of $39 Million against church for fraud and abusive practices. Judge 
then granted motion for new trial after finding prejudicial argument and 
improper inquiry into religion. 
Cogan vs Atiyeh. D. Or (1982). Case dismissed upon agreement after 
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denominational colleges withdrew from program which gave scholarship tuition 
aid to students attending any Oregon college. case brought by ACLU, which 
had approved statute in 1972. 
Cooper (aka Khalsa) YS Duncan. In court of appeals and federal court. (1981). 
Sikh teacher was dismissed from teaching and lost teaching certificate because 
wore Sikh headgear in school. Appeal to Education Department lost, and 
cases filed in both state and federal court. Agreement was return of 
certificate where teacher agreed not to return to State. Appeal: Court 
sustained prohibition, but rejected penalty. That decision is on appeal to 
Oregon Supreme Court. 
Cooper YS Oregon School Activities Association. 52 Or. App 425 (1981). 
OSAA rule which required that transfer students not participate in sports for 
one year after transfer held not to violate free exercise and equal protection 
clauses when applied to transfers from parochial to public high schools. 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter Day Saints YS Department 
of Revenue. 6 OTR 268 (1975), 267 Or. 775 (1976). A farm, whose income 
went entirely to charity, was itself held not exempt from state taxation. 
Oregon is not a "destination of income" state, and an exempt organization 
cannot run a business for profit and avoid taxation by passing profits through 
the organization. 
Dallas City YS Missionary Society of the Methodist Church. 6 F 356, affd.107 
US 336 (1881) A grant to religious societies of mission stations was not 
restricted to a single one for each, but for as many as they actually occupied, 
based upon federal Act of 1848 (August 14), 9 Stat. 323, Sec.1. 
Damascus Commmlity Church YS Clackamas County. 45 Or. App. 1065, appeal 
dismissed. 450 US 902 (1980). A zoning ordinance which allowed churches and 
parochial schools as a conditional use in land use law was not a violation of 
free exerc~se of religion where procedure was fair. 
Decker YS Berean Baptist Church. 51 Or. App. 191 (1981). Civil courts may 
not enquire into church doctrine to resolve church disputes (American Rule). 
Dickman YS School District 62 C. 232 Or. 238 (1962). cert. denied 371 US 823 
(1962). The Oregon Constitution was held to forbid free textbooks to 
religious schools. The "student benefit" theory was rejected under the State 
Constitution, although the federal Constitution would allow it. 
Diocese of Oregon (Protestant Episcopal Bishop) YS Department of Revenue. 
5 OTR 126 (1972). Companion case to Archdiocese of Portland. Gift of the 
Kerr Residence, used as the diocesan administrative center, held exempt from 
taxation. 
Dilger YS School District 24 CJ. 222 Or. 108 (1960). ORS 339.420, which 
allowed released time for religious instruction and required school districts to 
provide, approved as constitutional. 
Dillon YS Watson. US Dist Or. (1985). Right of minister to conduct non-
denominational classes and to proselytize within prison approved. 
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Eberle vs Benedictine Sisters. 235 Or. 496 (1963). Held that it was a jury 
question whether quality of glass in window of church falls below community 
standards applied to religious entity same as for other entities. 
Estabrook vs State 162 Or. 476 (1939). Although at common law witness who 
did not believe in Supreme Being was incompetent to testify, that was changed 
by Oregon Constitution. Inquiry into beliefs of Christian Scientist resulted in 
reversal. 
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society vs Department of Revenue. 
5 OTR 14 (1972). Receipt of net income by a charitable or religious entity 
does not render it non-exempt from taxation; it is not to be punished for 
prudential management. 
Evangelical Lutheran Charity Board vs Department of Revenue. 4 OTR 410 
(1971). 
On tax exemption, Oregon is a "strict construction" state: Land held for 
future use is not exempt. 
(First) 1st Evangelical United Brethren Church vs Department of Revenue. 
1 OTR 249 (1963). Church property is not exempt from taxation where legal 
title is held by trustees. Oregon applies the maxim that ad valorem taxes are 
concerned only with legal title. 
Fisher vs Clackamas School District 12 13 Or. App. 56, rev. denied (1973). 
The court approved "released time" (religious education off-school premises), 
but rejected "shared time" (joint use of premises by religious entity and public 
school entity). Public school had contracted with Catholic parochial school to 
hold its classes on parochial premises to parochial students during part of 
time. School fol.Dld not to be genuinely public, because church chose who 
could attend. 
Freeland vs State 295 Or. 367 (1983). It would violate Oregon Constitution 
Article I, Section 20, to grant or deny a preliminary hearing because the 
accused was of a particular religious denomination. 
Gennan Apostolic Church vs Department of Revenue. 6 OTR 521 (1976). A 
change in ORS 307.140 held to widen concept of "use" under Oregon tax law. 
The principle of apportionment applies, so that portions used for church 
activities were held exempt, but not apartments. 
Goodall vs State. 1 OTR 333 (1857). That deceased did not believe in future 
reward or punishment was held relevant to the credibility of a dying 
declaration. The Oregon Constitution was not raised in this case. 
Gregory vs Salem General Hospital. 175 Or. 464 (1945). Held that the statute 
of 1872 applied only to the formation of ecclesiastical corporations. Public 
hospital held to fall under rule that charitable institutions are exempt from 
liability for torts arising out of negligence. Exemption from such liability is 
not dependent upon whether an entity is religious but whether it is charitable. 
Harrisburg Lumber Co vs Washburn. 29 Or. 150 (1896). Lien on church valid 
and not exempt (Methodist Episcopal Church). 
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Hertzka vs State (1900). Christian Scientist was accused of practicing 
medicine without a license, where woman died after all doctors had given up 
and C.S. provided treatment. FolDld guilty before Justice of Peace, but not 
guilty on retrial in Circuit Court in Clackamas County. 
Hibernian BeneYOlent Society vs Kelly 28 Or. 173 (1895). Case set 
apportionment rule for exemption of charitable enterprises from taxation. 
Charity can restrict benefits to members. Oregon statute deals with property 
as it finds it and not with future uses. But case dismissed, because court of 
equity will not enjoin collection of tax, which is for court of law. 
Hosmer vs State 72 Or. Report 57-77. (1914). Libel case where catholic 
Convent was libelled by newpaper editor who published false accolDlts of 
"escaped nun". The editor's conviction was affirmed on appeal. 
Jehovah's Witnesses vs Mullen. 241 Or. 281 (1958). Municipality did not 
impermissably discriminate where upon full and fair review it declined to allow 
variance to construct meeting hall in residential area. 
Jensen vs State ex rel Juvenile Department. 54 Or. App (1981). Parents' free 
exercise objection to traditional medical treatment would not prevent court 
from assuming jurisdiction over hydroencephalic child for purposes of obtaining 
possible life-saving treatment. Treatment of such child by prayer only, while 
statute relieved parents of charge of child abuse, exceeded limits. 
Kay vs David Douglas High School. Multnomah Cowtty Circuit Court (1984). 
Court for bade prayer at high school baccalaureate service. 
Kelly vs Commissioner. 62 T.C. 131 (1974). All persons are taxable on 
income earned in individual capacity, as opposed to income earned as agent of 
church. 
Kemp vs Workers Comp. 65 Or. App. 659, modified. 67 Or. App. 270, rev. 
denied. 297 Or 227 (1984). Rule that Workers Compensation claimant can 
only refuse treatment when relying upon an accredited practicioner of a well-
established church violates Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. 
Liggett vs Ladd. 17 Or. 89 (1888). The property of an unincorporated 
religious association was conveyed to a literary association which was required 
to hold it for the benefit of the religious association. Arrangement held 
valid. 
Lenrich Assoc. vs Hayden. 264 Or. 122 (1972). Hare Krishna devotees could 
not require owners of private shopping mall to allow them access for 
solicitation and display of belief before public. Based on Lloyd v Tanner 
case. 
Lowe vs City of Eugene. 254 Or. 518 (1969). Eugene Sand and Gravel v 
Eugene 276 Or. 1007 (1977). The Eugene Cross cases •. Courts with different 
members first found that cross on public park was permitted, then forbidden, 
and finally permitted as a secular symbol to war dead. Case was 8 years in 
courts. 
McElwin vs Kabatoff. 275 Or. 393 (1976). Court refused to allow 
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interrogation of jurors after verdict in personal injury case where Plaintiff 
testified that she had attended Jehovah's Witness' service prior to accident. 
McGahen vs CommicuJioner. 76 T.C. 468 (1981). All persons as individuals are 
taxable on income (as opposed to whether or not taxable as agents of church). 
Marks vs City of Roseburg. 65 Or. App. 102 (1983). Gypsy forttme telling 
case. City's occult arts ordinance prohibiting fortune telling held invalid 
because focused on content of speech and writing. 
Methodist Book Concern vs State Tu Cnmmimon. 186 Or. 548 (1949). 
Oregon applies strict construction of tax law. 
Methodist Episcopal Protestant Church at Jefferson vs Adams. 4 Or. 76 
(1870). A religious corporation, tmder Misc. Laws Chap 3, can receive 
bequest. 
Miller vs Employment Division & Union GospeL 45 Or. App. 1117, 290 Or. 285 
(1981). Truck driver and related enterprises of church held not subject to 
state employment tax. 
Methodist Home Inc. vs Tax Commission. 226 Or. 298 (1961). Nursing home 
operation held not exempt from taxation, tmder principle it was ordinary 
business although run by church. 
Multnomah School of the Bible vs Multnomah County. 218 Or. 19 (1959). 
"Strict but reasonable construction" case. Exemption would be granted where 
initial steps were taken showing clear intent to use for charitable purposes. 
Murphy v Harty, 238 Or. 228 ( ). A judgement of $10,000 for libel was 
given to Murphy when another minister ref erred to him as a liar and accused 
him of carrying out "Satan's plan of division and destruction." The Court 
found that communications in the course of church discipline were privileged, 
but that a finding of actual or express malice could override the privilege. 
Napier vs First Congregational Church of Portland. 157 Or. 110 (1937). A 
tort case, where the court determined that an "invitee" became a mere 
"license" when he sought the church lavatory. 
Nelson vs Monitor Congregational Church. 74 Or. 162 (1914). A grantor of 
property to a church cannot sue to regulate its use unless he is a church 
member. 
Newton vs Cupp. 3 Or. App. 434 (1970). Protection of religious freedom is 
one of the obligations of all courts. 
Employment Division vs Northwest Christian College. 31 Or. App. 201 (1977). 
The court held that church schools were not covered under FUTA. 
Ex Parte Northrup. 41 Or. 489 (1902). Statute prohibiting barbering on 
Stmday held to be constitutional. 
Pacific Conference of Evangelical Churches vs Department of Revenue. 7 OTR 
429. Jennings Lodge Conference Center was held not exempt where no timely 
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application was made (though it might otherwise have been exempt). Estoppel 
not available in tax area, even though failure to file was based upon advice of 
official. 
Palmer vs State. Oregon Sp Ct. (1866), p 91 of Acts &: Res of Leg. Assembly. 
WA McPherson, State Printer. Incorporation of city of Salem did not 
invalidate Act of January 1854 to prevent Sabbath-breaking and barroom 
regulation. 
Pennoyer vs Wadhouse. 20 Or. 27 4 (1891). A devise was held to be for 
public charity when it was for the advancement of religion by construction of 
a (Presbyterian) church. 
Philomath College vs Wyatt. 27 Or. 390 (1893). American courts will not 
interfere in ecclesiastical disputes. Church of United Brethren in Christ. 
After announcing non-involvement principle, court conducted extensive review 
(which was also occuring in many other states) and determined that those who 
left church had no claim where substance of doctrine and original church 
constitution was adhered to. 
Pierce vs Society of Sisters. 268 US 510 (1925). U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down state initiative law which would have required that all children attend 
public schools in the English language only. 
Planned Parenthood vs Department of Hwnan Resources. 63 Or. App. 41 
(1983), aff 297 Or. 562 (1984). The claim by plaintiffs that rule limiting 
abortions was invalid because it violated religious freedom was not reached by 
courts, which struck down rule based on other reasons. 
Poe vs State Treasurer. 144 Or. 561 (1933). Gift by will to First Church of 
Christ Scientist for Christian Science Monitor was found to be religious and 
therefore exempt. 
Presbytery of Willamette vs Hammer. 235 Or. 564 (1963). A conveyance to 
trustees without an express statement still created a trust but did not limit 
use of property. 
Reorganized LDS vs Department of Revenue. 6 OTR 510 (1976). Recently 
acquired property was held to be exempt from taxation, in spite of "use" rule, 
where the delay in use was unavoidable because of necessary seeking of 
permits. The minimum requirements of "use" were held to exist. 
Roman catholic Bishop vs Baker. 140 Or. 600. (1932). (Cf. Antieu at 257). 
Where public schools were permitted to exist, exclusion of parochial schools 
was held invalid. 
Rombough vs Department of Revenue. 293 Or. 477 (1982). 
Russell vs Congregation Nevah Zedeck. 236 Or. 291 (1964). A synagogue 
was held not to be in breach of contract when it spent five months in good 
faith effort to get approval of site for construction of building. 
St. Louis Union Trust Co. vs Oregon. Annual Conference of Methodist 
Episcopal church. 14 F. Supp 35 (DC Or. 1936). Assumption of debt by 
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church is binding. 
Scott Co. VB Roman catholic Archbishop. 83 Or. 97 (1917). Where a deed 
contained a restriction limiting property use to residential property, but 
corporation waived this in stipulation, objection by other landowner held not 
effective and rights to use some property for church and school purposes 
approved. 
Shiloh Lutheran Revival Center VB Employment Division. 44 Or. App. 81 
(1980). Superceded by Miller. Non-profit religious organization was fo\Dld 
subject to unemployment tax, when it was of a type normally done for profit 
and not integral to religious purposes. 
Sisters of Charity vs Washington Comity Board of Commissioners. 3 OTR 106 
(1967). Organization must file on time to receive exempt status. The proper 
place to apply/appeal is to Tax Commission for review. 
Corporation of Sisters of Mary vs Lane CoWlty. 123 Or. 144 (1923). Hospital 
is charitable and exempt from taxation, even though some of patients are able 
to pay: question of exemption is purely legislative question. 
Society of St. Vincent de Paul vs Department of Revenue. 5 OTR 611 (1974). 
Land merely held with intent to use for charitable purposes is not exempt 
from taxation where no alteration or actual use for such purpose has begun. 
State vs Sprague. 25 Or. App. 621 (1976). Parents must support children 
regardless of religious beliefs. 
Stansberry vs First Methodist Episcopal Church. 79 Or. 155 (1916). First 
Methodist Episcopal Church. Conveyance which created trust for church was 
not necessarily perpetual but left discretion in church managers to close and 
sell after good faith use. 
Sununers vs Grant Park Baptist Church. 243 Or. 362 (1966). A railed light-
well was held not to be a dangerous condition, so that church as matter of 
law was held not liable for negligence when 5 year old fell in. 
Taylor vs Cupp. 29 Or. App. 585 (1977). Prison regulation prohibiting more 
than certain quantity of books and publications in cell not deemed denial of 
free exercise of religion: a proper limitation based upon security, and not a 
prohibition. 
'lbornton vs City of Portland. 17 4 Or. 508, 149 P2d 972 (1944). State can 
forbid children of Jehovah's Witnesses from being put out to sell literature. 
Based on U.S. Supreme Court case of Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944). Court held that Oregon and U.S. Constitutional provisions on religion, 
though in different words, were the same. 
Tijerina vs Cornelius Christian Church. 273 Or. 58 (1975). Church land was 
held not to be "agricultural land" so as to immunize church for liability for 
negligence, when it acquired farm land but was using as baseball field, and 
plaintiff injured by falling in unmowed weeds. 
Tooley vs Martin-Marietta Corporation. 648 F2d 1239, cert. den. Steelworkers 
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of America v Tooley, 454 US 1098 (1981). Section of U.S. Civil Rights Act, 
which allowed Seventh Day Adventmts to pay the equivalent of union dues to 
mutually acceptable charity, was held to be valid. Oregon has similar statute. 
US vs Sigman. 429 F2d 13. cert. den. 400 US 910 (1970). Selective Service 
compulsory regulations are not a violation of the free exercise clause of U .s. 
Constitution. 
US vs Crowhurst. 629 f2d 1297, cert. den. 449 US 1021 (1980). Argument by 
defendant that Tax form 1040, with its definition of gross income, forced him 
to lie and thus violate his freedom of religion was held to be frivolous. 
US Bank of Portland vs Snodgrass. 202 Or. 530 (1954). An inheritance 
contingent upon recipient not becoming or not marrying a catholic was held to 
be valid. Acts of private parties are not regulated by comtitutional 
provisions, which are a limit on government. 
Wells vs Ivancie. Multnomah Cotmty Circuit Cotrt, Portland. No. A83-04-
02710. (1983). Prayer service at city hall under sponorship of Mayor not 
permitted, but service on adjoining city park approved. 
State vs Yee Gueng. 57 Or. 509 (1910). Evidence that deceased did not 
believe in future rewards or punishments may not be considered in bearing on 
the credibility of a dying declaration (based upon Oregon Constitution). 
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(d) OREGON ATrORNBY GENERAL OPINIONS 
The first Oregon Attorney General was George E. Chamberlain (from 
1891-1895). His successors were: Cicero ldleman (1895-1899), D.R. Blackburn 
(1899-1903), A.M. Crawford (1903-1915), George Brown (1915-1920), I.H. Van 
Winkle (1920-1943), George Neuner (1943-1953), Robert Thorton (1953-1969), 
Lee Johnson (1969-1977), James Redden (1977-1980), James Brown (1980-
1981), and David Frohnmeyer (1981 to date). Chamberlain, Thorton, Redden 
and Brown were Democrats. 
2 Opinion Attorney General 71 (1905). State may have displays and exhibits 
on religion at Exposition. 
2 A.G. 178 (1905). A religious corporation can dissolve voluntarily by 
surrendering its franchise. 
10 A.G. 33(1920). Pupils of parochial school can not claim benefits of school 
transport law designed exclusively for public schools. Parochial students 
going same way at same time may be accommodated and allowed use of 
bus. 
10 A.G. 451(1922). Workmen who donate their services in building 
construction for religious organization may be covered by Workman's 
Compensation Law. 
10 A.G. 453(1922). Hotel managers may be criminally liable under Oregon 
Laws Section 2126 if they permit or aid barbering on Sl.D1day. 
11 A.G. 150(1923). Question, of whether property owned by Presbyterian and 
Catholic Churches is taxable, is not answerable based on the limited 
facts presented. 
11 A.G. 159(1923). Statute (Chap. 11, G.L. 1923, H.B. 18) prohibiting any 
teacher from wearing religious garb in school is plain and unambiguous, 
so that there is no authority in the Governor (Pierce) to allow of any 
exception or suspend its operation. The law provided that the teacher 
would be suspended and his license revoked. Failure to comply by a 
school board is misdemeanor. 
11 A.G. 199(1923). Compulsory school law (Chap. 1, G.L. of Oregon) does not 
affirmatively forbid sending children to private schools, but only requires 
that they attend public schools. 
11 A.G. 567 (1924). In absence of statutory procedure for voluntary 
dissolution of religious corporation, general law applies, so that voluntary 
surrender, death of all corporate members, or termination by legislature 
would suffice. 
12 A.G. 14(1924). Proposed gift of money by Baptists, for purchase of land 
and erection of cottage for childrens' farm home, deemed sectarian and 
impermissable where Baptists imposed condition of gift that they control 
nomination of matron, name of cottage, and tenure of vacancies. 
12 A.G. 408(1925). Oregon Laws Sec. 4235 provides that the land, building 
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and contents of churches are exempt from taxation, but by law they 
must be so used on Tax Day (March 1) to be exempt. There is no 
relation back, if later used as church. 
13 A.G. 10(1926). Trust provision in deed of lots to Methodist Episcopal 
Church includes power to dispose if proceeds used for trust purpose, 
where no specific language or power of revert or included. Based upon 
Stansberry v First M.S. Church. 
13 A.G. 237(1927). A catholic Sister cannot do practice teaching in public 
school in religious garb. Chap. 11, G.L. of 1923. O'Connor v Hendrick, 
184 N.Y. 421 cited as authority. 
13 A.G. 587 (1928). Appropriation of school funds by public school directors 
for maintenance of weekday schools of religion would violate Art. 1, 
Section 5. Chap. 24, GL of 1925 allows released time, but nothing allows 
public ftmding. 
14 A.G. 47(1928). Motor vehicle owned by church not exempt from 
registration fees even though used to transport school children. A 
church is not a political division of the state, so as to be exempt from 
that law. 
15 A.G. 403(1931). Bequest to First Church of Christ Scientist, to be used 
for the Christian Science Monitor, is subject to inheritance taxes. 
Oregon Code 1920, Sec. 10-601 requires use within State or United 
States, whereas the Monitor is "an International Newspaper". But a 
Multnomah County Circuit Court had held such a request to be exempt. 
15 A.G. 780(1032). Methodist Episcopal Church: annuity between church and 
individual not taxable tranf er under state inheritance law, but held to be 
an inter vivos gift. 
17 A.G. 102(1934). Catholic Church (exempt), convent (exempt), schoolyard 
and Playgrotmd (exempt), parsonage to be apportioned (not exempt as 
parsonage, but exempt to extent used as school) under principles of 
Benevolent Hiberian Society v Kelly. 
16 A.G. 537(1934). Bequests to catholic Church for masses for dead are for 
religious use and thus exempt from inheritance tax under Oregon Code 
1930, Sec. 10-601. 
17 A.G. 468(1935). Under Oregon Code 1930, Sec. 35-1010, which sets 
property qualifications for voters in school elections, Catholic Sisters 
cannot vote because they do not own property (all of which is solely 
owned by their corporation). 
17 A.G. 614 (1935). A church manse or parsonage owned and maintained by a 
church as home for pastor is not exempt from taxation. Oregon law 
exempts only property actually used for worship. Oregon Code Sec. 69-
104, as amended Oregon Laws 1931, Chap. 358. 
19 A.G. 439(1939). Oregon Laws 1939, Chap. 352, provides that school board 
shall provide transportation to private or parochial schools under 
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compulsory attendance laws (which require public attendance from all 
between 8 and 16 years of age) but excepts private students who have 
already acquired learning taught in first 8 years of public school). Chap 
352 does not extend to pupils who have learned elementary school. 
19 A.G. 479(1939). Legacies to Roman Catholic Archbishop, a corporation 
sole, held not exempt from inheritance tax under Oregon Code 1935, Sec 
10-601, because not made to body corporate and not limited to use solely 
within the U.S. (and therefore not within terms of statute). 
19 A.G. 565(1940). Missionary Society (unincorporated) of Evangelical Church 
is exempt from inheritance tax law. Oregon Code 1935, Sec. 10-601. 
19 A.G. 565(1940). Following Gobitis decision, state may require flag salute 
and pledge of allegiance without violating religious liberty and rights of 
conscience. Art. 1, Sect. 3. Discusses cases involving Jehovah's 
Witnesses. 
20 A.G. 105(1940). Non-high school districts may not use school funds to pay 
tuition, transportation, board or lodging of pupils attending private (or 
parochial) schools of high school grade. Student benefit theory rejected. 
Said that courts of colD'ltry unanimous in prohibiting use of public funds 
to pay for private or sectarian schools. 
20 A.G. 577(1942). OCLA Sec. 23-927, nuisance statute, does not prohibit 
peaceful distribution of religious literature on public street by Jehovah's 
Witnesses. Based on Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296(1939) and 
Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, (1942), both Jehovah's Witnesses cases. 
23 A.G. 473(1948). Released time religious instruction off public school 
premises under OCLA 111-3014 is legal. On school premises religious 
instruction is not. Based upon McCollum and State Constitution. 
23 A.G. 504(1948). Sec. 111-1021 OCLA, as amended Oregon Laws 1947, Sec. 
1, Chap. 72, allows school board to allow equal access to all, including 
religious denominations. Therefore, school building may be used as 
church, so long as this does not interfere with school use, where 
legislature has designed schools as civic centers. 
24 A.G. 80(1948). Residuary devise to Roman Catholic Bishop in trust for 
church and congregation in Hood River is exempt from inheritance tax on 
OCLA 20-101. 
24 A.G. 59(1948). Privately-erected memorial chapel could be built at Oregon 
State College when open to all students, but college could not employ or 
pay chaplain. OCLA 111-3802 forbids sectarian test in appointment of 
employees of colleges, and Art. I, Sec. 5 forbids money for religious 
institution. McCollwn raised a "high and impregnable wall". 
25 A.G. 78(1950). OCLA 111-874 and Everson allow but do not require school 
board to provide for parochial students' transportation (when along or 
near designated routes) or board or lodging in lieu of same. 
25 A.G. 254(1951). School Board not authorized to pay board of student 
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wishing to attend parochial school. 
26 A.G. 46(1952). Use of Bible in public schools barred by State and Federal 
Constitutions. 
26 A.G. 52(1952). Statutory (Or Laws 1945, Chap 316) and constitutional 
provisions on religious freedom could allow, if religion required, public 
school pupil to be excused from running or shower baths. An 
"apparently absurd question". 
26 A.G. 208(1954). Restaurant may not require Negro patrons to eat on one 
side of the caf e while reserving other side for white patrons, \.Dlder 
Oregon Civil Rights Act, ORS 30.670, providing equal treatment in public 
regardless or race, religion, color, or national origin. 
27 A.G. 46(1954). A school board may not arbitrarily refuse to grant at 
parental request a reasonable time for religious instruction, but may 
exercise discretion in its manner of doing so. ORS 336.260 and Zorach v 
Clauson, 343 U .s. 30 6. 
28 A.G. 5(1956). Rule requiring Saturday attendance at Oregon Dental School 
not invalid as to new students who could not comply with rule because 
of religious reasons (7th Day Adventists). 
28 A.G. 27(1956). It is an unlawful employment practice to ask on an 
application form if an applicant "regularly attends a house of worship". 
ORS 659.030 (1) and (3) say so precisely, and ORS 659.020 declares as 
repugnant to public policy any discrimination based on religion. 
28 A.G. 73(1957). Free textbook law permits use by pupils attending private 
schools which meet state standards. Separate standards may not be 
adopted for private and parochial schools. 
28 A.G. 137(1957). Or. Laws 1957, Chap. 272, the free textbook law, 
presumed valid, where school boards directly purchase books, so that no 
expenditure of state funds is involved. 
28 A.G. 166(1959). Children of school age attending private or parochial 
schools may enroll in public high school driver training. One subject to 
compulsory school law has a right to enroll or participate in part-time 
instruction. 
28 A.G. 257(1958). A non-sectarian chapel at the State boys school at 
McLaren is permissable. In spite of 1948 ruling that Oregon State 
College could not have chapel, McLaren could because ORS 421.035 and 
religious freedom allowed and required, and because Zorach required 
accommodation. Art. 1, Sec. 5 read to allow employment of chaplains 
elsewhere than in legislature. 
29 A.G. 387(1960). Building owned by religious group and used by religious 
director as residence not exempt from ad valorem taxes lBlder ORS 307-
140. Based on Benevolent Hibernian Society v Kelly. 
30 A.G. 14(1960). Attorney General will not give opinion to Labor 
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Commissioner on whether University of Oregon and Oregon State College 
may grant recognition to campus groups which exclude from membership 
on the basis of race, religion, etc., as this does not involve employment 
practices or places of public accomodations. 
30 A.G. 19(1960). The free textbook law, ORS 328.520, does not permit free 
use or distribution of other teaching aids to pupils in parochial schools. 
30 A.G. 317(1961). Based upon ORS 332.170, school board may permit use of 
schoolhouse by churches or organized religious groups for a proper 
purpose under such restrictions, terms and conditions as to compensation 
as the Board may impose. Cf. 1946-48(505), 1926-28(127), 1934-
36(438, 737), 1936-38(417). 
31 A.G. 36(1962). Transportation of elementary parochial school students in 
vehicles used exclusively for union high school district for pupil transport 
is exempt under ORS 767 .025 and not subject to transportation code. 
31 A.G. 430(1962). Stay of mandate by Oregon Supreme Court, pending 
petition for review by U.S. Supreme Court, of Dickman v School District 
Ho. 62 (1961) would have effect that textbooks in use in parochial 
schools should not be withdrawn, but no new books should be issued: to 
preserve status quo. 
31 A.G. 296(1963). Resident pupils attending parochial school are entitled to 
enroll in public schools to attend select classes. This is subject to 
reasonable rules and regulations. 
31 A.G. 428(1964). It is not a violation of State or Federal Constitution to 
have clergy and prayer at non-mandatory high school graduation or 
baccalaureate service. Accommodation to religion permissable even 
under Dickman. 
32 A.G. 209(1965). Use of public schools to distribute Gideon Bibles violates 
the Federal Constitution (based upon New Jersey case of Tudor v Board 
of Education). 
33 A.G. 351(1967). A grant of Hill-Burton (federal) funds, for construction 
of care facilities, is constitutional, notwithstanding ownership or 
operation of facility by church, religious sect or order. There are no 
state funds, so there is no state violation. 
33 A.G. 354(1967). Invocation at student body council meetings and 
assemblies violates Federal Constitution. 
34 A.G. 109 (1968). A proposal to provide funds for students at Oregon 
private colleges, without distinction as to church affiliation of the 
college, would be constititional. But see PESIC case, Cogan v Atiyeh, 
1982. 
35 A.G. 262 (1970). State may not provide financial assistance to student at 
or contract with parochial school, but may with other private school. 
35 A.G. 483(1971). State may not make tuition grants to or contract with 
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religious institutions of higher learning. 
37 A.G. 787(1975). It is permissable for State Board of Education to set 
policy that public schools may provide areas for displays of religious and 
other cultural significance. It is not permissable for volunteer adult to 
display creche in public classroom. 
38 A.G. 1929(1978). ORS 179.375, requiring Corrections and Mental Health 
Department to provide chaplains "including but not limited to Protestant 
and Roman catholic" is not limited to nor gives preference to those. 
Practice of having chaplaincy open to only one faith is permissable where 
that is the need. 
41 A.G. 281(1980). Teaching scientific creation theories in public school 
would violate Constitution IF it were found to be religious instruction. 
"Equal time" for creation theory not required if Darwinian evolution 
taught. The teaching of creation theory could not be required IF fotmd 
to be religious instruction. 
42 A.G. 44(1981). HB 2633, requiring public schools to give balanced 
treatment to theories of evolution and scientific creation, probably not 
constitutional. 
43 A.G. 8128(1982). Receipt of state monies by religious organization 
providing secular service of family counselling is permissable. 
43 A.G. 11(1982). A payment of public funds to a religious body for services 
rendered by the religious body is permissable: Catholic Family Services 
Program. 
44 A.G. 8148 (1983). The City of Rahneeshpuram, concluded to be wholly 
owned and controlled by a religious group, deemed unconstitutional. 
Payment of State revenue sharing funds to city not allowable where 
religiously affiliated corporation owns all property in the city. 
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(e) STATE LAWS AND PROPOSED LAWS 
Sources: 23 Oregon Law Review (1943) at 53-55 contains a 
bibliography of Oregon Statutes to 1940, showing the various compilations, 
revisions, digests and codes, of the Territory (first in 1850) and then of the 
State. Under the State were: (1) the 1862 Code; (2) the "Deady Code" of 
1866; (3) the Deady and Lane Laws of 1874; (4) the Hill Code of 1887; (5) 
the second Hill Code of 1892; (6) the B & C (Ballinger and Cotton) Code of 
1902; (7) Lord's Oregon Laws of 1910 (three volumes); (8) Olson's Oregon 
Laws of 1920 (two volumes); (9) Clark's Oregon Laws of 1928; (10) the 
Oregon Code of 1930; (11) the 1935 Supplement by Dyer and Kaufman; and 
(12) the OCLA (Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated) of 1940. Current laws are 
folDld in Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS), which is amended after each 
legislature. 
State Laws and Proposed Laws 
1843. Organic Law. Contained verbatim the words of the Northwest 
Ordinance. 
1845. Organic Law. Contained verbatim the words of the Northwest 
Ordinance. 
1849. Territorial School Law had section protecting religious opinion. 
1850s. Law allowed mission to hold township (34,040 acres). 
1850. Proposed territorial law to expel Catholic priests because of alleged role 
in Whitman Massacre failed. 
1854. Territorial law established Sunday closing of businesses not for 
charitable or neccessitous purposes and close regulation of taverns. 
Carried over in State law and readopted regularly. 
1857. Oregon Constitution. Article IX, Sec. 1, authorized immunity of 
churches, charitable and educational property from taxation. (Removed 
in 1917). 
1857. Oregon Constitution. Article I, contained numerous provisions protecting 
religious belief. 
1870. Mathew Deady responsible for first statute in country allowing 
corporations to form without a special act of legislature but upon 
signature of three incorporators, and laws on church incorporation. 
1880. A law proposed by the American Protective Association would have 
prevented the flying of any foreign flag over any public building. It was 
aimed at preventing the raising of the Irish fiag on St. Patricks Day. 
1901. There was talk in the 1901 session of a law to outlaw Christian Science, 
but it never got out of committee. 
1915. A bill was introduced by W .P. Lafferty (Benton County) for inspection of 
convents, monasteries, hospitals and like institutions, both regularly and 
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on petition of twenty or more persons. 
1917. Oregon Constitution. Article IX, Sec. 1, amended to delete language 
specifically exempting "religious" and similar entities. Exemption 
thereafter became statutory only. 
1922. Oregon School Bill. Initiative would have required that all children 
under 16 attend public schools in the English language. Overturned in 
Pierce v Society of Sisters. 
1923. Garb Bill. Forbade any public school teacher from wearing religious 
garb on penalty of dismissal and loss of certificate, with criminal 
penalties for Boards who did not enforce. 
1923. Proposed laws would have outlawed sacramental wine and made Columbus 
Day not a holiday. 
192X. Law required daily reading of King James Bible in schools. 
1925. Law permitted use of public school time (released time) for religious 
instruction. (Zabel 121). 
1941. Law provided for free textbooks and transportation for all students 
(including parochial). 
1953. ORS 336.260 Released time law. 
1962. Oregon Constitutional Revision Commission. Commission did not adopt 
proposed amendment which would have forbidden religion in schools. It 
did adopt language to Article 1, Sec. 5 which would have broadened it. 
Commission's recommendations not adopted. 
1971. Law allows individuals to refuse without penalty to participate in 
abortion when religious or moral reasons dictate. Hospital also allowed 
by law to decline abortion. 
1972. Initiative proposed Constitutional Amendment. Article 1, Sec. 1 was to 
be changed to same language as federal First Amendment. Failed of 
passage. 
Oregon Evidence Code. 5:06. Clergy/Penitent privilege: applies only to formal 
churches. 
ORS 106.120. Clergy of organized congregations may perform marriages. 
ORS 243.666. Fair share union dues. Those with religious or comparable 
objection may pay fair share equal contribution to agreed upon charity in 
place of union dues. 
ORS 657 .072 allowed exemption from Unemployment Compensation law for 
schools connected with organized church (Cf. Salem Academy) and 
provided tax exemption for minister or member of religious order. 
1981-83. ORS 166.155 and 166.165 created crimes of Intimidation. First 
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degree intimidation is Class C Felony. Second degree intimidation is 
Class A Misdemeanor. Intimidation if person by reason of race, color, 
religion or national origin violates statutes on harassment, assault, etc. 
1985. Statutes aimed at Rajneeshees passed. One prohibits state fmding to 
school districts supporting religious activity. (A serious tool against local 
option and standing problems). A second, aimed at Rajneeshpuram's summer 
festivals, gives counties the authority to regulate outdoor mass gatherings. 
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(f) LAW REVIEW ARTICLES ON RELIGION 
Oregon has three law schools: the University of Oregon at Eugene, 
Willamette Law School in Salem, and Lewis and Clark College/Northwestern 
School of Law in Portland. The latter's jolll"nal deals with environmental law. 
Oregon Law Review began only in 1921. Willamette Law Review began in 
1966. The only other state law jolll"nal has been the Oregon State Bar 
Journal, published since 1940, a work of highly irregular content and quality 
over the years. 
16 Oregon Law Review (1936). One article for, and one against, tort 
immunity for churches. Three cases based on trust fund theory 
discussed. 
18 Oregon Law Review (1938). "Religious Liberty and the Schools". 
Review of nag salute cases. A note that Bible reading may violate the 
state constitution (at 125). 
21 Oregon Law Review (1941)76. Article on distribution of religious 
literatlll"e by Jehovah's Witnesses. 
27 Oregon Law Review (1947) 150. Note on Everson. Cites trend to public 
support of religion in education. Decision said to tlll"n usually on State 
Constitutional provisions. Footnote 2 says Oregon Law allows transport 
to parochial schools. 
28 Oregon Law Review (1948). Review of Separation of Church and State in 
the U.S. 1948 Book by Alvin Johnson and Frank Yost. Pro-separation 
review, with survey of history and court decisions. 
31 Oregon Law Review (1951)78. Article discussing and opposing charitable 
tort immunity. 
33 Oregon Law Review (1953)242. Book Review: Opposes charitable tort 
immunity. 
38 Oregon Law Review (1958)350. 1955 case left to legislature (not the 
court) question of whether to end charitable tort immunity. 
40 Oregon Law Review (1961)274. On validity of released time statute. 
43 Oregon Law Review (1965)177. On validity of unemployment 
compensation statutes compelling work on Sabbath. Note on free 
exercise and discussion of U.S. Supreme Court case of Sherbert v Varner, 
7th Day Adventist case. 
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56 Oregon Law Review (Winter 1982) 1. Helen Mazur-Hart. Note on Racial 
and religious intimidation law passed in Oregon in 1981 session (making 
violations Class C felonies and Class A misdemeanors). 
20 Willamette Law Review (Winter 1984) 1. Note on Larkin v Grendel's Den, 
U.S. Supreme Court case prohibiting delegation of state power to church 
to veto tavern location. 
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(g) INTERVIEWS/SPEECHES 
Goodwin, Judge Alfred T. 9th Circuit Cot.rt of Appeals and former Oregon 
Supreme Court Justice, Member of Constitutional Revision Commission. Speech 
to ACLU at 1984 Annual McNaughton Awards Dinner. 
Greek, Adrian, Director of Positive Action Center, Portland cult awareness and 
monitoring center. Professor of Psychology at Reed College. J\.Ule 1985. 
Hinkle, Charles. ACLU Lawyer, Congregational Minister, expert on First 
Amendment and law and religion. Speech at Oregon State Bar Program on 
Oregon Constitutional Law. February 1985. 
Linde, Justice Hans. Oregon Supreme Cot.rt Justice, Member of Constitutional 
Revision Commission, noted scholar on development of law under State 
Constitutions. Speech at Reed College on Oregon Constitution. November 
1984. 
McKibbin, Margaret. Social worker and interpreter for Old Russian Community 
in Marion Col.Dlty, Oregon. Lives in Gervais, Oregon, one of Old Russian 
Believer centers. 
Remington, Stevie. Executive Director of ACLU of Oregon since 1973. 
Numerous discussions, 1978-85. 
Saalfeld, Father Lawrence. catholic priest, author of Forces of Prejudice in 
Oregon, and participant in Fisher case. Phone and personal interviews. 1984-
85. 
Schoenberg, Father Wilfrid, S.J. Jesuit historian of Northwest Province and 
author of books on religious history of the Northwest. Personal and phone 
interviews. 1985. 
Silverman, Carol. University of Oregon Folklore Department. Prepared film 
on Russian Old Believers for Oregon Committee on the Humanities (with 
Margaret Hixon and Margaret McKibbin). Interview, July 1985. 
Ttrner, Thomas. Oregon State Scholarship Commission. Provided be.ckgrol.Dld 
and materials on PESIC case with history of statute, funding, and case. 
Interview, March, 1985. 
Other Interviews: The author has participated in, reviewed, interviewed 
clients or lawyers in a number of recent cases, e.g. Kristofferson, Khalsa, 
Cooper, Kay, etc., and as part of ACLU Lawyers Committee for State of 
Oregon since 1978 has reviewed most cases that have come up for 
consideration. 
